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3It matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.
 (Donna Haraway,  2016)
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5Abstract
How are global discourses on climate change negotiated in national policy contexts, 
and how do they materialise ‘on the ground’, shaping adaptation at a local level? This 
is the overarching question that this dissertation addresses, as it traces the evolution 
of climate policy in Malawi since the establishment of an international framework for 
climate-resilient development in the late 1990s. Drawing on a theoretical framework 
that combines approaches from Science and Technology, Postcolonial, and Feminist 
Science Studies, this work spans across international, national and local spaces 
of knowledge and policy production, revealing the material and often unintended 
consequences of global scientific constructions of climate change. Fieldwork in 
Malawi, including interviews with policymakers in Lilongwe and climate-affected 
communities in Kasache, has revealed tensions at various stages and scales, examined 
here through a multi-sited ethnographic approach that situates local weather and 
climate practices in the lineage of colonial and postcolonial narratives and relations. 
The findings indicate that the discourse on climate change is a mobile, power-laden 
and socio-cultural practice transversally connecting spatial (international, national, 
local), historical (colonialism, neoliberalism) and epistemological (élite/subaltern, 
gender) localities. The exclusion of locally produced knowledge and meanings (by 
decision makers, farmers, women and elders) from national mainstream adaptation 
programmes obscures how vulnerability is locally produced, foreclosing opportunities 
for context-relevant decision-making. While formally increasing women’s participation 
in local decisional structures, gender and climate change interventions disregard the 
presence of biophysical and socio-economic factors, including ‘global’ essentialising 
narratives, which can exacerbate unequal power relations. At the same time, women in 
Kasache have engaged in collective responses outside international frames of gender 
empowerment through informal networks that build on historical matrilineal solidarity 
and democratic participatory practices. Several ‘policy recommendations’ on how to 
decolonise and democratise climate adaptation interventions can be drawn from the 
findings of this work. In a nutshell, interventions should be based on the identification 
6of underlying causes of vulnerability and adaptation strategies across societal groups 
(rather than on homogenous conceptualisations of climate risk exposure) and should 
acknowledge and address the forms of marginalisation and human agency produced by 
the discourse of climate-resilient development.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Encountering climate change in Malawi
In the late summer of 2011, I was living and working in Lilongwe, the capital city of 
Malawi. A year and a half earlier, immediately after graduating in Social and Economic 
Studies for International Cooperation and Development from the University of Rome 
(Italy), I had been selected for a year-long internship as a Programme Analyst for Climate 
Change with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Malawi.
My assignment was to assist the Government of Malawi (GoM) with devising an 
evidence-based strategic framework for a national policy response to climate change. 
Recent analyses (Text box 1) show that Malawi is particularly prone to climate 
hazards – whether anthropogenic or due to natural variability. Like many other 
contexts in sub-Saharan Africa whose economies are based on natural resources, 
Malawi faces a disproportionate share of climate change impacts, with especially 
direct consequences on water, food and health. A new knowledge management system 
(MDPC 2010), mainly sponsored by donor-driven programmes, was expected to fill 
critical information gaps in national adaptation and mitigation policy planning.
Most of the government officers I interviewed for my research were convinced that a 
successful response to climate change was intrinsically linked to spatially and temporally 
refined climate data and information (Chapter 5). They perceived climate change as a 
linear management issue requiring technologies and capacities that were easily accessible 
through multilateral development programmes. Their assumption was that climate 
information would effectively support public policy, providing a means of improving 
people’s lives in the face of a changing climate. Likewise, many of the framing concepts 
I was introduced to in my workplace (project management techniques, stakeholder-based 
participatory approaches, etc.) seemed to be tailored to a measurable, homogeneous, 
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social and environmental reality in which development planning was expected to produce 
positive results.
My practical experience in the ‘field’ proved otherwise, as what I encountered was a 
rather elusive, messy, and often conflicting landscape. The socio-cultural complexities of 
climate-affected communities were at odds with the linearity of national climate-resilient 
development strategies.
When I participated in field missions to the most ‘disaster-prone’ areas of Malawi, it 
became clear  that local narratives were quite nuanced and multifaceted, and sometimes 
in contrast with those of government officials. In April 2011, for example, I attended a 
post-flood assessment in the area of Karonga, in northern Malawi. During consultations, 
district government officials kept emphasising the need for weather forecasts as a panacea 
for local disaster preparedness. Conversely, spokespeople from resident communities 
were concerned about selective vulnerabilities to seasonal or sub-seasonal climate 
variability. In their eyes, access to health and sanitation, awareness and education, as 
well as women’s and children’s protection were not adequately addressed by national 
and district disaster management responses. Thus, while national and subnational 
decision makers conceptualised climate change mainly as a biophysical adjustment to 
be addressed through technology or capacity transfer, local communities talked about it 
in terms of public service delivery. A variety of understandings associated with climate 
change started emerging.
In my role as a research student, I encountered several additional ways of signifying 
and experiencing climate change at the local level. During interviews in the village of 
Kasache (Chapter 6 and 7), a group of elders described their experience of climate change: 
“We obviously see a change…We think that God is the main cause, and that God has 
decided it” (FGD, 8 August 2012). Unlike government officers in Lilongwe and the affected 
communities in Karonga, the elders were not worried about the lack of climate scenarios 
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Text box 1 – Malawi: a socio-economic outlook
Malawi: a socio-economic outlook 
Malawi is a small land-locked country bordered by Tanzania to the north, Zambia to 
the west and Mozambique to the east and south. The country’s topography is highly 
varied: the Great Rift Valley runs north to south through the country, containing Lake 
Malawi. The country’s climate is tropical, but the influence of its high elevation means 
that temperatures are relatively cool (Mc Sweeney et al. 2008). The semi-arid or dry areas 
total nearly 3 million hectares; droughts are common (Stringer et al. 2010).
From a socio-economic perspective, Malawi is one of the 49 Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs); it is one of the poorest countries in the world and has one of the lowest per 
capita incomes. Its population is approximately 17.5 million, the majority of which is 
dependent on rural farming (Brown 2011; World Bank 2014; NSO 2018). The country 
is characterised by an extremely low-yielding smallholder agriculture, maize as a staple 
crop and tobacco as an export crop (Bryceson 2006; Drimie et al. 2011). Local food 
production, imports and aid are the main food sources. Overall, the level of economic 
activity in the rural areas is quite limited due to the risks associated with the lack of 
diversification, infrastructure and communication, which make Malawi particularly 
vulnerable to natural shocks (Dorward and Kydd 2004; Drimie et al. 2011).
Both the country’s economy and the livelihoods of its citizens are almost entirely 
dependent on agriculture, which employs 80 percent of the workforce (Stringer et al. 
2010; Brown 2011). The Government of Malawi recognises that heavy dependence on 
rain-fed agricultural activities makes Malawi highly vulnerable to climatic variability and 
extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, which, over the past two decades, 
have increased in frequency, intensity, and magnitude (GoM 2006; Stringer et al. 2010). 
Projected climate change scenarios from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (2014) on 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerabilities (Working Group II) suggest that Malawi is likely 
to experience higher temperatures and greater rainfall variability than other countries in 
the sub-Saharan Africa region (Stringer et al. 2010; Brown 2011; IPCCa 2014). 
Increased droughts and floods may exacerbate poverty levels (Phiri and Saka Alex 2005). 
GDP losses of almost 1 percent every year are expected, with much higher economic 
losses in the event of extreme droughts. Shorter rainy seasons will potentially lead to more 
frequent failures in maize cultivation, which in turn will have significant implications for 
food security (World Bank 2014). Accordingly, the majority of the population will be 
particularly vulnerable to climate change, especially due to resulting impacts on food 
security, water availability and health (e.g. outbreaks of malaria, cholera and malnutrition).
Chapter 5 will outline key climate change policy actions in Malawi (at both international 
and national level), while Chapters 6 and 7 will describe how local communities, and 
more specifically farmers (women and men), perceive and have historically dealt with 
climate variability and change.
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or the weakness of humanitarian and disaster policy responses. What they worried about 
was God’s willingness to determine climatic changes. The profound interrelation and 
complementarity between human beings, nature and gods was evident in their words, which 
also pointed to locally embedded cultures and worldviews related to climate. Furthermore, 
women in Kasache described feeling excluded from gender mainstreaming approaches 
to climate change. The desire to have their views and concerns heard led them to seek 
solutions outside the boundaries of official development assistance (Chapter 4). From that 
perspective, climate change emerged as connected to processes and structures through 
which political and socio-economic power is exerted at community level.
As I delved deeper – as a professional and researcher – into the realities of Malawi, I 
realised that the narratives on climate change adaptation are permeated with ambivalence 
and contrasting perceptions across different or apparently homogenous (e.g. women) 
societal groups. Conflicting and synergetic meanings are produced not only at the interface 
between national and local epistemologies – different spatialities – but also within similar 
segments of a community. It appears that the discourse of climate change went through 
numerous modifications when travelling across different sites – produced by those directly 
affected by climate variability and change and influenced by international development 
interventions. As my research shows, these multiple, mutually transforming and often 
contrasting narratives are spatially and temporally connected and at times dissolve, re-
appearing under different forms. 
From documenting differential vulnerabilities in the rural fields to facing institutional 
authority-knowledge legitimisation processes, my research project in Malawi was 
shaped by the tensions between development practices and climate change narratives. 
My positionality in-between academia and development provided a unique opportunity 
for a critical reflection on climate change adaptation, which, beyond measurable policy 
outcomes, emerged as a living, messy and moving element within broader and multilayered 
socio-political contexts.
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1.1.1 Climate reductionism: tensions and negotiations 
In Malawi, I directly experienced some of the critical issues that animate contemporary 
academic debate on climate change. During a training event organised by UN agencies 
for national and local  (governmental and non-governmental) political actors from Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs)1, some criticism came from the audience regarding the 
shortcomings in national stakeholder inclusion and participation, to which a UNFCCC 
National Focal Point responded using the argument of a lack of technical and scientific 
knowledge. In his view, technical and scientific capacities legitimate authority and 
the ‘right to speak’ in climate public policy processes (Chapter 3). Tensions and 
fragmentation were also evident in national mandates on climate change in Malawi 
(Kosamu 2013; Chapter 5), mostly resulting from unclear responsibilities between the 
environment and planning ministries. Management and coordination of climate policy 
issues across sectoral and government tiers were affected by siloed or hierarchical 
views of climate change knowledge. This may particularly hinder the applicability of 
natural and/or social sciences to public policy domains, as well as the identification and 
inclusion of relevant stakeholders in national or sectoral policy processes (Turnpenny 
et al. 2008; Berman et al. 2012).
Climate change narratives endorsed by international scientific and policy institutions 
(e.g. the IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; or the UNFCCC, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) largely build on a ‘one climate, 
one science, one policy’ approach, also defined as climate reductionism (Hulme 2011), 
characterised by the supremacy of predictive natural sciences over historical and social 
accounts of natural and social environments (Hulme 2011; Sarewitz 2011; Weisser et al. 
2014; Eriksen et al. 2015; Hulme 2015). 
Climate reductionism is underpinned by a host of assumptions on the relation between 
humanity and nature as well as by hierarchical conceptualisations of space and time 
1 The specific location of the event is not disclosed here to protect the identity and opinions of the participants.
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(Chapter 3). By postulating the existence of a unique and homogenous climate change 
phenomenon, which human ability is inherently expected to predict and master, they 
can hinder the solution of the Earth’s climate crisis (Weisser et al. 2014; Eriksen et 
al. 2015; Hulme 2015). The approach I have here labelled ‘climate reductionism’ has 
several conceptual limitations due to its inability to: i) capture the tangle of different 
perceptions and knowledges (epistemologies) of climate change across spatial and 
temporal scales; ii) identify the existence of multiple ways (ontologies) in which 
climate change becomes significant to people. Most importantly, it fails to recognise 
that conflicts around meanings are linked to – and can hide – divergences of views on 
how climate change is experienced through historically stratified relations of power 
(Blaser 2014; Popke 2016; Goldman et al. 2016).
Disjunctions between policy processes, generally attributed to a lack or mismanagement 
of information, knowledge or skills, may also be related to discrepancies between what 
individuals know about climate change and how they act on the basis of crystallised 
cultural, political, social and economic structures and relations (Popke 2016; Goldman 
et al. 2016). Even the adaptation challenges I faced in my work and research in Malawi 
(perceived limited national adaptive capacity, pitfalls in disaster risk management, 
gender marginalisation) could be ascribed not only to issues of project, knowledge or 
stakeholders management, but also to a disconnect between meanings and practices in 
the public policy domain (among climate scientists, international development workers, 
policymakers, farmers, women, elders). For example, the fact that women in Kasache 
do not benefit from climate-resilient development projects is the result not only of a 
lack of formal participation (through gender balancing) but also of their substantial 
exclusion from community decision-making mechanisms, on which the implementation 
and legitimisation of international projects rely (Chapter 7).
Discourses mirroring climate reductionism have recently spread across the international 
development apparatus grounded in the post-World War II modernisation paradigm. 
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Climate-resilient development, which calls for the use of climate science and 
information in adaptation decision-making, has recently emerged as a ‘new’ dominant 
theme (Escobar 1995; Weisser 2014), with far-reaching consequences on the design 
and implementation of climate change projects at the local level (Eriksen 2015). In 
Malawi, for example, national to local adaptation interventions have been tied to the 
availability of scientific evidence and technical capacity (key words in the opening 
statements of many government documents on climate change) and mainly conceived 
as politically neutral responses to actual or expected biophysical changes. Several 
critical geographers recently argued that addressing climate change exclusively through 
scientific and technical inputs can lead to neglecting the underlying conditions of 
vulnerability, possibly aggravating marginalisation and oppression at the local level 
(Kelman 2014; Naess et al. 2015; Petheram et al. 2015). 
There are key questions yet to be answered, such as: how does the diversity of 
understandings of climate change I encountered in Malawi relate to this form of 
orthodoxy, or climate reductionism? 
1.1.2 Climate change as a travelling discourse
The state-of-the-art research in climate adaptation seems to reflect the limits of climate 
reductionism, having bypassed the wealth of analytical lessons offered by critical social 
science on the interaction between science, knowledge and policy in environment and 
society issues. The more recent works have mainly focused on the scientific or policy 
global dimensions of climate change, or on its local-functionalist elements (e.g. how to 
technically strengthen adaptive capacity in community x) (Anderson 2006). Empirical 
contributions and theoretical framings focusing on climate change as a socio-political 
process that moves across sites and is appropriated and re-signified by a multitude of 
actors in different locations are hardly incorporated into mainstreaming discourses 
(Eriksen et al. 2015).
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In the past decades, several Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have 
analysed the process by which climate change knowledge is produced within mutually 
legitimising scientific and policy bodies (e.g. UNFCCC, IPCC), discussing the role 
and relevance of authoritative climate science in international policy decisions. Fewer 
have been the reflections about the impacts of global discourses at the national and 
local levels or the analyses of how climate change is understood and practised in the 
‘interstitial’ spaces (neither exclusively global nor local). According to some, the 
academic and political reluctance to approach climate change in its negotiated – and 
contested – nature is mainly due to a lack of conceptual and methodological frameworks 
for the identification of socio-political and cultural traits in science-policy interactions 
(Weisser et al. 2014; Eriksen et al. 2015; Hulme 2015). My work will reveal the 
inadequacy of many concepts underlying the dominant climate change epistemology 
with a view to highlighting individual and collective understandings and experiences of 
climate change at multiple scales. 
The narratives I collected in Malawi speak for a variety of worldviews, beliefs and 
practices on climate change, which are transformed, included or excluded when 
encountering the ‘all-encompassing’ climate change epistemology through international 
or national policy processes (Blaser 2014). Drawing on Blaser’s (2014) definition of 
stories as narratives that embody certain ideas about world dynamics and complement 
the official ‘hi-story’ of the encounter with European colonialism,2 I will explore 
local stories as products of social, cultural and political forces. My aim is to account 
for forms of hybridity that run parallel to unifying and universalising approaches to 
climate change (Bhabha 1994; Latour 2004). The narratives I collected in Lilongwe and 
2 The terms colonialism and postcolonialism are frequently employed with reference to European colonialism, 
although colonialism as the conquest and control of other people’s lands and goods has been a recurrent and 
widespread feature of human history (Loomba 2005). This association refers to the historical fact that European 
colonialism was the most extensive among the different kinds of colonial contact in human history. By the 1930s, 
European colonies and former colonies covered up to 84.6% of the land surface of the globe (Loomba 2005). In this 
work, I will often use the term colonialism to indicate European and British colonial and postcolonial experiences, 
especially in the context of Malawi.
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Kasache, backed by anthropological and historical analyses, will reveal how knowledges 
and experiences of climate change cannot be disjoined from the historical, socio-cultural 
and political processes that brought them into existence. They can counter and at the 
same time enrich the dominant view of climate change, shedding light on the underlying 
different but interconnected power relations.
1.2 Dismantling orthodoxies
Drawing on the wealth of Science and Technology Studies, as well as Postcolonial and 
Feminist Science Studies scholarship, this work will challenge several orthodoxies 
characterising global climate change discourse, such as: the presumed objectivity and 
neutrality of climate science; the idea that an increased amount of climate data and 
information can lead to more effective policy decisions, and the assumption that improved 
knowledge integration (e.g. North-South) guarantees more equitable and inclusive 
outcomes (O’Reilly 2011; Hulme 2017).
The climate-resilient development paradigm discussed in Chapter 4 was conceived as 
a neutral and a-political solution to improving people’s lives in the face of a changing 
climate through science- and knowledge-based adaptation policies. However, several 
STS scholars argue that the international policy regime has so far only produced ‘policy-
based science’ rather than an ‘evidence-based policy’ (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; 
Nowotny 2003; Haas 2004; Demeritt 2006; Dilling and Lemos 2011), silently embedding 
and reproducing unbalanced (global to local) power relations and undermining national 
climate change policy and equality goals.
My work looks at the underlying rationalities and worldviews embedded in that knowledge 
as statements and relations of power (O’Reilly 2011), which need to be acknowledged 
and disentangled from socio-cultural or economic stakes if equitable results are to be 
attained by climate-resilient development initiatives (Kelman 2014; Naess et al. 2015; 
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Petheram et al. 2015). My reflections will provide analytical and methodological 
recommendations for those working at the interface between climate change science 
and policy, such as policymakers, climate scientists and technical specialists. This 
audience, perceived as the source of neutral and disinterested advice (Martin and 
Richards 1995; Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001), is often invested with the task of 
designing and implementing public policy interventions. Yet, globally ‘legitimised’ 
climate change discourses anchor these actors to a series of concepts and practices 
(e.g. participatory development, gender mainstreaming, knowledges integration) 
grounded in co-constituting Western-based3 dualisms (nature-culture, science-policy, 
masculine-feminine, public-private). Hence the necessity to dismantle the orthodoxies 
that, as shown by the case of Malawi, fuel disjunctions between multi-level knowledge 
and policy processes, generating marginalisation among societal groups.
 
By clarifying how climate change knowledge is related to social categories, cultural 
norms and economic structures, I will point to several knowledge assumptions that 
reinforce specific identities or practices, reproducing or challenging oppressing relations 
of power. The findings will raise awareness of the intersecting (power-laden) processes 
on which climate science-policy actors are asked to advise or decide (Chapter 8).
1.3 The thesis approach 
1.3.1 Research questions
This work examines the discourse surrounding climate change, from global scientific 
and development institutions (Chapters 3 and 4) to localised and context-specific 
communities (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). By tracing different discourses across multiple 
research sites, I will identify a variety of knowledges that blend, conflict or negotiate 
3  I will often use the word ‘Western’ to refer to the tradition of thought deriving from European positivism (Chapter 3). 
Despite its unavoidable use, I recognise that the term can essentialise a cultural tradition that is as various, multifold, 
historically and context-driven as any other (Ingold 2010). For this reason, I will clarify each time the specific object 
of my criticism towards Western thinking (e.g. humanity-nature or mental-material dichotomies). Furthermore, my 
theoretical approach, grounded in STS, postcolonial and feminist studies of science, will help me overcome the 
binary thinking (‘West/non-West’) deriving from a socio-constructivist approach (Chapters 3 and 4).
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with climate reductionism. This can potentially enrich prevailing climate change 
epistemologies, promoting context-relevant narratives that may contribute to unsettling 
the underlying conditions of climate change vulnerability at the local level.
Key to my research work are the following guiding questions:
1. How does knowledge and policy production on climate change in Malawi 
interact with dominant discourses emanating from international scientific and 
policy frameworks for climate-resilient development?
2. How do interventions inspired by the climate-resilient development paradigm 
relate to temporally situated (colonial and postcolonial) and cultural framings 
on weather and climate in Kasache?
3. How are individual and collective vulnerability, adaptation and agency in 
Kasache enabled, limited or otherwise affected by international policy discourses 
on gender and community empowerment?
My positionality in several international development agencies (first in Malawi, and 
later in Geneva at the UN European headquarters) has contributed an important added 
value to my research, allowing me to connect the local dimensions of climate change 
with global science, policy and development issues. Numerous STS empirical studies 
have explored the process of science-policy co-production in single specific locations, 
especially in industrialised countries,4 focusing, for example, on how scientific 
laboratories work or on the public perception of science (Marcus 1995; Hackett et al. 
2008). Much rarer are observations of the science-policy relationship in multi-sited 
social and cultural spaces where the political significance of science is investigated 
from the perspective of international, national and local political actors (Gupta and 
4 I will use the ‘North/South’ terminology developed in the context of the United Nations Conference on 
Environmental issues (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and adopted in literature to mark the distinction between industrialised 
and non-industrialised societies as well as the geographical division between the northern hemisphere’s temperate 
and colder eco-climatic zones and the southern tropical and sub-tropical zones. However, while the category North/
South replaces politically rejected classifications (First/Third World, West/Orient, and Developed/Underdeveloped), 
it does not account for the variety of social, cultural, and economic contexts, thus replicating the problematic binary 
of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Escobar 1995; Karlsson et al. 2007; Harding 2008; Chapters 3 and 4). 
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Ferguson 1997; Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001; Marcus 2002). My positionality has 
helped dismantle the boundedness of locality to pursue a hybrid (Bhabha 1994) and 
multi-sited perspective (Marcus 2002; Chapter 2). Multi-sited work has allowed 
mapping climate change as a travelling discourse, as well as embracing a broad, 
confuse, messy and apparently incompatible set of connections and relationships in the 
narratives of local communities, national decision makers and global organisations.
1.3.2 Methodological map
While my work emphasises actors’ interests, perspectives and interactions to explain 
the role of science in the policy domain, it situates these processes in a multilayered 
social and cultural space. Therefore, I drew on multiple, complementing streams 
of research in Science and Technology Studies. The map below (Fig. 1) identifies 
the STS streams contributing to my work and facilitates the understanding of my 
methodological approach. The map is a heuristic tool that represents each stream’s 
contribution, historically and theoretically, to generating new sets of concepts, such 
as multi-sited ethnography or hybridity (see Chapter 2 for further details on my 
methodological approach).

















Chapter 1 - Introduction 29
1.3.3 Multi-scalar interactions
My work discusses how specific conceptualisations of climate change (global, science-
based, development-linked, etc.) influence the definition and engagement of research 
actors (Fig. 2) in discourses and practices of climate change, generating alternative 
sets of ideas and experiences. Three groups of actors are involved in my analysis:
1. International scientific and development organisations, such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and various United 
Nations bodies that have historically defined the global scientific and policy 
terms of the climate change debate (Chapters 3 and 4). In the context of Kasache 
(Chapters 6 and 7), I also explore the role of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) as the main implementers of internationally funded projects;
2. Government constituencies – specifically in the context of Malawi (Kosamu 
2013) – recognised as the main players influencing the formulation of climate 
change-related policies at the national level (Gupta et al. 2007; Chapter 5); 
3. Local communities (Malawi), described as those mostly experiencing the 
localised effects of climate change (Gupta et al. 2007; Chapters 6 and 7).
My work will initially deploy a three-level or hierarchical scalar model (Fig. 2) derived 
from Gupta et al. (2007) to simplify the identification of key climate science-policy 
actors. Until recently, climate change was analysed through physical hierarchical scales 
as a global, national and local issue (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Gupta et al. 2007) or 
through the polarised extremes of ‘global’ and ‘local’ (Herod 2010; Birkenholtz 2011). 
My analysis will go beyond these spatial and conceptual hierarchies, problematising 
the ontological nature of the scale itself (Fig. 3).
In each chapter, rather than simply shifting (vertically) from one scale to another, I 
will reflect on the overlapping and multi-sited science-policy interactions, exploring 
the material and discursive interplay between different localities (Fig. 3). I will argue, 
for example, that local actors embed themselves globally and/or locally with specific 
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purposes (e.g. local civil protection committees build dialogue with international 
NGOs using global narratives), generating hybrid meanings and practices and breaking 
down the polarised or binary classifications of global climate change discourses.
1.3.4 The thesis at a glance
Chapter 2 discusses contradictions (and opportunities) between my fieldwork location 
and my positionality as a development worker with an international agency in Malawi, 
as well as the methodological foundations of my thesis. This chapter makes the case 
for a multi-sited ethnographic approach, which allows understanding how large-
scale narratives are embedded into concrete and localised life-worlds (Marcus 2002). 
Chapter 3 discusses the wide-ranging STS literature upon which this research is 
based, introducing the theoretical and methodological tools that allow identifying the 
genealogy, co-production and institutionalisation of a reductionist conceptualisation 
of climate change. Chapter 4 will further explore how global discourses on climate 
change came to be interwoven with development theory and praxis, trickling down 
to national contexts through practices of development support. This chapter will 
specifically introduce the climate-resilient development paradigm, discussing the 
conceptual shift from ‘science-based’ to ‘development-centred’ approaches to climate 
change, conceived by the international community as a means for safeguarding 
economic and human development from climate impacts. This evolution has introduced 
a number of development narratives (e.g. capacity building, gender mainstreaming) 
in global discourses on climate change, which may disregard or exacerbate the causes 
of vulnerability. Chapter 5 brings us closer to the case of Malawi, exploring how 
decision makers have internalised, used and reproduced climate science discourses in 
their country context. This chapter includes a critique of the ethnocentric character 
of colonial and neoliberal development interventions in Malawi. Chapter 6 focuses 
on climate-affected communities, exploring how climate change vulnerability is 
generated from within specific socio-political and historical contexts and making the 
case for regarding vulnerability as a local and contextualised phenomenon. Further, 
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Chapter 7 unpacks the dynamics of women’s participation and exclusion in the village 
of Kasache, exploring how climate-resilient development interventions, aimed at 
addressing the negative impacts of climate change on women, have led to unintended 
consequences, exacerbating gendered relations and selective vulnerabilities within the 
community. Chapter 8 will offer some final reflections, focusing on the interaction 
between epistemological and ontological scales and highlighting several key emerging 
features of multi-sited narratives on climate change.
This research work will start as a voyage, moving from one place to another. Knowledge 
about climate change will emerge from this journey as varied and messy, inspiring and 
binding as the places, ideas, people and experiences through which it becomes ‘real’. 




In Chapter 1, I outlined how my research experience started almost two years after the 
beginning of my assignment at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in Lilongwe. Whilst conducting my PhD research as a part-time and self-funded 
student, I faced several financial and time constraints. Most notably, my full-time 
job prevented me from spending extended periods in close contact with informants. 
My life history and personal biography created structural research ‘dilemmas’ (Sherif 
2001; Venkateswar 2001; Robert and Sanders 2005) and affected my possibilities 
within the ethnography, influencing the data collection process before (finding time and 
resources), during (multiple identities, see section 2.3.1) and after the fieldwork, since 
I have not had the opportunity to return to Malawi to discuss and share my research 
findings (section 2.5). In particular, I could not undertake the ‘standard’ ethnographic 
research experience, characterised by long periods in the field with local communities, 
participatory observation, and the construction of close relations with informants 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Springwood and King 2001; Venkateswar 2001; Roberts 
and Sanders 2005; Simpson 2011). 
The three-year life experience in Malawi, however, allowed me to get acquainted with 
many life situations. Although not in a structured way, I gathered a rich understanding 
of the country and culture. My idea of Malawi was initially influenced by standard 
prejudices that define cultures through all-encompassing categories such as ethnicity or 
nationality and do not take into account gender or socially differentiated subcultures. 
My daily interactions with people challenged my initial beliefs. For example, I expected 
that poverty would be especially concentrated in ‘rural’ areas – an understanding of 
social relations that reflected post-World War II economic development theories, which 
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assume countries whose national economy mainly relies on agricultural production as cut 
off from world markets (Escobar 1995). However, when I arrived in Malawi, I learned 
that logistical challenges such as lack of facilities and shortages of water, electricity, fuel 
and medicines, were a daily occurrence also in Lilongwe, the capital city. By observing 
these aspects of daily life, I readjusted many of my pre-constructed ideas. I learned that 
the African reality (homogeneous as it was initially in my mind) is much more layered 
and variegated than it is perceived by European imaginaries, and it is not possible to 
talk about one African reality. Similarly, my research suggests that climate change is 
far from being the purely natural event – independent of human actions – which can be 
isolated, dissected and managed by human rationality as envisioned in the international 
framework for negotiating climate policies. Rather, climate change emerged in my 
research as a travelling and hybrid construct that transcends the dualisms of Western 
positivist thinking (global-local; nature-culture), signalling the full entanglement of 
nature and culture (Chapter 8). I later realised that my early perceptions of Malawi were 
influenced by hierarchical categorisations of its geography (rural vs. urban), culture 
(West vs. non-West) and economy (formal vs. informal), which my rather ‘distant’ 
experience (exclusively based on readings and lectures) as a university student first, 
and later as a UN officer, had hitherto failed to dismantle.
My research experience greatly benefitted from my professional activity, which 
allowed me to fully immerse myself in a specific institutional setting, taking advantage 
of easy access to decision makers and climate-exposed communities. The international 
development agency in Lilongwe (UNDP) represented one of my actual fields, a place 
where I could establish close relationships and observe processes from an insider 
perspective (see section 2.2.1 for critical reflections on this concept), capitalising on 
daily ‘experiential learnings’ (Moore 2008). My multi-sited positionality allowed 
me to disengage from an exclusively global or local standpoint to embrace a broader 
set of connections and follow climate change discourses in multiple settings: local 
communities, national decision makers and global narratives. This perspective will 
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particularly enrich the understanding of climate change as reconfigured in the public 
policy context of Malawi, which, as I will explore in Chapter 4, has been heavily linked 
to the ideal of development as modernisation and to hierarchical categorisations of 
geographical, cultural and socio-economic spaces.
The construction of my identity as a research student went hand in hand with my experience 
of living and working in Malawi. The ultimate goal of my research was to critique the 
deep-seated beliefs about climate change that I encountered in my professional experience. 
In Chapter 1, for example, I described how national to local adaptation interventions in 
Malawi have been linked to the availability of scientific evidence and technical capacities, 
overlooking the causality between historical socio-political and cultural processes and 
the underlying vulnerability to climate change of specific groups. My research was thus 
shaped by critical feminist methodologies that propose using research as a means of 
constructive critique of society and suggest forms of direct and personal engagement 
of researchers in research sites such as private or public organisations (Harding 1998; 
Forsythe 1999; Hackett et al. 2008). In this chapter, I will discuss how this represented 
both an opportunity and a challenge for my work, influencing my research both at a 
theoretical level (through critical approaches to development and climate change science 
and policy) and from a more practical perspective, such as in the selection of methods for 
exploring climate change discourses in multiple contexts.
2.2 Multi-sited ethnography
According to Gupta and Ferguson (1997) and Fischer (1999), conventional single-site 
ethnography, by intensively focusing ethnographic observation and participation on 
the confined spaces of fieldwork, is inadequate to understand the challenges of the 
interconnected contemporary world. The traditional ethnographic focus on small-scale 
‘subjects’ and societies, conceived in a holistic/universalistic manner as ahistorical and 
spatially bounded, should therefore be problematised. The idea of single-site fieldwork 
has been recently revised through the concept of multi-sited ethnography, which can be 
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deployed to study spatially dispersed phenomena that occur simultaneously in different 
locations and are apparently unconnected (Marcus 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; 
Fischer 1999; Crate 2011).
My decision to use multi-sited ethnographies (Fischer 1999; Marcus 2002) was prompted 
both by my need to conduct fieldwork in a non-traditional way and by the struggle to map 
climate change as a travelling discourse across global and local contexts through classic 
modes of contextualisation (single-site ethnography). Multi-sited work particularly 
helped me to link research sites that are spatially and epistemologically disconnected 
(Marcus 2002). For instance, my ethnographic position in an international development 
context, rather than being restricted to a specific territoriality, was expanded to include 
an array of scales and locations, allowing me to follow the imaginary thread of climate 
change from localised communities to broader global narratives.
Multi-sited ethnography served the purposes of my research work from both a theoretical 
and an empirical perspective. Conceptually, it allowed me to link socio-cultural 
narratives in local communities to top-down, global and quantitative-based approaches 
to climate change. Methodologically, it helped me to represent and connect my various, 
mobile and overlapping identities within several localities: a climate change analyst in a 
multilateral organisation, a research student in a climate-exposed community, a Western 
development officer among Malawian decision makers. This methodology helped me 
to better articulate and somehow fix some of the asymmetries between my object of 
study, fieldwork, and written production that are less commonly found in traditional 
monodisciplinary ethnographic works (Marcus 2002).
The main challenge has been to conduct a multi-sited ethnography starting from a 
specific cultural context and moving towards a transnational dimension: the international 
development domain has indeed been traditionally exempted from ethnographic fieldwork 
because of the difficulties in observing and mapping transnational networks (Marcus 
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2002). Multi-sited ethnography, based as it is on paths, threads (often transnational) or 
juxtapositions of locations in which the researcher defines its object of study, can help 
trace cultural formations by following the links and connections suggested by multiple 
sites, thus downplaying the power of single-sited fieldwork (Marcus 1995). The primacy 
of participant observation is also reduced in multi-sited ethnography by the need to 
deploy social and cultural reconstruction strategies of multiple paths at different spatial 
and temporal scales (Fischer 1999; Marcus 2002).
Validation of fieldwork is not solely linked to the amount of time spent in a local 
context, but also to the attention devoted to social, cultural and political settings, also 
in their relations to other locations (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). A restricted focus on 
the global connections of locality, for example, contributes to explaining the limited 
ethnographic work done on transnational organisational settings, as well as the inadequate 
consideration paid to international or national political actors as ethnographic subjects 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Marcus 2002). However, since my professional perspective 
was an integral part of the research landscape, reflexivity is critical to my methodology, 
and in the next section I will discuss the challenges and opportunities provided by my 
positionality as fully embedded in the terrain I try to map. 
2.2.1 Ethnographic possibilities within my field
In recent ethnographic debates, there has been so much focus on the right amount of time 
spent trying to get access to interviewees, quantity of recorded material and amount of 
effort dedicated to entering and exiting the research field, that other issues affecting 
the quality of research outcomes were overlooked (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Roberts 
and Sanders 2005). The archetypal idea of field as the domain of “a lone, white, male 
field-worker living for one year or more among native villagers” has not yet been fully 
dismantled (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 12). Gupta and Ferguson (1997) argued how the 
concept of fieldwork is socially, historically and politically constructed and shaped by 
power relationships, availability of funds, as well as personal and gendered experiences. 
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For example, the radical separation of the field from ‘home’ or the hierarchy of field 
sites echo the Western epistemological project that values certain types of knowledges 
to the exclusion of others. 
Fieldwork observation has been relevant in my work, although not central, as it represented 
a starting point for a wider socio-constructive analysis. The collection of narratives from 
decision makers and communities, and a reflection from my standpoint, provided the 
initial material for tracing out the links and comparing apparently distinct discourses. But 
what was the meaning of ‘field’ in my case?
My main positionality as an official from an international development agency determined 
where my research started off and unfolded. By directly supporting the Government of 
Malawi, I had the opportunity to get to know many of the government officials I would 
interview for my case study at a later stage. I decided to focus my research on decision 
makers because I knew that I would enter this group with relative ease through my job, 
overcoming one of the biggest challenges in social research: getting access to élites or 
individuals that hold powerful or privileged positions (Springwood and King 2001; Rice 
2010). Studies on interviewing élites draw attention to the importance of the researcher’s 
institutional affiliation, use of personal connections and possibility of using influential 
sponsors (Rice 2010). These elements played indeed a fundamental role in facilitating my 
research work (see section 2.3.1).
My professional role provided me with critical insights on many embodied practices 
and routines in climate change policy and development institutions: as an insider I could 
take note of processes and daily routines and become a trained observer (Moore 2008). 
Experiences in work/corporate settings can allow researchers to become participants-
observers and make sense of underlying worldviews, assumptions and generalisations 
in organisational settings. Critical ethnography (Springwood and King 2001), militant 
ethnography (Juris 2007) and interpretative interactionism (Moore 2008) particularly 
Chapter 2 - Methodology 39
value this type of ethnographic participation and learning. However, things tend to 
be a bit more complicated. To start with, the position as insider challenges the very 
idea of what makes a field in ethnography (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). For instance, 
if there is an insider, there cannot be a field – at least if the ‘field’ is defined in ways 
that reproduce the self/other binary of positivist thinking (see the concept of external 
great divide, Plumwood 1991; Cohen 1989; Karim 1993; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; 
Springwood and King 2001; Sherif 2001). Sherif (2001) highlighted the challenges that 
half-insiders, researchers with their origins in the field of study, face in fieldwork, such 
as the persistence of a double barrage of prejudices, showing that ‘home’ itself is a site 
of difference and conflict. According to critical ethnographers, it is no longer possible 
to classify the outsider researcher and the ‘native’ as two neat categories, since native 
scholars have been facing ambiguous experiences at home too. Similarly, non-native 
ethnographers have found other categories to build up relationships with informants 
(e.g. through gender consciousness), dismantling the assumption that otherness means 
uncritical difference and ‘home’ corresponds to sameness (Karim 1993; Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997; Venkateswar 2001).
Another tension stems from the fact that presence and observation in the field – regardless 
of how long they last – cannot nativise the researcher and transform him or her into an 
‘objective’ authority (Hanna 2004; Longino 2004) and interpreter of a specific context 
(Karim 1993; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Sherif 2001; Springwood and King 2001; 
Roberts and Sanders 2005; Rice 2010; Simpson 2011). This recalls the critique of the 
positivist ideal of scientific objectivity raised by FSTS that I will discuss in Chapter 3. By 
assuming the existence of an objective and independently existing reality (independent of 
human hopes, fears or expectations), objective empiricism proposes direct observation as a 
‘rational’ method to truly represent reality (Hanna 2004). As highlighted by Blaser (2014), 
echoing critical feminist scholarship on empirical objectivity (Haraway 1988; Longino 
2004), field experience should not aim at acquiring an objective viewpoint through which 
to describe a given reality, as this implies a neat separation between nature and culture/
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mind. Field experience should help the researcher to explore alternative meanings and 
worldviews instead, the spaces (often marked by conflicting meanings or situations, see 
Chapter 6 and 7) of human and individual interaction where discourses, practices and 
power are interrelated, contested, produced and reproduced (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; 
Springwood and King 2001). This is particularly pertinent to my research work, which 
aims to revisit the existing concepts or categories (e.g. climate change as linked to the 
development apparatus, see Chapter 4) that may be inadequate to account for interactions, 
differences and conflicts between climate change epistemologies and ontologies.
While insider research can offer new insights and a deeper understanding, ethnographers 
will always remain partial insiders and their investigative work will be modulated by 
their biographies, gender and personal experiences (Sherif 2001; Venkateswar 2001). 
As my research intertwined with my professional life, my case shows that multiple 
research identities can co-exist, confronting specific challenges (external/internal/half-
insider, Sherif 2001; Wallington et al. 2005; Roberts and Sanders 2005; Lavis 2010). My 
standpoint (Harding 2008), in particular, was between and within different institutions, 
disciplines and ways of knowing and doing things, often characterised by contrasts and 
ambiguity. Although in my research I provide a critique of reductionist approaches to 
climate change, in my daily professional life I am expected to ensure that policy decisions 
are based on sound evidence and best available science, oftentimes experiencing tension 
and anxiety. For instance, during a training event for LDCs, a UNFCCC National Focal 
Point countered criticism from the audience about the limited inclusion and participation 
of national stakeholders with the argument that there is a lack of technical and scientific 
skills (Chapter 1). As a critical geography researcher, I felt quite disappointed by the 
argument and the fact that it was used to silence criticism and requests for inclusion. 
However, as a UN representative I had to silently accept both. In Chapter 8, I will further 
discuss how the contradictory meanings and attitudes I encountered during my fieldwork 
can be used to identify the modus operandi of hegemonic cultural and political projects as 
well as opportunities to foster agency in everyday practices (Renegar and Sowards 2009).
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My uncomfortable perspective – neither solely from an academic domain nor from a 
development sector – is what makes this research work an original contribution to the 
ongoing climate change science-policy and multi-sited ethnography debates. My hybrid 
and engaged participation helped me to appreciate the pluralism of values, interests, 
interpretations, epistemologies and practices in the specific context of Malawi, as 
well as the contrast with the internationally legitimised climate-resilient development 
discourse. In line with the FSTS concept of situated knowledges, my different 
positionalities represent an added value, since they helped me to draw new connections 
between well-known patterns of knowledge, providing a basis for the critical evaluation 
of the assumptions underpinning climate change global discourses. 
Several risks come with an ‘insider’ position in a research context, such as potential biases, 
the perceived lack of academic rigour (from a traditional ethnographic perspective), and 
the prevalence of advocacy roles (Daston 1992). In my case, aspects of my researcher 
ethics and authenticity confronted the impossibility of being sincere and truthful during 
fieldwork (section 2.3.2). In the community of Kasache, for example, I chose not to 
disclose my professional affiliation to an international development organisation to 
minimise the risk of courtesy bias (see section 2.4).
2.3 Practising multi-sited ethnography: from 
methodology to method
Eriksen (2015) and Popke (2016) highlighted how methods to identify climate change 
multi-sited epistemologies and ontologies are still largely unexplored in the field of 
critical human geography. My study deployed a variety of qualitative methods to gather 
data, including interviews and questionnaires with government and non-government 
policy actors (section 2.3.1), focus group discussions with climate-affected communities 
(section 2.3.2) and reviews of academic literature and policy documents (sections 2.3.3 
and 2.3.4). Data on interviewees’ seniority and demographic characteristics (age and 
gender), provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3, has allowed me to critically reflect on gender 
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mainstreaming efforts in international development policy and practice and to apply 
a critical feminist perspective to multi-sited ethnography. The following sections will 
discuss the practical steps I undertook during my fieldwork in Addis Ababa, Lilongwe 
and Kasache, describing the range of methodological approaches used to reach and 
represent each epistemic and ontological locality.
2.3.1 Encountering policymakers 
2.3.1.1 Addis Ababa
In Chapter 5, I will analyse a set of interviews with government officers I conducted 
in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) during a regional training workshop on National Adaptation 
Plans (NAPs) in April 2014. On behalf of my organisation, the United Nations Institute 
for Training and Research (UNITAR), I video-interviewed policymakers from 19 
different African countries (Table 1) to investigate the perceived capacity gaps in relation 
to national adaptation planning. The interviewees were mostly senior representatives 
of the ministries of Environment, Finance, Economy or Planning in their respective 
countries. The gender breakdown in Table 1 points to the unequal access of women 
delegates to international capacity development activities (4 women versus 15 men).
Significantly, the small number of women holding leadership positions in national 
governments may explain their limited participation and representation in international 
climate policy processes (IIED 2016b), as further discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 1 – Research informants consulted in Addis Ababa (2014)








1. Angola Ministry of Environment M Senior Interview
2. Democratic Republic 
of Congo
Ministry of Environment M Senior Interview
3. Ethiopia Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and Forest
F Mid Interview
4. Gambia Department of Water Resources M Senior Interview
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2.3.1.2 Lilongwe
In Chapter 5, I will explore how decision makers perceive the interplay between climate 
change science, knowledge and policy in Malawi. By decision makers I specifically 
refer to those individuals, mainly central government officials, actively engaged 
in international, national or sectoral policy work through their affiliation to specific 
institutions (e.g. the Least Developed Countries Group at the UNFCCC). While 
Chapter 5 focuses on government officials (from Malawi as well as from several other 
African countries; see Tables 1 and 2), I also spoke to representatives of international 








5. Guinea Ministry of Environment M Senior Interview
6. Guinea-Bissau Ministry of Planning M Senior Interview
7. Kenya Ministry of Water, Environment 
and Natural Resources 
M Senior Interview
8. Lesotho Ministry of Energy, Meteorology 
and Water Affairs
F Mid Interview
9. Liberia Ministry of Lands Mines and 
Energy
M Senior Interview
10. Madagascar Ministry of Environment F Mid Interview
11. Malawi Ministry of Environment and 
Climate Change
M Senior Interview
12. Mozambique Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry
M Mid Interview
13. Niger Inter-sectoral Committee on 
Climate Change
M Senior Interview
14. Rwanda Ministry of Natural Resources M Mid Interview
15. Sierra Leone Office of the President M Senior Interview
16. Somalia Ministry of Fisheries, Marine 
Resources and Environment
M Senior Interview
17. Sudan National Council for Strategic 
Planning 
M Senior Interview
18. Uganda National Planning Authority F Senior Interview
19. Zambia Ministry of Lands, Natural 




organisations, consultancy companies, academia and local NGOs, which exemplify the 
different types of organisations working on climate change in Malawi (Kosamu 2013).
Table 2 - Research informants consulted in Lilongwe (2011–2012)









United Nations and International Organisations
1. United Nations Country 
Office
M 40-50 Europe Senior Written interaction
2. United Nations Country 
Office
M 40-50 Africa Senior Interview
3. United Nations Regional 
Office
M 20-30 Africa Junior Written interaction
4. United Nations Regional 
Office
M 40-50 Africa Senior Written interaction
5. United Nations Head 
Quarter
F 30-40 Europe Mid Written interaction
6. United Nations Regional 
Office
M 50-60 Europe Senior Interview
7. United Nations Head 
Quarter
F 20-30 Australia Junior Written interaction
8. United Nations Head 
Quarter
M 40-50 Africa Mid Written interaction
9. World Bank Head 
Quarter
F 30-40 America Mid Interview
Education and learning organisations
10. Academia M 40-50 Africa Senior Written interaction
11. Academia M 40-50 Africa Mid Interview
12. Academia F 30-40 Africa Junior Interview
13. Academia M 40-50 Africa Mid Interview
Non-Governmental Organisations and consultancy companies
14. International NGO M 30-40 Europe Mid Questionnaire
15. International NGO F 50-60 Europe Mid Questionnaire
16. Regional NGO F 30-40 Asia Mid Written interaction
17. Local NGO F 20-30 Africa Junior Written interaction
18. Local NGO F 20-30 Africa Mid Questionnaire
19. International
consultancy firm
M 40-50 Europe Senior Interview
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As for consultations in Malawi, I contacted a total of 49 people between October 2011 
and September 2012, mainly representing government ministries and departments but 
also UN agencies, NGOs and academic institutions, the majority of whom were living 
and working in Lilongwe. The respondents had different levels of experience (from 
junior to senior level), different duties (from technical specialist to programme officer) 
and different kinds of expertise (natural resource management, economic or development 
planning) (see Table 2). Between feedback from interviews, written interactions (e.g. 









Government institutions (Ministries or Departments)
20. Environment M 40-50 Africa Senior Interview
21. Environment M 20-30 Africa Junior Interview
22. Environment F 40-50 Africa Senior Interview
23. Environment M 40-50 Africa Junior Questionnaire
24. Environment F 40-50 Africa Senior Questionnaire
25. Environment M 30-40 Africa Junior Questionnaire
26. Environment F 20-30 Africa Junior Questionnaire
27. Meteorological Services M 50-60 Africa Senior Interview
28. Meteorological Services M 40-50 Africa Senior Interview
29. Meteorological Services F 30-40 Africa Mid Interview
30. Meteorological Services M 30-40 Africa Mid Interview
31. Meteorological Services M 40-50 Africa Senior Questionnaire
32. Meteorological Services M 30-40 Africa Mid Questionnaire
33. Meteorological Services M 30-40 Africa Mid Questionnaire
34. Economic and Planning M 40-50 Africa Senior Questionnaire
35. Economic and Planning M 40-50 Africa Senior Questionnaire
36. Economic and Planning M 30-40 Africa Senior Questionnaire
37. Economic and Planning F 30-40 Africa Mid Questionnaire
38. Education M 20-30 Africa Junior Questionnaire
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email exchange) and questionnaires (Annex III), I obtained answers from 38 individuals, 
with an overall response rate of 77.5%. While I had limited control over gender, age and 
seniority representation among research informants in Addis Ababa, since these were 
government officials appointed to regional capacity development activities, in Lilongwe 
(Malawi) I was able to ensure a more balanced representation and the inclusion of multiple 
perspectives. However, since I especially targeted people working with climate data and 
information (e.g. IPCC assessment reports, climate models) for national policymaking, 
coordination and international negotiation processes, the feedbacks was still skewed by a 
predominantly male representation (66%) among respondents. Interviews unfolded around 
a number of guiding questions (Annex I) aimed at exploring the perception of authority 
of global scientific assessment bodies such as the IPCC in shaping the formulation and 
implementation of national climate policies. However, I rarely adhered to the pre-planned 
structure of the interviews, since I did not want to excessively steer or hijack the conversation 
with questions I had personally drafted. Most of the time, I would ask the first question 
and then the conversation would become more casual but still recorded through field notes. 
The improvisation factor allowed a more independent performance of the narrative. 
Although I started with the idea of basing my work exclusively on oral interactions, I had 
to reconsider my decision, constrained by the lack of physical and time availability of 
many participants, often dispatched on official missions overseas. I was therefore forced to 
administer on-line questionnaires – which were returned to me via email – to those who 
were not available for in-person interviews. The questionnaires contained a total of 24 
multiple-choice and open-ended questions (Annex III), through which participants could 
express their views about the interplay between global climate change epistemologies and 
national policy processes. Participants who were unable to take the questionnaire were 
asked for feedback on a short abstract (200 words) of my research containing some of 
the questions used for the interviews. Thus, different interviewing tools were selected 
according to the availability of research participants. In Chapter 5, I will review participants’ 
observations from questionnaires and conversational interviews whose recorded notes I 
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analysed through narrative and thematic approaches (sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).
Face-to-face interviews were mainly held at the UNDP premises or back-to-back to national 
technical government meetings. Most of the time interviews were improvised and decided 
on the spot, usually at the end of an official meeting, and therefore informal. Before both 
back-to-back interviews at official meetings and ad hoc research consultations, I would 
introduce myself revealing my double role as UNDP officer and research student. Usually, 
the people I contacted knew me exclusively through my work experience and only later 
discovered that I was also a research student. My position at the UNDP certainly helped 
me to gain access to and connect with some of the highest personalities in the public 
sector, and I could partly overlook some of the government official protocols for personal 
presentation and interview arrangements (Rice 2010; Lavis 2010). In fact, most of the time 
interviews were improvised and I did not need to spend much time introducing myself. 
This of course had positive aspects (e.g. no need for an appointment); the main drawback 
was that the interviews were held in a bit of a hurry, assuming that we would soon have 
another opportunity to continue our discussion (which oftentimes never materialised).
The informality and unpredictability that characterised most of my work with decision 
makers can potentially raise ethical issues (Simpson 2011). Interviewing officials who are 
in a position to influence decision-making processes could have placed me in an unequal 
power relation in that the input I received may have been the result of attempts to steer 
relationships and representations. However, I was never cut off, nor did I have concerns or 
experienced patronising, etc., and interviewees always seemed relaxed and open about their 
views. They did not hesitate to express criticism of global UN scientific or policy bodies 
such as the IPCC (Chapter 5). The informality of the setting may have helped, as did the fact 
that, for instance, I sometimes was not able to record the oral interactions because I did not 
have a recording device with me. One of the challenges in interviewing élites is that often 
researchers find themselves reinforcing existing patterns of knowledge construction and 
distribution by giving voice to powerful groups (Rice 2010). By choosing to also explore 
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community narratives in Kasache, I not only managed to offset the potential knowledge 
asymmetry deriving from exclusively consulting decision makers but was also able to give 
space to historically and socially disparate – and often marginalised – perspectives.
Free-flow interviews allowed me to understand the priority issues linked to the debate on 
science, knowledge and policy development among national policymakers. As Chapter 
5 will show, most of the decision makers’ narratives focused on issues of scientific and 
institutional capacity and related gaps in the climate change arena. The fact that I was 
working for a recognised aid and development agency may have influenced some of the 
feedback I received, and the interviewees’ emphasis on capacity gaps may have been 
related to my perceived influential position in a donor organisation. On the other hand, a 
well-established and confidential relationship probably allowed government officials to be 
quite open and frank in their criticism of the international climate change science-policy 
system. Although I was coming from a European country and representing a multilateral 
development organisation (generally associated with Western countries), during interviews 
informants often expressed their criticism about the supposed hegemony of global climate 
knowledge. Their openness was seemingly facilitated by a relationship of trust between us, 
an element that is considered fundamental in narrative research (Pile 1991; Simpson 2011).
The main drawback of my free-flow interviews with policy élites was that I did not 
entirely succeed in asking some crucial questions about the role and influence of 
global narratives in local contexts. When discussing the interplay between global and 
contextual knowledges, interviewees tended to focus on the most ‘visible’ or taken-for-
granted aspects, such as the need to integrate local climate data into climate change 
global and regional models. Deep issues such as perceptions of climate change science 
rarely came up spontaneously. The reason for this was twofold: the multi-layered nature 
of the narrative process, which makes it difficult to distinguish external considerations 
from internalised or sub-conscious evaluations, and the possible discrepancy between 
the speaker’s and the listener’s values, experiences and interpretations.
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To overcome this challenge (and increase the chance that interviewees would be 
available), after the first round of interviews I decided to design questionnaires aimed at 
investigating in depth some of the issues barely touched upon in free-flow conversations 
(i.e. authority and legitimacy of global climate change science; see Chapter 5). My goal 
was to understand why those issues were not mentioned, which was very significant and 
represents a research finding in itself.
2.3.2 Encountering communities in Kasache
My empirical chapters (6 and 7) also explore the narratives on climate change at the 
community level in the context of Malawi. In this work, I use the term ‘community’ to 
describe a group of people who share common resources, environment and aspirations 
while living in the same geographical area (Mercer et al. 2010). The aim of my research 
was to understand how communities reflect on climate change in the context of their 
own lives, priorities and beliefs.
My experience at the community level came after a few months of research with decision 
makers and was facilitated by my contacts with an international NGO that acted as 
a ‘gatekeeper’ (Roberts and Sanders 2005; Lavis 2010). I first learned about COOPI 
Figure 4 – Map of Salima District
Source: Google (2018).
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Text box 2  – Salima, Msosa, Kasache: a socio-economic outlook
Salima, Msosa, Kasache: a socio-economic outlook
The Fourth Integrated Household Survey 2016‒2017 (NSO 2017) highlights the socio-
economic characteristics of households in the Salima District. In Salima, 76 percent of 
households are headed by men and 24 percent by women, with an average household size 
of 4.1 persons. Salima has one of the highest dependency ratios among districts (1.4), 
calculated as the ratio of the number of dependents aged under 14 and over 65 years to the 
working-age population (15‒64 years old). The percentage of orphans is relatively high 
(about 10 percent, compared to 17 percent in Mulanje). Salima had the country’s lowest 
Net Enrolment Rate in primary and secondary education (77 percent). Among the reasons 
cited for non-attendance were: lack of money, lack of parental permission, the need to help 
with household chores and the school’s distance from home. School attendance in Salima 
is higher among pupils aged 6 to 13 and starts to decline in secondary school, with lack of 
money cited as the main reason for dropping out.
As regards distribution of the most frequently reported diseases in the Central Region, 
50 percent of those who reported an illness or injury in Salima suffered from fever and 
malaria. Asthma was the most frequently reported chronic illness (28 percent), followed 
by HIV and AIDS (12 percent). Salima ranked among the lowest in the nation for adequate 
food consumption and  housing conditions. At the district level, 72 percent of households in 
Salima reported receiving inadequate healthcare services.
In Salima, 89 percent of the population is engaged in income-generating activities, while 
79 percent also engage in household agricultural or fishing activities. Nationally, there is a 
higher proportion of female-headed than male-headed households engaginged in agricultural 
activities (87 percent versus 81 percent). In Salima, 92 percent of female household members 
contribute to the agricultural labour force (versus 80 percent of male members). About 53 
percent of households are engaged in casual, part-time or ganyu labour (see also Chapters 
6 and 7). The survey shows that 39 percent of the population aged between 15 and 64 years 
participated in the collection of water and/or firewood, with a higher proportion of women. 
Salima, and especially its female-headed households, also experienced very low levels of 
food security (61 percent). Food shortages reportedly due to droughts, erratic rains, floods 
and waterlogging affected 76 percent of the local population.
According to Malawi’s 2018 Census Preliminary Results (NSO 2018), the Msosa Traditional 
Authority has a population of 9,369 (4,622 men and 4,747 women). The Kasache Group 
Village Headman (GVH) oversees 6 villages located along the shores of Lake Malawi, about 
46 kilometres north east of the town of Salima. With a total population of 3,700, the villages 
of Kamphinda, Kasache, Matali, Moses, Palahari and Salim comprise 731 households with 
an average of 5 persons per household (COOPI 2018).
The village of Kasache has a population of 689 living in 150 households, with a prevalence 
of male-headed (113) versus female-headed households (37). The average age is 42 years, 
and the average family consists of about 4 people (COOPI 2012).
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Figure 5 – The Salima District and Kasache village
Source: Wilson (2018).
The dominant tribes are the Yao and the Chewa. Most households practice subsistence 
farming with maize as the staple crop, followed by rice as mostly a cash crop. Other crops 
favoured by local farmers include legumes such as beans and soy beans, tubers such as 
sweet potatoes and cassava, vegetables such as tomatoes, and other leaf vegetables. Other 
income-generating activities  include fishing, piecework labour (referred to as ganyu in 
Chichewa), and small businesses.
The nearest healthcare facility is in Khombedza, about 15 kilometres from Kasache on 
the Salima‒Nkhotakota road. On Fridays, a mobile clinic run by Islamic Development 
provides free medical services especially targeting children. One primary school serves 
the needs of the 6 villages under the Kasache GVH.
The area is crossed by the Lingadzi river and is often affected by flooding, a major cause 
of displacement and widespread crop destruction.
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Cooperazione Internazionale thanks to its collaboration with UNDP. The NGO, which 
had been operating in Malawi since 2002, focused its efforts on food security, climate 
change and disaster risk reduction issues. Through several informal interactions with 
the Country Director, I managed to identify a possible location for my fieldwork and 
secure some logistical support (a four-by-four vehicle, a field assistant and a room in 
a shared apartment to use as base camp). I decided to explore the Msosa area in the 
district of Salima, central Malawi, which has been described by the National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (GoM 2006) as one of the country’s most disaster-prone areas. 
The Department of Disaster Affairs (DoDMA) has a comprehensive list of over 350 
disaster-related events going back more than fifty years, with a predominance of floods 
(UNDP 2012). Salima has a land area of 2,196 square kilometres, with Lake Malawi 
forming its eastern border. The latest census (NSO 2018) assessed the population of 
the district at approximately 478,346, and the projected population for 2030 is almost 
650,000. The majority of the district’s population is engaged in maize subsistence 
farming. My choice of Salima was also motivated by the presence of individuals and 
communities exposed to climate change adaptation projects. COOPI’s endorsement 
was also instrumental in introducing me to the community of Kasache (section 2.4).
In July and August 2012, I undertook two separate field trips from Lilongwe to Kasache. 
On my first trip, at the end of July, I had an introductory meeting with the COOPI 
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Project Manager in Salima, where I gained a better 
understanding of the local impacts of climate change, types of disasters, institutional 
settings for early recovery and relief, as well as awareness and knowledge of climate 
change within the local communities. We identified and visited a suitable location for 
my field study: Kasache, a village located about 30 km from the main road connecting 
Salima with Nkhotakota, and around 85 km from the capital city, Lilongwe. The second 
trip took place in the first half of August 2012 and consisted of a seven-day sojourn in 
Salima, during which I conducted most of the interviews in the community.
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As I only had a week to spend in Kasache, I could not engage in a lasting dialogue 
with the research participants (Roberts and Sanders 2005). However, these encounters 
allowed me to get a sense of the socio-cultural ramifications of climate change on a 
different scale and explore the narratives embedded at a more local level. I had the 
opportunity to consult a total of 68 people during the whole field trip, although not 
everybody participated in group conversations (Table 3).
Table 3 – Research informants consulted in Salima, Msosa and Kasache
Date Place Informant Sex Age Modality
28th Jul 2012 Salima COOPI Project Manager 1 F 30-40 Individual interview
Salima Field Assistant 1 M 20-30 Individual interview
Kasache Group Village Head 1 M 40-50 Individual interview
Msosa Traditional Authority 1 M 50-60 Individual interview
29th Jul 2012 Kasache Farmers (n=12) 7 F
5 M
20-50 Focus Group Discussion
Kasache Group Village Heads (n=3) 3 M 40-50 Focus Group Discussion






06th Aug 2012 Kasache Individual household 1 M 40-50 Individual interview
Kasache Individual household 1 F 70-80 Individual interview
Kasache Individual household 1 M 20-30 Individual interview
Kasache Individual household 1 F 20-30 Individual interview
Kasache Individual household 1 F 30-40 Individual interview
07th Aug 2012 Kasache Farmers (n=9) 9 M 20-60 Focus Group Discussion
Kasache Elders (n=3) 3 F 60-80 Focus Group Discussion
08th Aug 2012 Kasache Farmers (n=12) 12 F 20-60 Focus Group Discussion
Kasache Elders (n=4) 2 F
2 M
60-80 Focus Group Discussion
09th Aug 2012 Kasache Local Civil Protection
Committee 
1 F 30-40 Individual interview
Kasache Local Civil Protection
Committee
1 M 30-40 Individual interview
Kasache Local Civil Protection
Committee
1 M 30-40 Individual interview
Msosa Traditional Authority 1 M 50-60 Individual interview
10th Aug 2012 Salima Field Assistant 1 M 20-30 Individual interview
Salima COOPI Project Manager 1 F 30-40 Individual interview
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In Kasache just as in Lilongwe I worked hard to ensure a balanced gender and age 
representation reflective of different perspectives and experiences. Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) ‒ gatherings of men and women farmers of different ages, elders, 
the Local Civil Protection Committee (LCPC), and local chiefs, including group village 
headmen ‒ were held at a meeting place where people convene during weather-related 
emergencies and LCPC meetings. Individual interviews with men, women, elders and 
the Traditional Authority were held in their respective homes in Kasache and Msosa 
(see pictures in Annex IV).
The Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with women, men, the Local Civil Protection 
Committee (LCPC) and the local chiefs, including Group Village Heads, took place 
at a local meeting point where people gather during weather-related emergencies 
and LCPC meetings. The individual interviews with men, women, elders and the 
Traditional Authority were held in their respective homes in Kasache and Msosa (see 
pictures in Annex IV).
My research method, as well as translation and interpretation issues, were discussed 
during a meeting with Ganizani Chibwana, a district officer from the Malawian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development who used to support 
COOPI locally. He was officially introduced as a research assistant and was especially 
helpful with cultural and linguistic matters in Kasache. Ganizani’s positionality is 
emblematic of the mixed and fluid identities often at play in fieldwork (Rice 2010; 
Simpson 2011): he was a government officer supporting an international NGO and 
translating for an academic researcher in local communities. His multiple roles in the 
field reduced the possibility of being ‘transparent’ with the people interviewed and 
fully disclosing all the related identities and power dimensions, lest they influence the 
interviewing process (I will further discuss fieldwork identities in section 2.4). 
Interviewing modalities were also addressed at the meeting with Ganizani, and it 
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was agreed to focus on FGDs, key informants, and interviews at household level. 
The interviews would be recorded both with a voice-recording device and with field 
notes. I shared a list of guiding questions (Annex II) to structure the interview process 
and asked Ganizani to avoid as much as possible the use of the English expression 
‘climate change’ and preferably refer to a broader climatic or environmental change in 
order to avoid specific narratives attached to existing and potentially super-imposed 
interpretations. My aim was to avoid the emergence of traditional power relationships 
between researchers and research participants (section 2.4), as well as identifying 
the research subject together with the informants through fieldwork practice, 
acknowledging that the community was best positioned to report on its own situation 
(Pile 1991; Scott et al. 2005; Watertone et al. 2006; Lavis 2010; Mercer et al. 2010).
One of the main challenges of my field research in Kasache was related to the 
translation and interpretation of interviewees’ responses. Wiles et al. (2005) recognise 
that miscommunication is a common problem in cross-cultural interviews and data 
collection. As for the expression ‘climate change’ – kusintha kwa nyengo in the local 
language – we noted that this was indifferently used to refer to both short- and long-
term variability (see Chapter 6 for further reflections), thus complicating feedback 
interpretation. Ganizani helped with interpreting, translating all the questions 
from English to Chichewa; however, just as with many other local languages, this 
practice often changes the meaning and connotation of key concepts conveyed during 
interviews (Mercer et al. 2010). Several times during the interviews in Kasache, I 
had to stop and reformulate my questions, because they were either not making sense 
to my audience or not successful at achieving effective two-flow communication 
(especially those related to adaptation or external/indigenous knowledge). The reason 
for such difficulties may be related to the nature of the languages spoken in Malawi, 
which are mainly an oral medium of communication, with words that have no direct 
English equivalent (Launiala 2009).
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The translation process itself had the potential to change the narrative meanings. 
Thus, I asked Ganizani a word-by-word translation of the audio scripts so that I could 
analyse them in depth and with less filters. This aspect is particularly challenging 
in the context of multi-sited ethnography, where the capacity to make connections 
between meanings from site to site relies heavily on translation and tracing processes. 
Most multi-sited work has indeed been developed in monolingual contexts in which 
translation and interpretation are unproblematic (Marcus 1995). Several resources 
available from traditional fieldwork strategies proved to be helpful, such as coupling 
oral interviews and feedback analysis with historical, social and cultural literature 
review to control the process of cultural reinterpretation. In Chapter 6, I will explore 
the anthropological meaning of kusintha kwa nyengo by looking at the relational 
ontologies expressed through traditional rain-shrines in Malawi.
The possibility of misunderstanding, mistranslation and cultural reinterpretation 
should be carefully addressed through quality control procedures for questionnaires 
and training of research assistants (Mercer et al. 2010). Unfortunately, I could not 
provide my assistant with this kind of training and preparation. Rather, I applied an 
iterative approach by which, at the end of each interview, Ganizani and I would have 
the opportunity to discuss and learn from what was working and what was not and 
improve the process. 
2.3.3 Narrative analysis
In multi-sited ethnography, given the absence of specific field delimitation (Marcus 
1995), narrative methodologies are used as heuristic tools to physically frame multi-
sited fieldwork by exploring it through people’s perceptions of places and situations 
(Pile 1991; Wiles et al. 2005; Lavis 2010). Narrative analyses focus on how people 
talk about and evaluate natural environments, phenomena and experiences (Pile 1991; 
Wiles et al. 2005). The interviewing process, which is a qualitative method commonly 
used in several disciplines, is placed at the basis of narrative methods. My observations 
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in this case study stemmed mainly from informal and spontaneous interviews with 
decision makers and focus group discussions in climate-affected communities. Free-
flow conversations can be coupled with narrative analysis (Roberts and Sanders 2005) 
to identify and interpret the layers of meaning in an interview and their connections: 
through casual conversations I was able to investigate the embedded meanings and 
interpretations that individuals attach to climate change, limiting the obtrusion of 
my external viewpoint (Wiles et al. 2005). In line with critical feminist research 
methodologies, upon which my work builds, the emphasis was on the importance 
of reducing the researcher’s filtering to allow situated perspectives from research 
participants to emerge spontaneously (Spivak 1985; Haraway 1988; Longino 2004; 
Harding, 2009; Reid and Taylor 2011).
As key steps in narrative analysis, I identified who was speaking and how they 
were speaking, taking into consideration the overall context of the interview itself, 
for example the situation of the interviewee and to whom they believed they were 
speaking. I focused on repetition of words and on themes, bearing in mind the kind of 
relationship between myself and the interviewee and what this would entail in terms 
of social and personal expression (e.g. capacity gaps were often emphasised during 
interviews with decision makers, which may have been related to their awareness of 
my position in a donor organisation).
I then reviewed all the interview transcripts as a collective – and often colliding – 
set of narratives (Foucault 1972; 1982) rather than stand-alone accounts, coding the 
conversation sections according to key themes (e.g. knowledge gaps, capacity building, 
participation, etc.). This approach allowed me to pinpoint a level of meanings and 
perceptions triggered by my questions and defined a priori (e.g. I did ask questions 
about knowledge platforms and information sharing). It also revealed a layer of 
meanings made visible by my interpretation process a posteriori (e.g. I did not ask 
any question explicitly related to informal labour networks, but the topic came up 
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while talking about adaptation strategies to climate change), as well as allowing me to 
cross-compare different parts of the interviews and different interviewees. 
2.3.4 Thematic analysis
The following step entailed a thematic analysis of the narrative (Roberts and Sanders 
2005), linking the climate change narratives that recurred most frequently in interviews 
with relevant anthropological and historical literature on the country and specific topics 
raised by the interviewees. For example, reading women’s narratives in Kasache through 
the historical literature on drought and famine in Malawi allowed me to understand the 
nature of ganyu labour. Though not directly related to my research questions, the issue 
was often mentioned by women farmers as a hunger coping mechanism and livelihood 
diversification strategy. A review of historical and anthropological literature allowed 
me to connect single conversations and statements to the larger social, historical and 
political contexts. For example, Stoler’s (1995) femminist historical accounts, linking 
conceptions of gender and morality during European colonialism, helped me to explore 
the historical evolution of matrilineal societies in Malawi – and women’s increased 
vulnerability to climate shocks – via the division between public and private spheres 
introduced by British colonial rule. Furthermore, the analysis of language (words 
and expressions used) provided important insights into interviewees’ perspectives. In 
Chapter 6, my discussion of the Chichewa expression for climate change, kusintha kwa 
nyengo, may lead to reflections on contextual worldviews and alternative human-nature 
relations. The narratives I collected provided a situated storyline anchoring the socio-
cultural landscape traced by climate change or, in other words, a historical, geographical 
and socio-political foundation for my multi-sited investigation. 
One of the biggest limitations of narrative analysis is the inevitable loss of the unique 
contextual nuances of people’s experiences. The richness and messiness of talk (Wiles 
et al. 2005) can be reduced by the nature of the recording devices (audio-recorders, field 
notes, translations, etc.). On the one hand, this process can produce very dense narratives 
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of the subjective world and its networks of meanings; on the other hand, it makes it hard 
for the researcher to report, synthesise and relate it to multiple layers of understanding, 
from deeply unconscious to highly conscious (Pile 1991). Furthermore, critical feminist 
methodologies value and deploy the reporting of messy realities to enrich understanding 
and interpretation (Law 2004). This approach would facilitate the incorporation of 
epistemological and ontological plurality and ambiguity into the research process, 
a central argument that I retained in my analysis. Resisting the rationalist appeal to 
eliminate or hide the ‘background noise’ that characterises oral interviews to offer a clear 
and clean picture, I preserved part of the heterogeneity in the answers from the same 
groups of interviewees (e.g. not all decision makers perceived climate change knowledge 
in the same way, Chapter 5) or in the silences, embarrassed pauses and attitudes during 
interviews with women and elders in Kasache (see Chapter 7).
Nonetheless, there is a risk that the researcher’s authority may be lost in the attempt to 
incorporate the many voices of research participants (Springwood and King 2001; Wiles 
et al. 2005). In my work, I stated my position as researcher mainly through material 
presentation and organisation. My personal contribution emerges from the approach 
I used to analyse, compare and link the interview material with the existing literature, 
social and cultural context. 
2.4 Identities, ethics and emotions 
My experience with the community of Kasache highlights the fluidity (Rice 2010) of 
my identity as a researcher and the fact that its construction was not entirely under my 
control, as interviewees also played an active role in creating it and possibly influenced 
the unfolding and outcome of some interviews. I arrived to the field (Salima) with a 
pre-existing identity, which was mainly defined by my profession. However, in order 
to establish relationships in Kasache, I had to take on a rather different and context-
specific role, that of the student. I also experienced unintended identities, as several 
interviewees associated me with the NGO that introduced me to the community.
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Unlike with decision makers, who already knew me professionally, I decided not to 
disclose my affiliation to UNDP with community members in Kasache, lest interview 
statements be shaped by the kind of ‘constructed needs’ usually shared with development 
and foreign organisations (Scott et al. 2006). In the context of international development, 
external researchers are often seen as a potential source of benefits, both financial and 
material, through their connections with the outside governmental, non-governmental 
and international communities (Mercer et al. 2010). For example, Ganizani told me 
that there had been complaints in Kasache that I did not provide any monetary or 
material compensation for interviews, probably due to a false assumption that I was 
working for the NGO COOPI. In some contexts, this courtesy bias is an expression of 
reciprocity (Launiala 2009; Reid and Taylor 2011), where individuals who share time 
and information expect something in return, which may be in the form of actual goods. 
This bias can also influence the research process, as interviewees may feel compelled to 
provide answers that they believe are desired by an NGO representative.
A representative of the LCPC, usually the chairman, was present at all times during 
interviews and visits to houses in the community, though always keeping a discrete 
distance and ready to act as a mediator, if necessary. All research was basically carried 
out under the supervision of an authoritative representative of the village, who would 
oversee the interviews on behalf of the community. Although this did not affect my 
personal performance or the kind of questions I wanted to ask, it probably influenced 
the interviewees who may have at times felt obliged to give socially acceptable answers, 
especially during FGDs. Nonetheless, the LCPC chairman’s demeanour made internal 
power dynamics more explicit and gave me a cue to further investigate intra-community 
relations. This also demonstrated that informants are conscious and active agents in 
field studies and can exert forms of power, control and resistance over the enquiry 
process, especially when research work implies readings within networks of power and 
privileges (Springwood and King 2001). 
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The local protocol required meeting with the village chiefs and the LCPC to discuss 
and agree on a detailed agenda of meetings and appointments before actual research 
could begin, and I obtained oral consent to proceed with data collection and interviews 
from the Traditional Authority (TA) and Group Village Head (GVH) before entering the 
community. My work strictly followed the Code of Practice for research established by 
Lancaster University in 2009, which sets out ethical principles and practices concerning 
acceptable sources of funding, dissemination of results, care of human participants, 
proper management of finances and research workers1. Lancaster University’s Code of 
Practice seems to reflect a standardisation process initiated in the UK in recent years 
(Simpson 2011) to establish uniform ethical procedures for different disciplines and 
sources; for example, it requires individual participant consent to be obtained in writing 
or orally communicated before interviews. In my case, I had to negotiate two levels of 
entry in order to get access to participants, both of which were on a collective basis – the 
first with the village heads and the second with the chief of the LCPC.
Unlike in Europe, where informed consent commonly hinges on the idea of individual 
self-determination and autonomy (Simpson 2011; Smith 2012), consent was not provided 
to me by single individuals for a particular research project or set of questions, but for a 
person or group of people. In any case, lest I be questioned about the legitimate decision of 
the village chiefs over the community’s willingness to speak and establish a relationship 
with me, I deemed it necessary to always check orally with each participant. Thus, 
although the Lancaster Code of Practice seems to have been formulated to be applicable 
to different contexts and circumstances, I coupled it with a practice of dialogue and 
community consultation, not immediately envisaged by standard ethical codes.
My experience resonates with feminist and postcolonial reflections (Reid and Taylor 
2011; Smith 2012) on the limits of ethical standardisation processes in effectively ensuring 
community participation, self-determination and cultural autonomy in academic 
1 A formal ethics opinion for my research project was provided by the Faculty of Science and Technology Research 
Ethics Committee (FSTREC) of Lancaster University in July 2019.
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research, particularly within indigenous contexts. Critical feminist methodologies 
(Bannon 2009; Lavis 2010; Smith 2012) suggest that research ethics should be grounded 
in care, compassion and reciprocity. The ethic of care and love is not imposed by 
external agencies, it rather rests on the individual researcher’s accountability and on the 
uniqueness and emotionality of dialogue established between researcher and research 
participants (Smith 2012).
While the first part of my research was done in collaboration with government officials 
with whom I had a continuing professional relationship, individual interviews in Kasache 
were totally different in that they allowed me to get closer to participants’ lives and 
viewpoints, thus experiencing new emotions and feelings. While I had been relaxed and 
spontaneous when interviewing government representatives, I felt rather uncomfortable 
and shy in the rural community. The main emotions I brought into the process were 
anxiety and fear of saying or doing something that would hurt the interviewees’ feelings 
or cause offence. Not only was I concerned that participants might relive distressing or 
uncomfortable experiences, I was also conscious of the ‘distance’ that might emerge 
in my conversations with the community members (would I be able to deal in a tactful 
and sensitive way with individuals who had experienced hardship?). These reflections 
led me to conduct my research with empathy and respect of community values, norms 
and cultural protocols; my own empathy and sensitivity led me to try to establish 
relationships based on care and responsibility. This process required a high level of 
respect, reciprocity and critical attitude, acknowledging the different subjectivities of 
the interviewees. When facing potentially embarrassing situations, for instance, I never 
insisted on getting feedback at all costs.
Despite my cautious attitude, discussing issues of power balances in the community 
and women’s and elders’ involvement in knowledge-management platforms proved 
challenging – probably due to the fact that it was hard to reach an adequate level of 
intimacy, trust and connection in the context of a short interview and with very limited 
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interaction. Certainly, interviewing people in a context of distress (Simpson 2011) 
challenged my multiple subjectivities, since it forced me to dig into more personal and 
intimate values and qualities, unpacking additional identities. This experience shows 
that multiple research positionalities can co-exist and compete even within a single 
interview or research setting. Additionally, specific research contexts and unforeseen 
circumstances may produce distress or embarrassment, thus ethical practices cannot 
merely consist in applying codes of conducts or protocols (e.g. informed consent) but 
require a higher degree of integrity (Lavis 2010; Simpson 2011). 
2.5 Conclusions: dissemination and outreach
This chapter highlighted some of the social and power structures that influenced my 
status of researcher, including poor accessibility of the field site and scarcity of time. All 
these elements played a substantial role in compounding the difficulties of conducting 
my research and determining final research outcomes. The reflections presented in this 
chapter helped me to critically reconsider the scope of the structural dilemmas I faced 
during fieldwork. The peculiar and changing conditions during fieldwork, for instance, 
facilitated the emergence of alternative ethnographic approaches, which are especially 
needed to understand the challenges of a mobile, non-localised and transversally 
connected world (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Fischer 1999; Marcus 2002). 
Mobile ethnography, however, posed specific challenges. Addressing climate change as 
a socio-cultural and mobile discourse required an inter-disciplinary approach, due to the 
lack of a distinct theoretical perspective able to link global climate change epistemology 
with local ontologies. Particularly challenging was the need to: i) give account of both 
the global science-policy framework and the fragmented and (apparently) unconnected 
lived experiences in Malawi; and ii) identify and follow the connections between 
spatial, temporal and epistemological scales without losing sight of the integrated and 
continuous relations between them. By coupling STS theoretical concepts with the 
contextual architecture (assembled through desk review, fieldwork and experiential 
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learning) offered by the case of Malawi, I was able to trace climate change constructs in 
space and time, rather than being focused on a single-site perspective.
My hybrid positionality helped me to overcome the risk of analytical fragmentation. 
By situating myself in different worlds (e.g. headquarters, country office, development, 
academia), I experientially learned from parallel situations, achieving a broader view of 
the tensions and connections between various contexts. The simultaneous experiences 
in Malawi and in international development agencies mutually enriched each other, 
pointing to ‘unexplored’ (by somebody working exclusively in development or academia) 
paths of connection. My choice of spaces and sites of investigation was prompted not 
only by personal opportunities, but also by the way climate change is conceptualised 
and actioned – both in the context of development and in science-based organisations.
My positionality, although extremely useful in connecting various locations, was 
at times problematic, as I had to continuously shift from one context to another and 
provide meaningful ‘translations’ (of meanings) between sites. The research problems 
I identified often appeared to be related to managerial or technical issues (e.g. pitfalls 
in communicating early warning messages to communities) linked to my professional 
activity and perhaps not considered problematic from an academic viewpoint. Likewise, 
what was considered well-established from an academic perspective was still a novelty 
or unexplored in the context of international development (e.g. critical approaches to 
gender mainstreaming, Chapter 7). My experience shows that the broken connections 
between academia and policy are not accidental, but symptomatic and revealing of those 
hidden power relations that multi-sited ethnography attempts to uncover, as further 
discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to the policy implications of my research work.
Furthermore, the nature of multi-sited ethnography reduces the possibility of 
disseminating and sharing research findings across research levels. Usually, feedback 
on the results involves those who participated in the research process (NGOs, local 
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communities, etc.). One of my concerns, for example, is the impossibility of going 
back to Malawi to discuss and disseminate the research results, which many of the 
interviewees in Kasache explicitly asked for. While I expect to be able to share my 
findings through COOPI, the NGO that introduced me to the community, not being able 
to do it in person could affect the process of knowledge-sharing and feedback collection.
On the contrary, since COOPI managers can more easily be contacted via email and 
distance-based tools, sharing my findings with them may help foster innovative outreach 
action (Lamphere 2004), collaborative research, and the development of educational 
material or new climate change community projects – currently characterised by 
knowledge-sharing or decision-making formats that restrict women’s and elders’ 
participation. Outreach and policy-oriented activities may be envisaged as part of 
my PhD research dissemination or exit strategy, as is customary in many applied 
anthropology PhD programmes (Lamphere 2004) where researchers devote their time 
and skills to assisting the NGOs, communities and government agencies that supported 
their fieldwork. In the context of international development organisations, this would 
be most effectively achieved through day-to-day input to the creation of knowledge 
products and training activities, definitely a less visible and academically rewarding (in 
terms of publication metrics) but probably more meaningful role (see Chapter 8). 
Certainly, my fieldwork experience served as an opportunity to identify possible methods 
for applying a multi-sited ethnography, an approach that is still partially explored in critical 
human geography. A key open question is: how can better comprehension of climate 
change as a multi-sited socio-political process facilitate transformational adaptation 
at different levels? My empirical chapters will respond to this question, showing how 
global climate change narratives circulate across spatial, temporal, epistemological and 
ontological localities, allowing alternative ways of knowing and experiencing climate 
change to emerge and be politically recognised. 
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Chapter 3
The legitimisation of global climate science
3.1  Certifying climate science
The relevance of scientific advice has been one of the salient traits of the climate 
change public policy domain (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998), mirroring the increasing 
importance of science and technology in contemporary societies (Martin and Richards 
1995; Latour 2000; Nowotny 2003; Haas 2004). The majority of policymakers I 
consulted during my research in Malawi described climate change as a scientific issue 
whose legitimate knowledge and expertise should come from globally accredited 
organisations. In their view, this would lead to objective, neutral and credible policy 
decisions. Some also highlighted the skewed geographical distribution of the capacity 
to generate climate change knowledge. Chisomo Bera1, a junior female officer from 
the Environment Affairs Department, claimed:
Climate change knowledge produced through IPCC reports influences 
climate change knowledge generation and policy formulation in Malawi, 
because Malawi has not sufficiently generated its own knowledge… 
IPCC reports have been established as the global authoritative source on 
climate change knowledge on the assumption that they do not represent 
just the North, but the entire globe (Questionnaire, 13 March 2012).
This view partly echoes the dominant ‘one-climate, one-science, one-policy’ 
narrative on climate change (Hulme 2011; Sarewitz 2011), which reflects a positivist 
interpretation of science, or the belief that legitimate science produces truth (section 
3.2). This tendency is not new in the public policy arena, since expert knowledge 
has been historically (section 3.2.1.1) perceived as a neutral and disinterested arbiter 
of scientific and technical public disputes (Martin and Richards 1995). According 
1 I will employ fictitious names to protect the identity and opinions of the individuals who contributed to my field study.
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to Rayner (2003), policymakers worldwide perceive climate change science and 
knowledge as trustworthy when it is grounded in and produces quantitative and 
numerical thresholds (e.g. finer spatial scale scenarios, seasonal climate information) 
that can be invoked to trigger action or justify inaction. For that reason, scientific 
bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have assumed 
a special role in the public policy domain as the source of objective and reliable 
policy decisions (Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001). Nonetheless, Chisomo points out 
how scientific authority plays a crucial role in shaping the modes by which climate 
knowledge is produced, articulated, included or excluded in the dominant climate 
change scientific frameworks. The hierarchy of knowledge determines how climate 
science is generated in the Global North and disseminated across the Global South 
as a supposedly universal (“they represent the entire globe”) and legitimate truth. In 
the case of Malawi, it is linked to the political and economic relations that developed 
during and in the aftermath of British colonial rule. 
In this and the following chapter, I will identify the theoretical and methodological 
tools grounded in Science and Technology Studies (STS) that will help me answer the 
following questions: where does the epistemological authority of a global (Northern/
Western) and scientific approach to climate change come from? Why is this approach 
recognised as an inherent element of ‘good’ climate change science and decision-
making by policy actors in Malawi? And how is global climate change knowledge 
interacting with other types of knowledge?
According to STS scholars (Martin and Richards 1995; Roosth and Silbey 2008), 
scientific ideas are not universal or unassailable facts, but the outcome of material 
and social conditions determined by socio-economic interests relevant to a group’s 
survival (Restivo 2001). They are shaped by the meanings and interpretations that 
people in particular historical or cultural contexts assign them (Harding 2008). 
Scientific knowledge is imbued with the worldviews and assumptions of scientists 
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and policy actors (including multilateral and bilateral public funders in the case of 
climate change, see Chapter 4), which are taken for granted by millions of people 
(Restivo 2001). The global concern about highly non-linear and potentially abrupt 
environmental threats has put Earth science centre stage in sustainable development 
policies and agendas (Sachs 2012), shaping international development budgets and 
allocations.
If approached through STS theoretical tools such as the social constructivist approach 
(Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001; Restivo 2001), Chisomo’s statement seems to 
revolve around three key concepts: authority (e.g. the IPCC in the case of climate 
change), knowledges (Northern/Western and Malawian) and agency (“Malawi has 
not sufficiently produced its own knowledge”). Authority, knowledges and agency 
indeed interact in shaping responses to climate change. Different socio-cultural, geo-
political and historical factors determine which kinds of knowledge are considered 
authoritative and relevant to decision-making (Eriksen et al. 2015). Although climate 
science has been accorded authoritative status by the science-policy actors that 
generate, legitimise, reproduce and/or refute climate change knowledge, other types 
of knowledge can also enable or limit individual and collective agency – the process 
that creates the conditions for social change, including the resolution of inequalities 
(Foucault 1982; Prabhu 2007). I will explore these processes through the concept of 
hybridity (Bhabha 1994), bringing it into conversation with the STS approach with 
a view to overcoming the rigid binary scales (North/South), knowledges (Western/
non-Western), identities (experts/non-experts) and socio-political orders (developed/
developing countries) often stemming from constructivist approaches (section 3.2.1.1).
In the empirical chapters, I will draw on methods from STS to explore how individual 
and collective aspirations and initiatives are shaped by global authoritative knowledge 
in the context of Malawi.
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3.2 The question of climate science ‘universality’ 
3.2.1 Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
STS offers valuable tools to conceptualise the relationship between science, knowledge 
and policy. Focusing on the history, social organisation and culture of science and 
technology (Roosth and Silbey 2008), STS recognises that science, as well as many 
other human activities, is socially and contingently constructed – being the outcome 
of collectively organised human labour and decision-making rather than an asocial and 
impersonal activity (Edge 2001). 
STS originated in the debates between supporters of universal and transcendent methods 
for understanding nature and those claiming that access to nature is inevitably filtered 
through collectively created forms of cognition and communication (Roosth and Silbey 
2008). In the second half of the nineteenth century, these debates informed two of the main 
traditions in the philosophy of science: empiricism and positivism. While empiricists 
argued that scientific truths are based on empirical observations, positivists believed 
they can only stem from a rigorous set of logical relations that describe representations 
of reality (Law 2004). Both approaches ultimately reflected a single underlying 
assumption: the separation between human and nature (Plumwood 1991; Merchant 
2006; Ingold 2010; Blaser 2014; Glazebrook 2016). This dualistic foundational view 
defines the whole Western thought and scientific apparatus, which places the human 
mind at the centre of life (anthropocentrism) or ‘outside of nature’ as its master and 
controller, treating nature as merely instrumental to human interests (Plumwood 1991; 
Ingold 2010). Sharply separated categories are emphasised in this perspective, such as 
those opposing mind and body, reason and emotion, masculine and feminine (Plumwood 
1991; Renegar and Sowards 2009; Lugones 2010; Glazebrook 2016).
The early STS debates are very relevant in the context of international climate change 
policy negotiations. During the negotiations for the Paris Agreement (2015), heated 
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discussions arose about whether climate change should be considered in isolation or 
in relation to economic and social issues, human rights, gender equality, and the rights 
of indigenous peoples and local communities (whether exclusively ‘natural’ or also 
‘social’, ‘cultural’ and humanitarian) (ICCG 2015). Many social issues were barely 
acknowledged as related to climate change in the final version of the agreement.
There is a tendency in the negotiation processes surrounding the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to project the idea that science 
and policy are two distinctively defined and separate worlds, drawing a distinction 
between social and physical worlds (Hulme 2017). The international framework for 
negotiating climate policies has operated on the assumption that anthropogenic change 
in climate is a distinct extension or modification of natural climate, mainly dealing with 
the causes and consequences of elements of climate change that are of anthropogenic 
origin (Hulme 2011). For the UNFCCC it matters whether hurricanes are natural or 
anthropogenic in origin, hence caused by elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere. Yet, as argued by Hulme (2011), the weather cannot be sharply 
dissected into different causal elements. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC 2015) states that “Adaptation planning should be based on information 
and scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the 
climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that supports decision-making”. 
The assumption behind the idea of informing is that knowledge is not constructed, but 
simply and passively transferred from science to policy as a form of legitimisation 
(see also section 3.3). The relationship between climate and society reflects the tension 
between the distinct roles assigned to nature and culture in positivist thinking. In 
predictive and projection simulations of future climate change, for instance, climate is 
extracted from the matrix of interdependencies that shape human life within the physical 
world. As a product of human reason, it is thus elevated to the status of universal 
determinant of future ecology, economic activity, development, national wealth, social 
mobility and human behaviour (Hulme 2011). 
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Key to this process is that Western dichotomy usually polarises differences in binaries 
(e.g. mind-body) and minimises shared characteristics, drawing lines of superiority/
inferiority whereby the superior side must separate from and dominate the lower side 
(Plumwood 1991). In the human/nature dualism, for instance, despite humans having 
both biological and mental characteristics, only the mental are taken as ‘authentic’ 
and representative of the human dimension, whereas the human sphere (synonymous 
with mind and reason) should control the natural (and irrational) sphere. In the climate 
and culture/society binary, polarisation often arises between the known (e.g. short-
term or predictive) and unknown (e.g. long-term) future. For instance, while little 
predictability exists in climate impact assessments in terms of nutrition or health, 
global heat balances can become the one known variable in an otherwise unknowable 
future (Hulme 2011). In Chapter 4, I introduce a wider critique of the positivist 
conceptualisation of time (Blaser 2014), arguing that the emphasis on short-term 
horizons in climate change policy planning (e.g. NAPAs, the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action) provides a shield from the openness, contingency and multiple 
possibilities of the future to conform with the shorter time spans necessary for political 
decision-making and economic operability in the global marketplace (Pepper 1999; 
Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010).
The ascendancy of abstract and universal reason also led to favouring epistemological 
approaches to science, which assume that there is only one reality (ontology) that 
can be observed from culturally different viewpoints (Ingold 2010). The positivist 
perspective recognises knowledge statements as scientific and universally valid only 
when confirmed by empirical data and detached from cultural life-worlds (Latour 2004; 
Roosth and Silbey 2008). According to this view, a ‘certified’ science is grounded in 
impersonal criteria, disentangled from local, social, economic and political stakes, 
as well as strongly differentiating between empirically proven facts and political or 
cultural values (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Latour 2000; Law 2004; Demeritt 2006). 
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The positivist approach encouraged a division of labour between academic disciplines 
dealing with human, linguistic, social and cultural products and those dealing with the 
structure and composition of the material and physical world. With regard to climate 
science, the hierarchy of disciplines seems to have affected climate change research 
patterns, favouring natural science applications such as remote sensing and climate 
modelling (Shackley and Wynne 1996). In climate change policy discourse, as further 
explored in the next chapter, the ‘rules of evidence’ governing what can be claimed 
as objective and true tend to be implicitly transferred from one domain of knowledge 
(physical and predictive sciences) to another (socio-cultural) without any in-depth 
theoretical or analytical review (Jasanoff 1995; Shackley and Wynne 1996; Demeritt 2006; 
Dilling and Lemos 2011). Failing to understand the interactions between biophysical and 
socio-political processes, this approach tends to reduce the different ways of knowing 
and viewing climate change to homogenous and simplified forms (Hulme 2011). Most 
importantly, reductionist approaches allow (culturally biased) prescriptive claims to 
implicitly enter scientific discourse, diminishing the likelihood that situational individual 
and collective knowledges and initiatives will emerge and be recognised. By reviewing 
postcolonial approaches to science, Chapter 4 will explore the possibility of re-evaluating 
and reintegrating the epistemologies and ontologies that Western positivism dissected, 
denied or obliterated during colonial rule. In the second part of this work (Chapters 5, 6 
and 7), I will further explore the implications of intertwined Western-related dualisms for 
the recognition of expert/non-expert climate change knowledges or gendered (feminine/
masculine) climate change impacts in Malawi.
3.2.1.1 The rationale for a social constructivist approach
In the second half of the twentieth century, the social constructivist theory (Cozzens 
and Woodhouse 2001; Restivo 2001) – one of the key STS scholarships – introduced 
the dimension of power in the science-policy interface, describing how specific interests 
(commercial, political) are able to exert their authority in the public policy domain and settle 
any scientific dispute in their favour (Martin and Richards 1995). Social constructivism 
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highlighted, for example, how the mathematically founded, rationalised empiricism of 
Protestantism legitimised Western science, emphasising the historical and institutional 
roots of the scientific revolution that gave rise to modern Western science (Restivo 2001). 
This element is particularly relevant to my analysis, since it allows me to acknowledge the 
roles of science and religion during colonial rule in shaping environmental belief systems. 
In Malawi, Scottish missionaries deployed ‘climate discourses’ (Hulme 2008) within a 
framework of moral economy that equated ‘heathenism’ with environmental and moral 
decay (Endfield and Nash 2002a, 2002b).
Michael Foucault (1972; 1982) further explained the mechanisms through which 
power operates in relation to knowledge, marking a fundamental break with Western 
epistemological and ontological dualism and introducing a process-based ontology 
(Caldwell 2007). The process of objectification transforms human and non-human beings 
into narrative and material objects through power relationships in which authoritative 
subjects generate discursive strategies that systematically create the object of which 
they speak, assigning the latter a taken-for-granted value (‘objective’) (Foucault 1972; 
1982). In Chapter 5, I will discuss how the discourse on a North-South knowledge divide 
shapes the way scientific, technical and policy capacities are perceived among decision 
makers in Malawi, determining the strategies and venues for accessing financial and 
technical support. Discourses, according to Foucault, represent power structures linked 
to socio-economic interests, which generate unifying narratives upon which hegemonic 
practices and institutions are created and power is exerted. More specifically, discourses 
are syntheses, meant to divide or group sets of phenomena according to specific (e.g. 
cultural) principles of classification or normative and institutionalised rules. For example, 
a succession of scattered historical events or phenomena can be grouped or linked 
according to the same organising principle. Accordingly, in climate change discourse 
women as a group are generally deemed to be more vulnerable to climate change impacts 
(Chapters 4 and 7).
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These groupings are not seen as consequences of collective historical and socio-political 
processes but normally accepted before any examination, and their validity is recognised 
from the outset. Foucault, however, recognises that the legitimacy accorded to the discursive 
links is not intrinsic, autochthonous and universally recognisable, but rather the means 
through which subjective power is exerted – by naming, showing, hiding, revealing. The 
unbalanced relation between subject and object originates subjection, one of the major 
forms of power described by Foucault, in that individuals are tied to their position/identity 
in the social system and are not conscious of their subjectivity and submission. The issue of 
space (narrative and material) for individual action and human agency in the subject-object 
dialectic and struggle is one of the key points around which postcolonial and especially 
feminist critiques have built their scholarly reflections.
Influenced by the Foucauldian process-based ontology (Caldwell 2007), the social 
constructivist approach sees in the negotiations between researchers and political actors 
the mechanism that generates scientific knowledge. This theory stresses that motivations 
and behaviours in any given institutional sphere (such as religion, economics or politics) 
are intertwined with interests, motivations and behaviours from other institutional spheres, 
such as science (Restivo 2001). In Chapter 5, I will highlight how the increasing pledge to 
enhance the ‘climate scientific rationale’ of public finance investments, recently emphasised 
by several multilateral climate and development funds, serves to comply with international 
criteria for ‘good governance’ and financial accountability (Nowotny 2003; Rayner 2003; 
Kandlikar et al. 2011). The science-policy negotiation process unfolds through government-
supported scientific research, which enables the flourishing of specific scientific ideas and 
exerts symbolic authority over public opinion (Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001).
In the case of climate change, for example, the construction of the 2°C target was highly 
debated and negotiated among climate modellers and social scientists within the scientific 
community. Although scientifically ambiguous and contested,2  it has emerged as one of 
2 Van der Sluijs et al. (1998), for example, point out that the questioning of scientific judgements was not welcomed 
in early climate change world conferences such as the Villach’s one.
Chapter 3 - The legitimisation of global climate science 75
the key features of climate policy negotiations in the past thirty years (van der Sluijs et al. 
1998; Boykoff et al. 2010). Global surface temperature was selected by the UNFCCC to 
monitor progress in the implementation of the Paris Agreement (World Meteorological 
Organisation WMO, 2018). However, in the WMO and IPCC scientific communities, the 
essential features of climate change are described through a set of fifty-five ‘Essential 
Climate Variables’, indicators that track the state or level of some aspects of climate. Indeed, 
the Earth’s surface temperature reflects only part of the increases in energy in the global 
system. Shifts in patterns of global precipitation and water cycles will more evidently 
determine the effects of floods and droughts at the local level (WMO 2018). Nonetheless, 
the 2°C target represents a threshold for the increase in global average temperature, allowing 
policymakers and the general public to better understand humankind’s contribution to 
climate change, and the nature and degree of such change. As such, it allowed parties to the 
UNFCCC to negotiate temperature goals for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
(2015). According to van der Sluijs et al. (1998) and Boykoff et al. (2010), the 2°C target 
operated to represent and simplify the risk of climate change in a way that was easier to 
understand for policymakers, overshadowing the contested process of scientific knowledge 
construction and translation.
A social constructivist lens helps to explain the socio-economic interests and struggles that 
trigger the formation of scientific statements. In the context of my case study, this approach 
clarifies the origins of the epistemological authority of physical accounts of climate change 
and the mechanisms through which it has been reproduced. In the next section, I will 
discuss the institutionalisation of a global and scientific view of climate change.
3.3 Climate reductionism in the driving seat
A substantial body of work has emerged from STS in the 1970s to challenge the 
positivist and empiricist approaches to climate change (Shackley and Wynne 1996; 
Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Saloranta 2001; Demeritt 2006; Grundmann 2007; Wynne 
2010; Hulme 2011). According to these critiques, global narratives on climate 
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change are distinctively characterised by the hegemony of empirical sciences over 
contingent, historical and social accounts of the natural environment. Indeed, they 
portray climate change as a physical fact belonging to the realm of natural sciences. 
According to Hulme (2011), reductionist approaches to climate change originate in 
the idea of ‘climate determinism’, a corollary to the positivist paradigm of science, 
which assigned to physical climate and related sciences the power to explain the 
performance of environments, people and societies. The two forms of determinism 
are, however, distinct. 
Climate determinism, which became particularly widespread at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, contended that climate is the dominant determinant of racial 
character, intellectual vigour, moral virtue and the ranking of civilisations (Hulme 
2011) – a systemic essentialism that was especially criticised by postcolonial STS. 
In Chapter 5, I will provide an example of climate determinism in the context of 
colonialism, exploring the Scottish missionaries’ narratives about the relation between 
physical climate and morality in Malawi.
Contemporary climate reductionism, on the other hand, through the epistemological 
authority assigned to global bodies of scientific knowledge assessment (section 3.3), 
retains some forms of the explanatory power of climate in determining the “behaviours 
of biophysical and socioeconomic systems” (Hulme 2011, 253). Climate reductionism – 
similarly to climate determinism – idealises climate science as a highly disciplined way 
of ensuring objectivity and disinterestedness in decision-making processes (Edge 2001; 
Demeritt 2006). Reductionist approaches are particularly visible in analyses of conflicts, 
human migration or spread of diseases, in which physical climate science is given a 
prominent role in explaining humanitarian crises (Hulme 2011). 
The hegemony of natural sciences in climate narratives manifests itself through the pivotal 
role of numerical weather and climatic predictions/projections and GHGs modelling in 
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policymaking (Hulme 2011). Since the 1980s, impact and emissions scenarios have been 
employed to understand the risks and impacts of major biophysical change and identify 
policy options that are robust to uncertainties. These methodologies build on controlled 
observations of nature and climate, such as computer-based simulation models of future 
climates. Through mathematical equations and computing technology, climate is isolated 
from the matrix of interdependencies characterising human life within the physical world 
and extracted as the primary determinant of past, present and future system behaviour and 
response (Hulme 2011).
The assumptions underlying climate models and predictions envisage a linear interaction 
between climate and society and favour predicting future climate over understanding the 
present and future nuanced interplay between cultural, social, political and environmental 
changes (Hulme 2011). In this regard, Kim et al. (2017) highlight how the first significant 
attempt to address adaptation to climate change in the context of the UNFCCC in the 
2000s was prompted by a ‘climate-first approach’, in which climate science, data and 
information lead to policy planning through short-term and project-level interventions 
that do not necessarily address national development concerns. The climate-first approach 
first materialised in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) – approved by 
the UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Marrakesh in 2001 to support Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in addressing urgent and immediate adaptation needs through climate 
vulnerability assessments (Kim et al. 2017).
In Chapter 5, I will highlight the challenges posed by the climate-first approach in 
Malawi’s NAPA, which focused on short-term, project-level and risk management 
measures at the core of climate change policy planning without accommodating the 
multiple values and interests of the local communities. In Chapter 4, I will outline 
how in the last decade, also in acknowledgement of the limitations of NAPAs (ECBI 
2007; Stringer et al. 2010), UNFCCC negotiation processes have started to promote a 
‘development-first’ or climate-resilient development approach (Bahadur et al. 2013; Kim 
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et al. 2017) where climate risks are first assessed against national development priorities. 
Yet, as I will discuss in the empirical chapters, in Malawi’s case a development-first 
approach still neglects the social, political and economic relations affecting agency and 
equity in communities.
While the IPCC defines scenarios as “plausible and often simplified descriptions of how 
the future may develop” (Rosentrater 2010, 253), several authors have highlighted some of 
their biggest disadvantages. For example, scenarios are not able to account for qualitative 
changes in nature-human relationships (since they assume that the future will be a linear 
continuation of the past) or fail to capture historically contingent features or socially 
relevant meanings of climate change, fostering a limited involvement of local knowledge 
producers (Berkhout et al. 2002; Biggs et al. 2007; Rosentrater 2010; Hulme 2011). 
Interestingly, what reduces the credibility of climate scenarios with the public opinion – 
since individuals perceive such scenarios as too distant from everyday life (Rosentrater 
2010) – is the same abstract quality that is so appreciated by policymakers (Chapter 5).
This tension is symptomatic of the discrepancy in timeframes between two types of 
adaptation processes. The first one, responsive adaptation (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010), refers to the spontaneous and routinised reactions that people, especially farmers 
and pastoralists, perform in response to extreme weather events (within seasonal or 
sub-seasonal time spans) and climate variability (within yearly timeframes). The second 
points to anticipatory adaptation: through the use of numerical models it seeks to predict 
and address climate risks (e.g. sea level rise, droughts) that may arise in the long term 
(from decades to centuries) and are not yet perceived at present (Cannon and Müller-
Mahn 2010). The latter is particularly appreciated in adaptation policymaking. 
Such divergence also has implications for the relationship between climate change 
adaptation and development explored in Chapter 4. While recent efforts in the UNFCCC 
attempt to integrate the two processes (Janetos et al. 2012; Bahadur et al. 2013; Kim 
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et al. 2017), my work will expose the difficulty of linking adaptation to development. 
My empirical chapters will argue that neither the climate-first focus of Malawi’s NAPA 
(GoM 2006) nor the climate-resilient development framework (Kim et al. 2017) – still 
grounded in present or foreseeable time spans (e.g. five-year electoral cycles) (Cannon 
and Müller-Mahn 2010) – entirely improve individual livelihoods in the face of a 
changing climate. 
Briefly, climate prediction methodologies and techniques reinforce the positivist 
assumption of science as the unique occupant of a distinctive niche in the intellectual 
domain, while other knowledge-producing activities, such as a religion or politics, are 
seen as secondary and complementary (Gieryn 1983). In Chapter 6, I will show how 
current climate change initiatives in Kasache tend to overlook the existence of spiritual 
explanations for climate change, mostly linking adaptation to rationalist and techno-
managerial solutions.
Rationalism and ‘scientificity’ (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010) are not the only 
salient features of the international debate on climate change. The IPCC has recently 
acknowledged the spread of a global form of climate change knowledge that is 
monopolising “the planning and development strategies and rendering other forms of 
knowledge subordinated to a form of climate reductionism” (2014, 20). This observation 
echoes Chisomo Bera’s statement (Questionnaire, 13 March 2012) claiming that 
knowledge and policy formulation processes in Malawi are heavily influenced by the 
“global authoritative knowledge” [sic] provided by the IPCC, which claims to represent 
the entire globe.
3.3.1 The creation of a global knowledge consensus 
The idea of climate change as a global issue can be traced back to the late 1980s debates 
describing it as a long-term, technical, irreversible and human-induced threat, not 
immediately relevant to development concerns (Janetos et al. 2012). The global nature 
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of the problem was emphasised in the first political declarations on climate change, such 
as the Toronto Declaration (1988), the Second World Climate Conference Declaration 
(1990) and the UN General Assembly Declaration (1990). The IPCC remarked on the 
necessity of global policymaking with the release of its first assessment report in 1990 
(Gupta et al. 2007). 
Specifically, climate change began to be considered as a global issue in view of the 
scientific understanding that only a global commitment to reducing GHGs emissions 
would provide a solution to the warming of Earth’s atmosphere, irrespectively of 
the source, location and amount of greenhouse gases emitted (Gupta et al. 2007). 
The international community worked on establishing a multilateral mechanism for 
negotiations on emissions reduction, which materialised in the creation of the UNFCCC 
in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
Meanwhile, the need to systematically link science to policy resulted in the creation 
of the IPCC, with the assumption that a periodic state-of-the-art assessment of climate 
knowledge could fill the gaps in the action-oriented policy domain (Jasanoff and 
Wynne 1998). The relevance of IPCC scientific assessments grew hand in hand with 
the progress of UNFCCC negotiations: as policymakers’ demand for unambiguous 
quantitative information increased, so did the pressure on scientists to supply certain 
and consistent scientific knowledge (van der Sluijs et al. 1998). The IPCC’s ‘mission’ 
was to increase confidence and trust in climate science, as well as synthesising and 
consolidating scientific knowledge on the basis of scientific consensus and participation 
(Grundmann 2007; Ho-Lem et al. 2011). 
According to Gupta et al. (2007), the global scientific consensus on climate change 
has been instrumental to mobilising political action under the UNFCCC international 
framework, especially in reacting to several states’ (US, China, India) reluctance to 
multilateral solutions to climate change. Until the 1990s, the industrialised countries 
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that had conducted the bulk of research on mitigation were also the most involved in the 
climate change debate (Bodansky 2001). Only from the 1990s onwards did developing 
countries seek greater representation in the international arena, arguing that climate 
change needed to be increasingly viewed as a development rather than exclusively 
environmental issue.
Not only would climate change affect the Earth’s physical and biological systems, it 
was argued, but also human well-being, especially for those members of society who 
depended on climate-sensitive resources. Furthermore, present development pathways 
would set the stage for future greenhouse gas emissions (Janetos et al. 2012). The 
development perspective was also supported by the fact that about 70% of GHGs since 
1850 had been emitted by industrialised countries and the devastating effects had been 
mainly felt by developing countries (because of geographical latitude and climate-
dependent socio-economic structures). Moreover, a development-centred focus (Janetos 
et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017) would allow developing countries to shift the debate from 
the rather technical domain of the IPCC – in which they struggled to participate on an 
equal basis with industrialised countries – to the multilateralism of the UNFCCC. The 
first round of climate change negotiations was in fact initiated under the auspices of the 
UN General Assembly rather than the IPCC or the WMO, as developed countries would 
have preferred (Bodansky 2001).
However, it was only with the Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) UNFCCC 
Summits, where special emphasis was placed on synergies and trade-offs between 
climate policies and national development goals (Janetos et al. 2012), that the need for 
integrated climate change and development approaches was formally recognised. The 
Cancun Agreement specifically acknowledged the role of National Adaptation Plans 
(NAPs) in facilitating the integration of adaptation into national development planning 
and structures. Unlike NAPAs’ short-term and project-level perspectives (section 3.3), 
the UNFCCC endorsement of medium to long-term strategic NAPs marked a shift 
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from a climate-first to a development-first focus in the international climate change 
policy community (Janetos et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017). My professional experience 
and fieldwork in Malawi, mainly conducted between 2010 and 2012, will allow me 
to give an account of the critical challenges of linking climate change to development 
objectives in those transitional years.
While, according to the first IPCC and UN declarations, international multilateral or 
national institutions are the most appropriate level of governance to address climate 
change, more recent observations underscore the multi-scale nature of climate change 
and the need to deal with the challenge simultaneously at different levels (Gupta 
et al. 2007). According to Gupta et al. (2007), rather than focusing on spatially 
circumscribed resolutions or the optimal level for managing climate change policy – 
whether global, national or local – policymakers should focus on a joint multi-level 
governance response. This new focus on global-local interactions seems to go along 
with the growing debate in critical human geography where the concept of hybridity 
(Bhabha 1994) has been introduced to explain different ways of experiencing and 
practising climate change adaptation (Hulme 2010; Birkenholtz 2011; Burnham et al. 
2016; Goldman et al. 2016; Popke 2016). 
According to Popke (2016), Burnham et al. (2016) and Goldman et al. (2016), the emphasis 
laid on the global nature of climate change in international negotiation processes can 
lead to disregard of alternative spatial scales and knowledges. In the positivist scientific 
tradition (section 3.2.1), the ‘local’ and the ‘particular’ have been considered less 
relevant to policy decisions than the global and defined in opposition to the universal 
(Plumwood 1991; Herod 2010). As argued by Plumwood (1991), the ‘local’ has gained a 
negative connotation because of its proximity to the individual and emotional (feminine) 
spheres. The essential features of a positivist epistemological framework, conversely, 
are assumed to rely both on the primacy of human reason and on distance from the 
value-laden aspects of particular individuals or contexts.
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My empirical chapters will critically explore this conceptualisation, showing how the 
origin of present framings of climate variability and change in Malawi cannot be polarised 
around spatial (global-local) and temporal (present-future) binaries. In fact, they are a 
hybrid of ‘universalising’ colonial practices and locally grounded knowledge traditions. 
While multi-level governance perspectives point to the inadequacy of binary spatial 
policy approaches to climate change (North-South, global-local), they risk shifting the 
process of essentialisation from the spatial scale to cultural or economic elements. In 
fact, Gupta et al. (2007) emphasise that a multi-level governance approach would be 
especially crucial to understanding the cultural drivers and livelihood issues affecting 
local adaptation and mitigation responses. In Chapter 7, I will examine in greater detail 
how even ‘progressive’ climate policy initiatives, inspired by principles of cultural and 
gender inclusion and formal consultation, have approached vulnerability through single 
variables (e.g. gender, culture, geography or economic status) and in isolation from wider 
power (and ontological) structures, potentially leading to exacerbation of inequality.
Scientific debates and international policy negotiations have contributed to defining 
climate change in very specific terms – mainly as a global environmental issue  at one 
end of a spatial (universal/particular) and epistemological (West/Other) spectrum (see 
Chapter 4). These conceptualisations, however, should not be considered as ‘inherent’ 
features of climate change, since they stemmed from the interplay between domestic and 
international forces. My work will in fact recognise climate change as a hybrid socio-
cultural construct escaping nature-culture dualisms and emerging from the contrasts, 
continuities and overlapping between spatial and temporal scales.
As illustrated by STS scholars through the concept of scientific paradigm, scientific 
claims do not overlap with policy agendas by coincidence. For instance, in his analysis 
of power in the climate science-policy interface, Richard (2001) argued that the global 
climate change policy regime emerged as a result of various issue-related and interaction-
related factors. Among them were the development of scientific knowledge about 
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climate change, the transition of the issue from the scientific to the political agenda – as 
discussed in the next chapter – and the interplay between the international regime and 
national interests and negotiation tactics. Briefly, a global perspective served the purpose 
of ensuring that the authority of scientific bodies of global knowledge production such 
as the IPCC was recognised (section 3.3.2), as well as granting visibility to climate 
change public policy and protecting specific national economic interests (e.g. limiting 
GHGs emission reduction targets). Some of these conceptualisations overlapped: for 
example, developing countries shared a global vision of climate change centred on 
a development perspective, while European countries sustained a global conception 
focusing on the scientific aspects (Table 4).
3.3.2 The role of science in the international climate policy 
framework 
In a context of rising global consensus on climate knowledge, the IPCC has emerged as 
a mediating force, able to neutrally enter the regulatory and policy domains thanks to 
its scientific expertise.
STS reflections on the ‘boundaries of science’ (Gieryn 1989; Latour 2000) provide 
particularly useful insights into the origin of the IPCC global scientific authority. The 
positivist conceptualisation of science assumes that non-specialised knowledges (outside 
Table 4 – Perspectives in defining the climate change issue
Perspective Actors





European countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
National USA, Japan, Russia and oil-producing states
Environmental and natural science
(research-based evidence)
European countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; 
USA, Japan, Russia and oil-producing states
Development Developing Countries
Source: adapted from Bodansky (2001).
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the boundaries of ‘certified’ climate science) do not possess the same explanatory 
value of scientific expertise (Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001). This process, defined 
as “boundary work” (Gieryn 1983; Restivo 2001), leads climate scientists engaged 
in policy advisory roles to extend their material and symbolic resources in order to 
simultaneously reinforce their standing, access to funding and professional autonomy.
Some of the narratives used by scientists to expand and protect their authority have 
focused on the utility of science for advancing technology or adopting impartial policies 
(Gieryn 1983). Shackley and Wynne (1996) noted that scientists increasingly need to 
justify their research in terms of its policy relevance in order to secure funding and 
meet global expectations for environmental science. Conversely, scientific evidence 
is used by policymakers to strategically or symbolically legitimise policy solutions 
by selecting the analysis that better conforms to pre-existing policy options (Rayner 
2003; Grainger 2009; Juntti et al. 2009; Lidskog 2014). As a consequence, scientific 
knowledge is deployed to strengthen consensus around appropriate policy responses, 
while at the same time allowing policymakers to locate the bulk of responsibility 
for tackling climate change within the realm of science (van der Sluijs et al. 1998; 
Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001; Rayner 2003). As highlighted by Grundmann (2007), 
in this process knowledge claims are used instrumentally to achieve specific policy 
goals. What I described in this section is a circular process whereby politicians tend 
to legitimise policies through positivist science (numbers, models, etc.) and scientists 
are forced to produce results that can be used by politicians. Thus, science and policy 
become inextricably intertwined, especially with regard to their legitimacy, meaning 
that they need each other to be legitimised.
This brings back the issue of demarcation between science and expertise raised by 
Gieryn (1983) in the early STS debates. In particular, the fact that scientists define 
certain characteristics of science as inherent and unique is part of an ideological and 
constructed effort to distinguish their work – boundary work – and its products from 
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non-scientific intellectual activities. When the goal is the expansion of authority and 
expertise, the ambiguous boundaries of science heighten the contrast between science 
and non-science – or ‘pseudo-science’, such as indigenous knowledge. Shackley and 
Wynne (1996) noted that the uncertainties surrounding climate science may have 
been used by scientists both as a way to legitimise the IPCC’s special niche to reach 
a science-based consensus and to secure financial and political support for further 
research. For example, global to regional numerical models (‘climate scenarios’) 
provide the quantitative basis for climate change projections and associated risks – a 
plausible future climate constructed for investigating the potential consequences of 
human-induced change. However, as noted by the IPCC (2015), they overall have not 
yet reached the necessary maturity to fully represent future conditions that account 
for natural climate variability and, consequently, to be consistently used by the impact 
assessment community. 
The epistemological influence of the IPCC may reside in its ability to act at the same 
time as an intergovernmental and a scientific institution (Grundmann 2007; Ho-
Lem et al. 2011; Lidskog 2014). Although it was established in the 1988 by the UN 
General Assembly to allow governments to build consensus on the climate science 
production process, its first and most influential outcome was the 1990 scientific 
assessment of global warming, drafted by an international community of climate 
scientists (Bodansky 2001). The historical role of the IPCC has been to synthesise and 
consolidate scientific knowledge, in the belief that scientific consensus can ensure 
stable political outcomes from international negotiations (Grundmann 2007; Ho-Lem 
et al. 2011). Haas (2004), however, highlights the fact that policy actors in the IPCC 
play a fundamental role in shaping the science advisory process, appointing lead 
scientists or voting for the assessment reports. For instance, in 2002, the United States 
vetoed the appointment of a well-regarded American climatologist, Robert Watson, 
in favour of Rajendra Pachauri, based on the belief that Watson was too independent 
from the US administration (Hass 2004).
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Although the degree to which the IPCC is able to assess policy-useful knowledge 
is politically circumscribed (Haas 2004), IPCC findings are presented as the best 
available science, disjointed from political action. Sharp boundaries are maintained 
between science and policy to gain credibility. As noted by Corbera et al. (2015), 
the IPCC is largely considered as the authoritative voice of scientific knowledge (see 
Chapter 5 for national decision makers’ perspectives). What is often missing in the 
public perception, however, is a reflection on the wide array of socio-cultural processes 
involved in the preparation of the assessment reports. For instance, the writing and 
revising of the reports tend to privilege specific institutional affiliations (US- and 
UK-based), pre-existing scientific collaboration and training patterns (dominated by 
economics or engineering in the working group on mitigation) (Corbera et al. 2015).
The IPCC has gone from initially being the main reviewer of policy-relevant science 
to becoming the only dispenser of climate policy prescriptions perceived as reliable 
(Grundmann 2007), helping to define and legitimise specific conceptualisations 
of climate change (e.g. empiricist, positivist). The epistemological authority of the 
IPCC, however, has been criticised (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Grundmann 2012; 
Corbera 2015). Part of the criticism has been sparked by the email controversy3 – also 
known as ‘climategate’ – which involved the East Anglia’s Climate Research Units 
(CRU) in November 2009. Lead climate scientists were accused of omitting specific 
findings to prevent uncomfortable research from being selected for peer review 
process and inclusion in the IPCC assessment reports (Grundmann 2012; Maibach 
et al. 2012). In reaction to the climategate, the IPCC undertook an institutional 
reform of its management structure. The Panel, in particular, shifted towards 
increasing transparency, data traceability and quality assurance in several areas, 
including the author selection process or citation of non-peer reviewed literature. 
The IPCC has been in fact accused of excluding knowledge claims generated in 
3 In November 2009, thousands of personal emails and research papers were copied without authorization from a 
server at the University of East Anglia in the UK and posted on two internet blogs. An international scandal broke, 
involving leading climate scientists who were accused of having altered temperature reconstructions of past climates 
and recent observational records to increase public belief in anthropogenic climate change and legitimise the role 
of the climate scientific community. An investigation concluded that no fraud or scientific misconduct had occurred 
(Grundmann 2012; Maibach et al. 2012).
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domains outside certified predictive science (indigenous knowledges, religious 
beliefs, etc.) (Grundmann 2007; Ho-Lem et al. 2011), as well as overlooking national, 
geographical and gender diversity in the authorship groups (Corbera et al. 2015; 
IPCC 2019).
The broad patterns of national participation in the IPCC show a predominance of 
authors and specific worldviews from North America and Europe, just as in the WTO, 
and hence from richer and more populous countries that have greater financial and 
human resources to devote to its processes (Haas 2004; Ho-Lem et al. 2011; Corbera 
et al. 2015). In 1995, the IPCC started making efforts to improve participation from 
developing countries, requiring that the chairmanship of each working group be 
shared between authors from developing and developed countries (Ho-Lem et al. 
2011). Although geographic representation has increased, Corbera et al. (2015) note 
that actors and institutions from the Global North still play a hegemonic role. Most 
of the underlying research is carried out in northern universities and institutes 
(Biermann 2002; Haas 2004; Kandlikar et al. 2011; Pasgaard and Strange 2013). In 
Chapter 5, I will reflect on the limited capacity of Malawi’s scientists to participate 
in the IPCC, arguing however that merely ensuring epistemological diversity within 
IPCC working groups does not revert the hierarchy of knowledges and disciplines.
As further explored in my empirical chapters, the rationalist ontological armature 
shapes not only international negotiation practices but also the value systems 
through which climate variability and change are experienced in Malawi. The IPCC 
example highlights how the definition of specific characteristics of climate change 
not only influences the type of knowledge flowing into policymaking (e.g. science-
based) but also how the parties to the conventions design and perform negotiation 
strategies. In particular, specific epistemological assumptions (e.g. the primacy of 
natural sciences) underlying climate knowledge determine what competencies are 
needed to effectively negotiate in international policy regimes or to translate it into 
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relevant national policies. The epistemological tensions in the IPCC knowledge-
producing committees (e.g. what type of knowledge matters for climate change) could 
point to more profound ontological conflicts, such as the unbalanced distribution of 
economic, cultural and political power in international policy processes. 
From an STS perspective, the boundary of science is shifted and used to protect 
claims of expertise by arguing that only specialists can evaluate the relevance and 
usability of scientific knowledge in the policy domain (Gieryn 1983; Shackley and 
Wynne 1996). Other STS scholars note that the flaws in the IPCC management 
structure relate to a binary model that linearly links science to policy, allowing 
policy actors to “cherry pick” (Grundmann 2012, 285) the scientific evidence needed 
to advance their policy cases. The result is a politicisation of climate science where 
disagreements in policy values (e.g. communication and presentation of findings 
for public consumption) appear as disputes over scientific knowledge, such as in 
the climategate. As recognised by Hulme (2017), a positivist approach to decision-
support (through social, economic or climate modelling) tends to reduce the space 
and recognition for human agency and the evolution, adaptation and innovation of 
values, cultures and practices, as further discussed in the next sections.
In section 3.3.1, I emphasised how, since early negotiations, developing countries 
advocated for a development-centred view of climate change both to draw attention 
to the impact of climate change on development and to counter the primacy of 
the Western scientific and technological apparatus supported by the IPCC. The 
next chapter will argue that shifting the core of the negotiations to a policy- rather 
than scientific-based forum was not sufficient to increase developing countries’ 
negotiating capacities, nor did it bring about extensive change in international 
political balances and development pathways. The political changes in the 
climate policy regime that developing countries hoped for, such as a more equal 
representation of knowledges and interests, did not entail questioning the overall 
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ontological apparatus the regime was built upon. Thus, the developmentalisation 
of climate change did not put an end to the patterns of knowledge and financial 
dependency initiated during the colonial era but actually reinforced them, as further 
discussed in Chapter 4.
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has problematised the concept of science-based decision-making in 
the context of climate change, outlining how this idea has emerged as a socio-
cultural and political construction from a number of partial and politically 
contingent discourses. The narrative on global climate change emerged from the 
international political negotiations that defined climate change as an essentially 
long-term, irreversible and human-induced threat occurring on a wide scale. This 
conceptualisation stemmed from a scientific consensus on the global nature of 
the climatic challenge following international negotiations between scientific- 
(e.g. IPCC) and policy-oriented (e.g. UNFCCC) actors. Industrialised countries 
supported a focus on the global and scientific dimensions of climate change to 
aid the quest for a multilateral climate policy response. Developing countries 
gradually entered the international climate change arena, stressing the importance 
of a development-driven view of climate change.
The STS theoretical framework provides a means for reflection on the tensions 
between climate change knowledge and policy production. From an STS 
perspective, claims to scientific authority can be dismantled, assuming that there 
is no way to separate science from values in any policy area, as any boundary is 
artificial, temporary and convenient to the purposes of the individuals or groups 
with authority to draw lines (Cozzens and Woodhouse 2001). By criticising 
positivist and rationalist approaches, STS outlines the roots of the epistemological 
and ontological authority of natural science (stemming from the human mind’s 
supposed ability to objectively know and control nature) to frame climate change 
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as a biophysical phenomenon that can be linearly mastered by neutral techniques 
and expertise.
In the empirical chapters, the social constructivist approach will allow me to 
explore climate science as a social and contingent construction in the context of 
colonial and postcolonial relations, facilitating the identification of political or 
institutional interests in the production of a global climate change knowledge. 
Through a postcolonial critique of rationalism, STS will enable a counter-narrative 
perspective on the achievements of Western science and technologies from a Global 
South point of view. Furthermore, feminist STS will provide helpful insights to 
reflect on the links between anthropocentrism and androcentrism (Plumwood 1991; 
Harding 2008), outlining how women’s and nature’s marginalisation is grounded 
in positivist rationalism and in the hierarchical binomials of mind-body, universal-
particular and public-private. 
Chisomo Bera’s statement at the opening of this chapter arguably summarises 
some of the key issues f lagged up by STS branches since the third quarter of the 
last century and explored in this chapter. Her claim reflects a tension between the 
desire to comply with the IPCC (Western-based) recognised authorship and the 
propensity to deploy local (and possibly culturally emancipated) knowledges for 
national climate change policy design. How can these multiple and contrasting 
aspirations for a usable and reliable science be accounted for?
If the concepts of ‘globality’ and ‘scientificity’ emerged as representative of the 
consensus on climate change global knowledge (in section 3.2.1 I discussed how 
the positivist scientific thought usually polarises differences in epistemological 
binaries, drawing hierarchical lines of superiority and inferiority), what are the 
alternative epistemological features left out by the international policy and scientific 
frameworks? How does this omission shape individual and collective ways of 
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thinking and acting upon climatic changes? The combination of several theoretical 
and methodological tools offered by STS and its postcolonial and feminist critiques 
to science will emerge as increasingly compelling as I gradually move towards the 
exploration of the many different ways of knowing and acting on climate change I 
encountered in the context of Malawi.
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Chapter 4
The rise of the climate-resilient development 
paradigm
4.1 The key features of an ‘all-encompassing’ climate 
change
Within the recent Paris Agreement it was stressed that, without science and research 
from the Global South, ‘universal’ (sic) climate science is unachievable (IISDa 2015). 
This statement sheds light on the geographic and political hierarchy characterising 
international relations in the climate policy regime, which materialised in the Annex I/
non-Annex I Countries framing within the UNFCCC (section 4.2). While attesting to 
the importance of acknowledging the structural power marks embedded in the current 
climate change knowledge production processes, it endorses the positivist ideals and 
aspirations for a universal science that can be transferred along a North-South binary 
(section 4.3). Climate change, which initially emerged as a scientific issue, came to be 
gradually defined by the UNFCCC as intertwined with development issues, especially 
through the North-South approach sustained by both developed and developing countries. 
This chapter will explore the international climate and development policy architecture 
through an STS theoretical lens, laying the groundwork for the investigation of how 
specific conceptualisations of climate change materialise in the context of Malawi. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the climate change epistemology endorsed by the international 
bodies of science and policy production seems to be characterised by a series of features 
– rationalist, positivist, anthropocentric – anchored in the dualistic foundational 
view defining the Western epistemological and ontological apparatus (Plumwood 
1991; Ingold 2010; Blaser 2014). The bulk of positivist rationalities generates a sort 
of ‘all-encompassing’ (Blaser 2014) narrative on climate change that tends to exclude 
contextualised knowledges, neglecting the interconnectedness of climate change and 
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historically contingent and power-related issues, as well as the replication of neocolonial 
relationships in Malawi. In fact, this chapter argues that the key narratives defining 
international climate change knowledge originated in the political, cultural and historical 
interactions between the positivist scientific apparatus and knowledges ‘situated’ in 
national stakes or contextual epistemological positions (gender, indigenous).
Thus, the supposed primacy of global climate scientific epistemology can be either 
criticised or enriched by pointing to the historical contingency of Western scientific and 
political traditions, from which global climate change knowledge mainly originated. 
This is crucial to shedding light on how contextual and alternative knowledges and 
experiences, erased or neglected by dominant epistemologies, can be better identified, 
expressed and sustained (Chapter 8).
4.2 The climate and development policy architecture
With the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, the classification of global climate 
change actors crystallised into two opposing categories: Developing Countries (non-
Annex I countries) and Industrialised Countries (IC, Annex I and II countries). Several 
developing countries were further classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) – 
their current number is 47 – on the basis of statistical indicators: gross national income 
per capita; human assets (nutrition, health, education and literacy); and economic 
vulnerability (natural and trade-related shocks; physical and economic exposure to 
shocks; smallness and remoteness) (Cornell 2010; Gupta 2015).
Climate change has thus been framed as a North-South issue since early negotiations,1 
echoing a hierarchical organisation of geographical and socio-economic space featuring 
the Western ‘external’ (modern-traditional) great divide. This spatial binary is especially 
sustained by developing/non-Annex I countries, whose priority in the UNFCCC is to 
1 This was not done without contention. For example, between 1991 and 1996 scientific controversies arose about 
the definition of survival vs. luxury emissions (terms coined by China at COP-3 to emphasise equity aspects); the 
possible inclusion of the right to development clause; the mechanisms for adaptation finance and implementation 
(Gupta 2015).
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maximise financial assistance for capacity-building and climate change adaptation as well 
as technology transfer from developed countries (Richards 2001). During negotiations, 
for example, LDCs often emphasise their need for technological and financial support 
to reduce the rate of emissions and facilitate adaptation, as well as developed countries’ 
historical responsibilities for GHG emissions (Richards 2001; Gupta 2015).
Because climate change was initially framed as a global and technical problem, its links 
to climate change and development pathways revolved especially around the need for 
governments and corporations to limit greenhouse gases emissions in their pursuit of 
economic growth and profit. Until the early 2000s, international negotiations focused on 
emissions reduction and the need for non-emitting energy technologies to be transferred 
to developing countries (Janetos et al. 2012). 
The Cancun Agreements (2010), and more recently the Paris Agreement (Article 12, 
UNFCCC 2015), have restated the importance of ‘capacity building’ and transferring 
technologies and capacities from Annex I to non-Annex I countries. Although the 
semantic distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries is less marked in the 
Paris Agreement (the Parties in the Agreement are defined as developed and developing 
countries), capacity and technology transfers still serve as a way to compensate the latter 
for the former’s historical responsibility for GHG emissions (reflected in the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’). 
The UNFCCC country classification according to gross national income, as well as its 
focus on national development pathways and capacity transfer, recalls the 1950s classical 
and neoclassical concepts of development as economic growth (Lélé 1991; Escobar 1995; 
Redclift 2006). These theories equate development with Gross National Product (GNP) 
growth and conceive development as a process of constant but directed economic change 
(Lélé 1991) with high levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and technology transfer 
(Escobar 1995; Pepper 1999; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). The wealth generated 
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through capital accumulation by richer groups, they argue, would produce benefits for 
the poor by ‘trickling down’ through the economy and raising the income of the whole 
population (Escobar 1995; Pepper 1999; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010).
According to neoclassical economics, the goal of development is to “increase social 
welfare” (Lélé 1991, 609); however, the process of social change is measured in terms 
of economic outputs and material consumption. As noted by Escobar (1995) and 
Pepper (1999), in neoclassical (rational) economics, a country’s capacity to secure 
advancements in science and technology is seen a prerequisite for economic progress 
and development (see section 4.3 for further reflections on the neo-liberal definition of 
development). In lack thereof, sustained bilateral or multilateral transfers of skills and 
capacity become an important component of development projects (Escobar 1995). 
Capacity transfers assume uniformity of geographical, social, cultural and economic 
spaces, on the basis of which skills and technologies can be conveyed through a binary 
transfer from one context to another.
When defined as conventional economic growth (Lélé 1991; Escobar 1995; Pepper 
1999; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010), development may however generate inequality 
and social conflict – because of the market economy’s tendency towards concentrating 
wealth and failure to redistribute it effectively (Escobar 1995; Kaplan 2000; Easterly 
2002; Sharp et al. 2010) or because of environmental damage caused by increased 
greenhouse gas emissions, widespread use of fossil fuel, and consumerism (Pepper 
1999; Redclift 2006; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010).
In the past decade, climate change international policy processes have started reflecting 
more critical conceptions of development. Following the 1980s post-development 
debates (see section 4.3), there is a growing consensus that development should 
aim at reconciling economic gains with individuals’ lifestyle improvements through 
redistributive policies focusing on poverty reduction, health and education (Cannon 
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and Müller-Mahn 2010). More specifically, development is believed to be ‘sustainable’ 
when it balances the needs of present and future generations without compromising the 
Earth system’s capacity to preserve and reproduce itself (see Escobar 1995, Pepper 1999, 
and Redclift 2006 for a discussion of the ideal of sustainable development proposed 
by the Brundtland Commission in 1987). As argued by Sachs (2012), “sustainable 
development embraces the so-called triple bottom line approach to human well-being” 
by which world’s societies should build on “a combination of economic development, 
environmental sustainability, and social inclusion” (2206). 
Post-development critiques have questioned the actual progressiveness of sustainable 
development (Escobar 1995; Pepper 1999; Redclift 2006; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010), which, according to Pepper (1999), is nothing more than rational management of 
natural resources within the production of capital. The underlying principle of capitalist 
development, which revolves around profit accumulation at the expense of the Earth’s 
carrying capacity (treated as economic externality or hidden cost), would be incompatible 
with environmental protection and economic growth. Pepper (1999) argued that an 
‘ideal’ model of sustainable development would limit the global marketplace (including 
transport costs and GHG emissions), favouring spatially closer market exchanges and 
social interactions. Furthermore, the longer time horizons demanded by sustainability 
principles are discordant with the short-term and sector-specific perspective necessary 
for political decision-making and operability in the global market (Pepper 1999; Cannon 
and Müller-Mahn 2010).
The links and synergies between climate change and sustainable development policies 
have been recently acknowledged by climate policy and science actors (Cannon and 
Müller-Mahn 2010; Janetos et al. 2012; Yim et al. 2017), considering that most LDCs 
within the UNFCCC are among the main recipients of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) (Brautigam and Knack 2004). The 2001 IPCC Third Assessment Report explicitly 
accounted for the influence of climate change on human and ecosystems’ well-being in 
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terms of food supplies, water and energy, which in turn affect populations’ prosperity, 
health and security. The 2007-08 UN Development Report, “Fighting Climate Change in 
a Divided World”, indicates climate change as the defining human development challenge 
of the twenty-first century (UNDP 2007). The report emphasises how human development 
choices, through the emission of GHGs, will have a significant impact on the state of the 
climate system. Development pathways, correspondingly, will determine the ability of 
societies to adapt to the potential impacts of climate change (UNDP 2007). The linkages 
between climate change and sustainable development have been acknowledged especially 
as trade-offs between global economic growth per capita and the unprecedented stress it 
places on the Earth’s ecosystem, particularly in low-income countries (OECD 2012). The 
Paris Agreement has recently established a global adaptation goal “of enhancing adaptive 
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a 
view to contributing to sustainable development” (UNFCCC 2015).
Adaptation has been especially conceptualised in terms of sustainability and  development. 
As argued by Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010), this relationship is manifold. As for 
development, adaptation involves change to maintain the capacity of individuals, 
ecosystems and societies to deal with current or future predicted climatic change (Nelson 
et al. 2007). Adaptation addresses the outcomes of biophysical changes to the environment, 
such as droughts, flooding, water quantity and quality, and degrading ecosystems. Their 
interaction with social and economic conditions – the other two interrelated dimensions 
of sustainable development  (Pepper 1999; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010; Sachs 2012) – 
shapes individual vulnerability to climate change.  For instance, climate change impacts 
are expected to affect people’s opportunities to generate income. Furthermore, as pointed 
by Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010): “Adaptation involves billions of people in less 
developed countries who are already the object of development policies for many NGOs, 
governments and donors” (622).  According to a UNEP report (2016) on adaptation 
finance, in developing countries climate-resilience activities are often integrated into 
development interventions. For instance, the financial needs of adapting to climate change 
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result from the difference between the costs of adaptation and the financing available to 
meet developmental cooperation activities (UNEP 2016). 
4.2.1 The dangers of resilience thinking
The concepts of climate change vulnerability and resilience2 help to define the “development 
context” of climate change (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). The IPCC (2012) report 
“Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation” acknowledges that anthropogenic climate change is rapidly hindering 
development in many countries. The report also defines vulnerability and resilience as 
the resulting products of economic, social, environmental and political processes. In the 
resilience framework, mathematical and modelling simulations are applied to natural 
resource management, focusing on relationships between components, disturbances and 
perturbations that contribute to the socio-ecological system’s susceptibility to change. 
Deriving from natural (ecosystem and landscape ecology) and technological (physics or 
engineering) domains, this approach emphasises the functioning of the socio-ecological 
system as a whole, as well as the biophysical conditions that put societies at risk of hazards 
(Nelson et al. 2007).  
Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010) argue that in the context of climate change adaptation, the 
resilience approach “is not sufficiently conducive to the inclusion of the other (my emphasis) 
risks and crises that affect the majority of people who are linked to the ecosystem through 
their livelihoods” (625). In fact, they add, it tends to neglect the functioning of individual 
components (e.g. societal actors, power relations, beliefs systems, etc.) of the socio-ecological 
system, while the concept of vulnerability clearly identifies the economically and politically 
induced conditions influencing people’s exposure to risk. Although the two concepts are 
frequently mentioned together in policy documents (e.g. see above the statement in the Paris 
Agreement), there are fundamental tensions between them. Because the resilience approach 
2 Nelson et al. (2007) define vulnerability as “the susceptibility of a system to disturbances determined by exposure 
to perturbations, sensitivity to perturbations, and the capacity to adapt” (395). Resilience is conceptualised by the 
same authors as: “the amount of change a system can undergo and still retain the same function and structure while 
maintaining options to develop” (395).
100
is mainly concerned with ensuring the flexibility of natural and societal systems to future 
climate change, issues of equity in adaptation processes and outcomes may be neglected.  
In the mid-2000s, the UNFCCC shift from a climate-first (e.g. NAPAs) to a development-
first (e.g. NAPs) focus in international climate change policy negotiations drove several 
multilateral and bilateral development organisations to design resilient approaches to climate 
change policies and programmes that would safeguard development from climate impacts. 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed its approach 
to NAPs based on a Climate Resilient Development (CRD) framework, emphasising that 
the design and support of adaptation plans should take account of each country’s national 
development goals rather than focusing on exclusively climate-driven projects (Yim et al. 
2017). In Germany, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH 
(GIZ) designed a “Climate Proofing for Development” approach (Fröde et al. 2013) that 
advises on how to integrate climate change adaptation into development. In the United 
Kingdom, the Department for International Development (DFID) formulated the concept of 
“climate compatible development” (CDKN 2010) with the aim of creating new development 
landscapes supporting economic growth and social development in the face of the multiple 
threats posed by climate change (CDKN 2010). 
Furthermore, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in late September 
2015 under the frame of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
include 17 goals and 169 targets, many of which show the synergies between development 
and climate change policy agendas. Unlike the 2000-2015 Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the SDGs place particular emphasis on the role of human activity (e.g. 
through economic and population growth) in influencing fundamental earth dynamics 
(Sachs 2012). Goal 13 specifically states the need to take urgent action to combat climate 
change focusing on five specific targets, each envisaging different measures. Under 
the post-2015 Development Agenda, poverty eradication is considered key for reducing 
vulnerability and building resilience to climate change.
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With a focus on capacity transfer (see section 4.2.2) and poverty reduction as the 
means for reducing the vulnerability of socio-ecological systems, the climate-resilient 
development paradigm seems to build on both the neo-liberal development discourse 
and the systemic framework of resilience. The former assumes that the best way to 
reduce climate vulnerability is through improved economic activities, technology 
advancements and inputs provision, which are expected to automatically increase 
the extent to which losses and damages can be avoided. The latter, treating human 
response to environmental perturbations as an outcome of ‘rational’ actors, tends to 
remove the inherent power-related connotations of vulnerability (Cannon and Müller-
Mahn 2010). Issues of justice, whether ‘distributive’ (who is harmed by climate change 
and benefits from adaptation) or ‘procedural’ (whose knowledge matters in identifying 
vulnerabilities) are overlooked (Nelson et al. 2007).
The interplay between development (sustainable or neo-liberal), climate change and 
adaptation has several implications. Whether climate-resilient development can help 
reduce climate risk or is itself responsible for generating vulnerabilities is still an 
open question. Whether these approaches are heralding radical or ‘ideal’ generations 
of sustainable development pathways or producing “green capitalism” (Pepper 1999), 
and whether they can effectively facilitate adaptation and vulnerability reduction at the 
local level (Bahadur et al. 2013), remains controversial (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). 
In Chapter 7, I will show how climate-resilient development interventions that seek to 
address asset disparities (through the provision of farming technologies) actually increase 
individual vulnerability to climate change.  In section 4.3, I will draw on the postcolonial, 
post-development and feminist critiques of STS to problematise the conceptualisation of 
the “development context” of climate change. This aspect is especially important, as it 
allows me to introduce my empirical chapters where I will discuss how the interaction 
between climate and development shapes the way climate-resilient development is 
translated into national policies in Malawi, affecting people’s livelihoods.
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4.2.2 Mainstreaming climate universals into national contexts 
The previous sections highlighted how international climate policy and scientific 
processes facilitated the gradual emergence of a climate and development policy 
architecture through a series of multilateral agreements. Multilateral and bilateral 
development actors have been particularly central to facilitating the development of 
climate policies within national and subnational contexts (Agrawala 2004; Janetos et 
al. 2012), aligning technical and financial support with the key pillars (e.g. capacity 
building, technology transfer, etc.) of the international climate policy regime.
In the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, capacity building is emphasised as a major cross-
cutting theme of climate-resilient development, since it enables developing countries 
to achieve the objectives of the conventions and participate in the international policy 
arena. According to a UNEP report (2016) on adaptation finance, funding for capacity 
building as a primary means to reduce vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate 
change has now become a priority for donors. Total bilateral and multilateral funds 
for climate change adaptation in developing countries reached US$ 22.5 billion in 
2014. 
Richards (2001) and Biagini et al. (2014) confirm that attention to adaptation in 
UNFCCC negotiations has been mainly focused on financing activities with a strong 
emphasis on capacity building, overlooking the importance of the implementation of 
adaptation actions. Biagini et al. (2014) note that too much attention has been paid to 
helping LDCs meet their official obligations under the UNFCCC, such as developing 
National Communications or National Adaptation Plans of Actions (NAPAs), and only 
limited support has been provided for developing and implementing actual policies. 
A coding exercise of 158 adaptation activities from 92 projects funded by the GEF 
(Table 5) shows that the most frequently funded adaptation actions are those related 
to capacity building, management and planning, and policy (Biagini et al. 2014).
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In the case of Malawi, understanding how climate change is integrated within a 
development planning and assistance context is particularly challenging (UNDP 2012; 
Kosamu 2013; GoM 2014). Kosamu (2013) observed that it is hard to distinguish how 
domestic and international resources are allocated to climate change adaptation, as 
activities and investments are often classified under a single ‘environmental’ budget 
code. More generally, Brautigam and Knack (2004) highlighted how, in Malawi, 
foreign aid has funded more than 40% of government expenditures on average for 
nearly 20 years. A recent “Report on Public Expenditure Review on Environment and 
Disaster Risk Management (DRM)” (GoM 2014) documents the public expenditure 
of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Management for the 2006–2012 
period. The report interestingly remarks how Official Development Assistance3 
supported the environment and natural resources sector to the tune of US$ 99 
million over the six-year period through direct support of 25 projects. While 86% 
3 Malawi’s top ten development partners in the 2010-/11 financial year included: the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Global Fund, the European Union, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), Centres for Diseases Control, 
and German Development Cooperation (GIZ).
Table 5 – GEF adaptation activities coding
Adaptation typology Number of occurrence in Global Environment Facility 
project document texts 
Capacity building 1310
Management and planning 474








Source: adapted from Biagini et al. (2014).
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of total environment and climate change financing by donors supported government 
projects, DRM financing to government institutions totalled 60%, with the remainder 
channelled through non-state actors. In most donor support modalities, the Malawi 
government directly manages all project activities and implementation, unless project 
implementation and financing are devolved, such as in the DRM proportion, to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (GoM 2014).
This snapshot of Malawi’s environment4 financial architecture points to the key role 
played by central government departments in national climate policy formulation and 
implementation (Kosamu 2013). By linking climate policy to development planning 
processes, UNFCCC international agreements assigned national governments a central 
role in the formulation and implementation of national climate change programmes 
and projects. In the case of Malawi, this pre-eminent position is reinforced by the 
substantial financial support provided by development partners to the Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Change Management. As argued by Biagini et al. (2014), 
this could also point to a tendency towards allocating resources for capacity building 
(or measures enabling the necessary conditions for an adaptive response) to line 
ministries (Planning, Finance or Environment) or governmental structures, rather 
than to policy activities that address the effects of climate change and the resulting 
vulnerability in communities.
My empirical chapters will further argue the influence of international and national 
policy mechanisms (NAPAs, NAPs) in shaping the ways adaptation is translated at the 
central government and community levels. The prominent guidance of international 
and national policy and planning mechanisms in Malawi (e.g. NAPA) may also clarify 
why national policy directives tend to be implemented on the ground by NGOs in 
Kasache through government-supported institutions such as the Local Civil Protection 
Committees (Kosamu 2013; Chapter 7). 
4 The report also highlights the difficulty of distinguishing between environment and climate change programmes 
and expenditure, as in all ministries and departments, environment and climate change expenditures are coded under 
the same budget category.
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In the attempt to provide assistance on climate change issues, however, the 
international community has faced a set of challenges common to development aid 
(section 4.3). In recent years, due to the global financial crisis and cuts in public 
spending, development aid has increasingly focused on concepts such as ‘value for 
money’ or ‘aid effectiveness’, continuing to deliver development within a neo-liberal 
framework (Escobar 1995; Easterly 2002; Sharp et al. 2010). This tendency has been 
gaining momentum in bilateral and multilateral aid, especially since the Monterrey 
Consensus (2002) stated that ODA can be effective only when supported by sound 
policies and good economic governance (Tendler 1997; Dollar and Levin 2006). This 
is not new. As argued by Escobar (1995), the institutionalisation of development put 
pressure on government officials in Latin America to transform the style and scope 
of their activities to meet the requirements of institutions such as the World Bank. 
In Chapter 5, I will explore how the international quest for good governance and 
accountability in climate change has shaped policymakers’ narratives in Malawi 
(e.g. about what constitutes usable knowledge or expertise), influencing the national 
capacity to formulate policies that are relevant to national or local contexts.
The necessity to focus on the issue of capacity is linked to the UNFCCC’s understanding 
of climate change as having physical and global features, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The belief that skills and capacities can be benchmarked and transferred across 
regions underpins ideals of spatial homogenisation and North-South hierarchies, and 
a conception of the world as one interconnected space. The transfer of capacities may 
introduce specific development rationalities to national contexts, on the assumption 
that geographically, economically and socially vulnerable countries and communities 
cannot start implementing certain types of adaptation actions until they have created 
an enabling environment. 
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4.3 The controversy of the climate-resilient 
development approach
4.3.1 Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies (PCSTS)
The idea of capacity building endorsed by the UNFCCC is underpinned by the belief that 
human progress is linear and positive and reflects the conceptualisation of development 
as ‘modernisation’, first articulated in the late nineteenth century and then updated in 
the 1950s when the post-World War II development apparatus was established (Escobar 
1995; Everett 1997).
Postcolonial Studies of Science (PCSTS) are central to unveiling how several scientific 
and policy narratives in the climate change debate are often considered universally 
valid (see Chapter 6 on soil conservation theories) despite being in fact very partial and 
selective and originating in particular historical contexts such as European colonialism 
(Feierman 1994; Edge 2001; Restivo 2001; Roosth and Silbey 2008).
More specifically, the modernisation ideal is grounded in rationalist and evolutionary 
explanations: just as the human species evolves from childhood to maturity, societies – as 
well as the “nonhuman world” (Plumwood 1991) – progress from tradition to modernity 
through stages of economic growth, increasingly separating the public and private spheres 
in the social domain (Escobar 1995). The notion of modernisation underpins the idea 
of time and evolution as linear and progressive and, as argued by critical feminist and 
STS scholars (Haraway 1988; Plumwood 1991; Latour 2000; Blaser 2014), along with the 
internal great divide (nature/culture) and the external great divide (modern/traditional), it 
is one of the core features of Western scientific and policy thought.
Blaser (2014), in particular, notes how the history of European culture is traditionally 
represented against a background of linear time, a pathway of progressive evolution, 
where modernity is equated with the present. Interestingly, approaches to climate 
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change and development substantially share a linear conception of time, too, although 
focusing on different time scales. While scientific analyses of climate change extend 
into the unknown future (e.g. projections target multi-decadal to centennial time scales) 
to include possible outcomes that are hardly perceived by most, development policies 
focus on the transformation of present issues such as poverty, malnutrition, health, etc., 
on the assumption that it will endure in the future.
According to Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010), this discrepancy in time frames 
hinders the integration of climate change into development policies. For instance, while 
development involves an imminent promise of improvement, adaptation renders life 
possible under unknown though expected climatic changes (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010). This perspective may help to understand the challenges faced by NAPA in Malawi 
(Chapter 5), where a short-term focus on adaptation – reminiscent of the short time span 
of neo-liberal development efforts (Pepper 1999) – did not succeed in fundamentally 
challenging some of the root causes of climate vulnerability grounded in the historical 
experience of colonialism (Chapter 7).
The epistemology of climate change seems to have embraced the key features of the great 
divides in positivist thinking: a focus on predicting and mastering climate change (nature) 
through scientifically advanced human capacities; the modernisation ideal, through which 
societal abilities to adapt to and mitigate climate change are built via technology and 
capacity transfers; a linear and short-term conception of time (i.e. a focus on the present), 
especially in the programmatic approach to climate policy planning (e.g. NAPAs).
What emerges from this and previous chapters is an overall disconnect between the time 
frames characterising IPCC science (substantially multi-decadal and centennial) and 
the temporal spans addressed through UNFCCC policy mechanisms (annual or decadal) 
(Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). Thus, while the positivist perspective endorsed by 
the IPCC has played a major role in situating climate change within the neutral realm of 
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science, UNFCCC climate policy decisions are not automatically informed by longer-
term scientific time frames, especially at the national and subnational levels. In that 
regard, the Paris Agreement (2015, sub-paragraph 7c), its subsidiary bodies, and the 
multilateral Green Climate Fund (GCF Board decisions 2014/07 and 2018/19) have 
recently called for an increase in the use of climate science and information – also 
defined as ‘climate rationale’ – in adaptation decision-making (WMO 2018; see Chapter 
5 for further discussion).
From an STS perspective, this could point to political actors within the scientific 
and policy bodies using science for their own ends and exploiting only those parts of 
positivist discourse that would generate political benefits (e.g. the depoliticisation of 
climate change and an increase in aid flows) (Demeritt 2001; Sarewitz 2011; Weisser 
et al. 2014; Eriksen et al. 2015; Hulme 2015). On the contrary, the elements of climate 
science that could produce critical outcomes (long-term perspectives) have been mostly 
overlooked (Demeritt 2001). In fact, a long-range view of the past or outlook on the 
future could magnify historically grounded causes of climate change or fundamentally 
question future development pathways.
STS has particularly highlighted the key feature of traditional European thinking: the 
epistemological and ontological divides support each other in connecting political 
projects that would seem otherwise unconnected (Blaser 2014). For instance, the 
homogeneity of global space was deployed during colonialism to categorise the world 
into ‘civilisations’ and ‘barbarians’ (Feierman 1994, quoting McNeill, 1963, The Rise 
of the West). At the same time, the linearity of time served to define African societies as 
timeless and static products deriving from and dependent on encounters with the main 
Euro-Asian civilisations. According to this view, African development spreads from the 
North southwards, where ‘civilisation’ is seen as originating in European science and 
culture. The non-Western Other or barbarian was defined (negatively and in opposition) 
as lacking rationality and civilisation, backward and locked out of history. As argued 
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by critical feminist thinkers (section 4.3), the binary polarisation and the superiority 
of the upper-side (the North or the West) were achieved by rejecting and denying the 
characteristics of the non-Western.
With the introduction of historical, cultural and geographical dimensions in social 
constructivism, postcolonial STS emphasises how culture’s position in regional and 
global political and economic hierarchies plays a relevant role in controlling the ways in 
which knowledge is generated, included or excluded in dominant scientific paradigms 
(Harding 2008, 139). For example, Harding (2008) highlights the tendency of Western 
rationalities to forget and repress scientific borrowings from other cultures and the fact 
that European sciences benefitted from the knowledge of the natural world accumulated 
by indigenous cultures.
PCSTS considerably elaborated on the idea of ‘indigenous knowledge’, a tool theorised 
by conventional European iconography to frame Western knowledge and identity 
(Broch-Due and Schroeder 2000; Neumann 2000; Ingold 2010). Historically, the 
concept of indigenous knowledge has been deployed strategically by colonial élites 
to represent stereotyped ‘traditional’ and pristine models of livelihood as inherently 
‘good’ because they are close to nature and compliant with colonial environmental 
management (Neumann 2000). Or, in the case of Malawi (Chapter 6), to represent 
‘primitive’ indigenous practices as environmentally ‘destructive’ and justify the 
enforcement of specific land conservation initiatives. As previously noted (Chapter 3), 
positivist thought focuses on the dichotomies between reason and nature, universal and 
local, to assess what is rational, universal and thereby authentic. Conversely, what is 
natural, local, or indigenous is perceived as ultimately irrational, and rejected, denied 
or removed (Plumwood 1991). In Chapter 6, I will highlight some elements of the 
environmental belief system in Malawi that were selectively appropriated by Christian 
missionaries to reproduce their religious and political power and authority. 
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PCSTS has shown how the growth of European science historically coincided with 
successive phases of expansion of European political power and ideologies. A case in 
point is the development of Western sciences, and especially astronomy, cartography and 
economic botany, which have relied heavily on the success of European exploration and 
colonisation. Through the extraction of knowledges from indigenous groups, European 
colonial authorities reorganised local socio-economic, political and cultural structures 
and drew the colonies into globally dependent relationships and flows that lasted well 
after colonial independence thanks to post-World War II financial and development 
policies (Escobar 1995; Loomba 2005).
The ‘voyages of discovery’ greatly benefitted from the exploitation and appropriation 
of contextual knowledges about flora, fauna, topography, geology, medical plants 
and diseases of newly explored areas, without acknowledging the contribution of 
accumulated indigenous knowledge to European scientific progress (Jasanoff 2004; 
Loomba 2005; Harding 2008; Roosth and Silbey 2008). 
4.3.2 The problematisation of development as ‘modernisation’
While the ideal of development as modernisation flourished in one specific cultural and 
historical knowledge system, the Western one, marginalising and disqualifying the non-
Western ones, it was endorsed by international aid agencies after the Second World War 
(Harding 2008, 131–133). In the 1980s, a mix of approaches labelled as ‘neo-liberal 
economics’ became dominant in the ‘Third World’ under the pressure of international 
development institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB), which focused on the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and monetary 
stabilisation policies (Easterly 2002; Dollar and Levin 2006). The dissemination of 
positivist scientific rationality, at the basis of European economic growth, was assumed 
to lead to social and economic progress worldwide (Feierman 1994; Escobar 1995; 
Everett 1997). The industrialised nations of North America and Europe saw their model 
of development as the ideal model to be inherently and uncritically transferred to ‘Third 
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World’ societies – often former colonies and newly independent states in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (Escobar 1995).
Post-development scholars (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995) underscored the neocolonial 
character of these policies, designed and implemented to equip the Global South with 
northern technologies and know-how. Escobar (1995), for example, argued that international 
development was the result of a historically produced discourse: in the post-World War II 
period, Western experts and politicians had defined the conditions of certain countries as 
poor and backward, turning ‘the poor’ into ‘the assisted’ and designing the tools needed 
to study them and intervene. Development strategies were the outcome of this specific 
definition of the poverty issue and, especially in the former colonies, were employed to 
rebuild the relations between the newly independent states and the metropoles. 
Post-World War II development strategies, for instance, emerged as specific modes 
of national, regional and sectoral planning, where growth was equated to investment, 
which in turn was financed by external aid (Easterly 2002). This called for a type 
of policy planning and institutions (e.g. national planning agencies) on the recipient 
side that would ensure the right allocation of scarce resources, correct market prices, 
and maximise savings. These tools were perceived as neutral, desirable, universally 
applicable and independent of political, cultural and historical content.
According to Easterly (2002), certain traits of the development aid community have 
remained virtually unchanged since its foundation, as it turned into a non-competitive cartel 
of organisations, yet with different objectives and agendas. Resistance to change within 
development bureaucracies, which is apparent in the lack of research, experimentation 
and critical evaluation (see Chapter 1 for some of my personal experiences), is triggered 
by a fear of aid budget cuts due to negative performances and feedback (Easterly 2002). 
Several studies (Ferguson 1994; Michalopoulos, 1999; Easterly 2002; Brautigam and 
Knack 2004) show the problematic impacts of development aid in developing countries. 
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Interviews with women in Kasache point to a tendency of international development actors 
towards overlooking the importance of supplies and long-term project maintenance that 
would allow climate-resilient development initiatives to operate after official development 
assistance has ceased.
Easterly (2002) explored the effects of aid bureaucracies on national government 
institutions, such as their tendency towards defining development outputs as money 
disbursed rather than service delivered; producing many low-return observable outputs 
like reports and frameworks and few high-return observable activities; placing enormous 
demands on management in national bureaucracies and treating national civil servants 
as a free good. Especially in financially constrained contexts, development aid can have 
distortive effects. The mechanisms deployed by development bureaucracies to incentivise 
civil servants’ commitment to projects, such as daily allowances provided on the occasion 
of workshops and seminars, can negatively shape the impact of development efforts, 
fostering donor dependence or creating opportunities for misuse of public resources (Vian 
et al. 2013; Nkamleu and Kamgnia 2014). Although the pursuit of benefits deriving from 
per-diems is globally widespread, Nkamleu and Kamgnia (2014) observe that in the 
African context, the increasing amount of public spending for financial incentives has 
become a regular component of the development project system, fuelling opportunistic 
behaviours among civil servants5. The authors note that although daily payments are 
generally justified, their use and abuse negatively influence projects’ and programs’ design, 
management decisions, and employees’ motivations and behaviours (e.g. which project 
they should work on, or whether they should go on field missions or focus on office-based 
work)6. Chapter 5 will draw on the narratives of national decision makers in Malawi 
to highlight the impact of specific conceptualisations of climate-resilient development 
on the formulation and implementation of national climate change policies. I will argue 
for example that in Malawi, the challenges of integrating cross-cutting issues such as 
5 In Malawi, travel allowances accounted for a 21 percent of public officers’ salaries in 2010 (Nkamleu and Kamgnia 
2014).
6 As recognized by Nkamleu and Kamgnia: “Per-diem rates for donor-funded projects can be more than twice as the 
government system rate” (Nkamleu and Kamgnia 2014, 8).
Chapter 4 - The rise of the climate-resilient development paradigm 113
climate change through joined sectoral policymaking can be partly ascribed to siloed 
or hierarchical views within academic disciplines and scarce attention to developing 
infrastructure for scientific research.
Post-development scholars (Kaplan 2000; Easterly 2002; Sharp et al. 2010) criticise the 
scope of planning and management strategies aimed at “achieving improved performance 
and demonstrable results” (UNDP 2009). The focus on cost-effectiveness criteria, one 
of the key components of the development apparatus, is also an attempt to respond to 
the growing demands for public accountability on how development assistance is used, 
what results are achieved, and how appropriate these results are in bringing about desired 
changes in human development (Escobar 1995).
In the climate change domain, Berkhout et al. (2002) claim that an emphasis on quantitative 
techniques – such as cost-benefit analyses at the project appraisal stage – has led to a lack 
of attention to the social side of climate impact assessments. Qualitative impact studies, 
linking physical scenarios with socio-economic factors, would generate a wide range of 
potential outcomes, with higher uncertainties and lower social predictability, and hence 
be less attractive to international development grants (Berkhout et al. 2002). A case in 
point is offered by the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). NAPs were designed by the 
Least Developed Country Expert Group (LEG) of the UNFCCC in 2012 to help countries 
integrate climate change adaptation into development planning, budgeting, implementation 
and monitoring processes at national, sectoral and subnational levels. Despite not being 
‘prescriptive’, NAPs (LEG 2012) link the identification and implementation of adaptation 
actions to certain policy processes, such as coordination structures, cross-sectoral 
committees or assessment techniques, climate data and evidence or capacity needs 
assessments. The NAP multi-step process provides that specific pathways can be followed 
by LDCs to kick-start climate-resilient development processes to reach an ideal situation.
As discussed in Chapter 5, despite having become standard in Malawi, aid-
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effectiveness practices (including result-based performance and gender mainstreaming, 
as further discussed below) do not necessarily lead to better planning, decision-
making and equitable resource distribution. Furthermore, external and donor-driven 
policy guidelines can undermine agency as well as confidence in institutional and 
individual capacity to influence local circumstances (Kaplan 2000; Easterly 2002; 
Sharp et al. 2010). I will analyse these aspects in regard to the Kasache case study, 
showing that ‘informal’ adaptation measures are hardly acknowledged or supported 
by either international development organisations or individuals. In particular, 
women’s vulnerability and experiences of climate change in Kasache shed light on the 
challenges of applying the climate-resilient development paradigm in the context of 
gender relations, as further discussed in the next section.
4.4 Gender and climate change in the international 
policy arena
In the context of the UNFCCC, the interlinkages between gender and climate change 
have only recently received formal recognition (Kaijser and Kronsell 2014; IIED 
2016b). Out of the three multilateral environmental agreements emerging from the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit, the UNFCCC was the only one lacking gender-sensitive 
language in its text (IIED 2016b). More than twenty years later, at the eighteenth 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18) in 2012, the issue of ‘gender and 
climate’ was added as a standing agenda item, and it was agreed that it should no 
longer be considered on an ad hoc basis under ‘any other business’ (IIED 2016b).
According to some scholars (Röhr 2006; Arora-Jonsson 2011), the emphasis on 
women’s inherent vulnerability to climate change served the purpose of raising 
gender issues’ visibility in the international climate policy agenda. At COP 20 in 
2014, the UNFCCC launched the Lima Work Programme, a two-year initiative 
aimed at promoting gender balance by encouraging parties to raise awareness 
among delegates and increase the participation of female delegates in negotiations. 
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In March 2018, the IPCC established a task group to develop a framework of goals 
and actions aimed at improving “gender balance and address[ing] gender-related 
issues within the IPCC” (IPCC 2018). The UNFCCC National Adaptation Planning 
Technical Guidelines encourage the use of gender-sensitive frameworks in policies 
and activities: “Integrating a gender perspective into the NAP process can help to 
ensure that there is equal participation of men and women in the decision-making 
processes, as well as in the implementation of adaptation activities” (LEG 2012, 17). 
Historically, the international climate change policy debate has focused on promoting 
gender balance and women’s formal inclusion through ‘gender mainstreaming’ 
(Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Charlesworth 2005) rather than on the causes of 
gender inequality (Röhr 2006).
On that basis, gender is integrated into policies, plans and activities through the 
mentioning of women (all women) as a particularly vulnerable group (see Arora-
Jonsson 2011; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014). Some policy documents from bilateral and 
multilateral policy actors in Malawi, which I will analyse in Chapter 7 (NORAD 2010 
and FAO 2011), uncritically identify the traditional patriarchal society as the main 
cause of Malawi’s gender issues. This approach, as well as gender mainstreaming, tends 
to portray an ahistorical, unmediated (e.g. by socio-political factors) and deterministic 
idea of women’s agency and vulnerability, with little if any acknowledgement of the 
way relations of power intersect at different levels, from social structure to symbolic 
construction, determining a contextual gender-related vulnerability, as discussed 
below (Cho et al. 2013; Patil 2013; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014; Liska 2015).
4.4.1 Feminist Studies of Science (FSTS)
Critical feminist scholars argue that a number of interrelated Western-based dualisms 
are condensed in the universal notion of ‘woman’ (Plumwood 1991; Chandra 
Mohanty 1994). Chandra Mohanty (1994) contributed to this debate introducing the 
idea of ‘Third World Women’ as a homogenous and subjugated group constructed 
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under the social category of ‘average Third World woman’. Mohanty observes that, 
in development literature, Third World Women have been historically represented in 
contrast to Western standards for measuring progress (see also Chapter 7). 
This stereotype is rooted in the homogenous and hierarchical categorisations of 
Western-based universalism and grounded in the separation between culture and 
nature, body and mind, human and non-human, men and women (Lugones 2010). 
With regard to the external great divide (Blaser 2014), the ‘Third World’ represents 
what is irrational, uneducated and tradition-bound (section 4.3); in the masculine-
feminine binomial, ‘woman’ is the negation of all rational and masculine qualities. 
The feminine sphere as represented by the Western tradition is in opposition to 
masculine and rational domains, and hence emotional, unpredictable, unreliable and 
to be confined to private realms, yet in continuity with the merely physical, natural 
and animal (Plumwood 1991). 
During European colonialism, indigenous people in African or American colonies 
were thought to be as wild and libidinal as animals (non-human); women (in both 
the Global North and South) were differentiated against a supposed male perfection 
marked by rational, heterosexual, Christian, public, rule-oriented and subjective/
intentional features. This typification further classified Third World Women according 
to their deficiencies with respect to Western women (educated, free and in control 
of their bodies), implicitly projecting the former as domestic, family-oriented and 
passive victims of local and global patriarchal cultures. 
The work of Ann Laura Stoler (1995) is particularly useful for understanding how 
gender, colonial and postcolonial relations co-constitute each other. She points to 
how colonial discursive strategies on sexual practices of the colonised flourished on 
the basis of the classification of colonial objects into distinct human beings, (e.g. the 
‘libidinal savage’). Colonised societies were defined as morally declining and put in 
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stark contrast with the ideal male-headed family milieu of European bourgeois families. 
The discourses on sexual self-control assumed and produced racial distinctions and 
contributed to the making of European identity, as well as serving the colonising 
purposes of the European imperial project (Stoler 1995). In Chapter 7, I will show how 
the experience of colonialism in Malawi, by introducing Christian conceptualisations 
of family structure and household management, deeply transformed local matrilineal 
societies (mbumba), further imbricating gender relations into racial, colonial and 
patriarchal structures and increasing women’s vulnerability to climate shocks – via 
the division between public and private spheres.
Mohanty (2003 and 2013) has recently called for an increased historical and cultural 
specificity in women’s studies to take account of the intersections between systemic 
power structures and multi-folded inequalities (race, gender, class), avoiding forms 
of generalisation and reductionism.7 Lately, intersectional analysis has especially 
highlighted the interactions between gender, race, class, sexuality and other 
categories of individual and collective inequalities, and the structures of power and 
domination. Intersectional analyses make the fundamental point that individual 
identities are differently affected by multiple interacting systems of oppression and 
privilege, depending on the individual’s societal position (Lugones 2010; Garry 
2011). Intersectional scholars emphasise how single-axis frameworks (institutional, 
scientific, legal, analytical, etc.), which operate under the pretence of neutrality and 
neglect the power dynamics shaping identity formation, can rarely transform the 
conditions of marginality (Cho et al. 2013; Mohanty 2013; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014). 
Sandra Harding (2009), for example, noted that male-biased Western epistemologies 
tend to ignore the most significant changes in women’s lives and neglect their role in 
social change. As a consequence, Western scientific projects have been historically 
characterised by the absence of women in the design and management phases, affecting 
the nature of scientific inquiries and generating socially regressive effects on women. 
7 The systemic socio-historical and institutional analysis underpinned by the concept of Third World Women has also 
been criticised for being totalising and responsible for the creation of a unified and homogenous subject (Mohanty 2013).
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More specifically, intersectionality can disclose the colonial legacies and deep biases 
based on race, class, and gender that permeate the methods, formulations of issues, 
and substantive positions of Eurocentric philosophy (Garry 2011). Recently, quests 
for a systematic intersectional analysis of gender and climate change have emerged 
that would allow including insights from various disciplines on the relations among 
humans and nature, as well as clarifying how contextual and multi-sited dynamics 
of power interact to produce ‘objective’ narratives and identities linked to climate 
change (Cho et al. 2013; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014; Liska 2015).
In Chapter 7, I will discuss some of the gender stereotypes (e.g. the ‘feminisation of 
poverty’ trope) deployed in climate change policy discourses, which risk categorising 
women as inherently vulnerable to climate change and substantially reducing their 
inclusion in development initiatives. In Malawi, these simplifications shaped the 
design of women-centred climate change projects, which, however, tend to neglect 
how women’s vulnerability and responses are historically and socially constructed 
not only by gender, but also by age, societal position and family networks. 
In that sense, FSTS filled up some of the theoretical and methodological gaps left 
by PCSTS (e.g. binary North-South typification and gender-blind colonial analysis). 
PCSTS typically frames colonised identities and struggles as opposed to ‘Western’ 
historical and cultural ideals (Harding 2009; Sharp et al. 2010; Lazarus 2011). Mudimbe 
(1988), for example, pointed out the tendency of postcolonial African analysts to retain 
the epistemological categories characterising Western thinking, such as the coloniser-
colonised binary relation, whereby the colonised can only exist and develop his/her 
identity in dependence/contrast to the coloniser (Sharp et al. 2010). The tendency in 
postcolonial studies is hence to criticise the Western conceptual framework while 
using its dualistic thinking structure (Loomba 2005; Harding 2009; Lazarus 2011). 
Some postcolonial accounts have failed to recognise the overall spectrum of social 
impacts, transformations (not only racial and cultural, but also class- and gender-
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related) and agency generated by the historical, political and economic experiences 
of Western capitalism, such as colonialism. 
4.4.2 Agency outside ‘mainstream climate change’
Gender difference has been historically constructed around a singular notion of 
male dominance, thus ‘naturalising’ female vulnerabilities and inequalities – that is, 
removing the human and political spheres – and denying women cultural and historical 
specificity (Mohanty 1994; Spivak 1994; Arora-Jonsson 2011). On that basis, women 
are also represented as sharing identical interests and needs. This narrative tends to 
present women as the inherent victims of certain socio-economic systems, without 
taking into account the interactions between gender and other forms of disadvantage 
(class, race, age, marital status, ethnicity) or the networks between women and 
women, and women and men, as the main determinants of marginality (Mohanty 
1994; Leach 2007; Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Seppälä 2016). This view tends to 
portray women as incapable of solving their own problems, denying them agency and 
subjectivity in the history of power relations.
Similarly, the UNFCC categorisation of Annex I and non-Annex I countries (section 4.2) 
tends to deprive the diverse political structures, economic positions, culture and 
political environment of any geographic and historical specificity, reinforcing 
the view of LDCs as unique and homogenous compared to non-LDCs. The use of 
reductionist approaches in the climate change international policy regime made the 
first ten years of climate change negotiations particularly challenging for LDCs, since 
they did not have a clear and well-defined vision of possible shared interests and 
positions (Richards 2001; Gupta 2015). As LDCs include a broad variety of countries 
from very different parts of the globe and facing different climatic challenges, the 
composition of LDCs groups (defined according to statistical criteria) made it hard to 
participate and be influential. This often resulted in the adoption of common positions 
based on defensive and limited negotiating strategies and on the highest of the lowest 
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common denominators or reserve position (‘hollow negotiating mandate’), where 
LDCs were willing to subordinate their interests to those generally articulated and 
broadly acceptable to all developing countries (Richards 2001; Gupta 2015).
The need for developing countries to acquire technical skills therefore becomes a 
requirement for building partnerships and consensus and protecting national interests 
in international policy negotiations, as well as a key component of the narrative on 
capacity building. This narrative inevitably enforces a discourse centred on several 
deficiencies in non-Annex I countries – namely, the lack of climate data and information, 
public services, human resources, credit, technologies, skills and capacities in general 
– or, as in the case of ‘women’, a general inability to solve their own problems. 
Mainstreaming climate and development approaches not only influence collective 
negotiating positions (e.g. the LDC Group in the UNFCCC) and strategies. They 
equally influence the initiatives and aspirations of national policymakers at the very 
individual level. 
The feminist reflections on the concept of agency, in that sense, can help carve out a 
space for freedom and subjectivity in Western binary relations (subject-object, North-
South, men-women), where the objectified subjects also have opportunities for action, 
visibility, voice and legitimacy (O’Hanlon 1988; Haraway 1991; Mohanty 1994; 
Spivak 1994; Leach 2007; Carr 2008; Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Harding 2008; 
Arora-Jonsson 2009). According to critical feminist scholars, agency is embedded 
in daily processes of social engagement and expressed in routines, skills and habits 
through which individuals negotiate and shape their important choices within present 
circumstances informed by the past (Renegar and Sowards 2009; Lugones 2010; 
Alemu et al. 2018).
Through the concept of embodied and situated  knowledges, which depart from the 
Foucauldian idea of the body as a site of power struggles (Caldwell 2007), FSTS 
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methodologies have transformed the logic of scientific enquiry, exposing implicit 
assumptions and potential reifications of specific standpoints and allowing recognition 
and critique of the responsibility of science for ethical and political outcomes (Haraway 
1988; Longino 2004; Hanna 2004; Wallington and Moore 2005; Reid et al. 2006). In 
this view, power dynamics are decentralised to various and disperse relations, which 
build on the locatable and partial knowledges and experiences contingent to specific 
socio-historical contexts (Phelan 1990; Caldwell 2007).
The idea of situated knowledges can enrich emerging epistemological and ontological 
approaches to climate change, conceptually grounding tensions and interactions between 
different ways of knowing and experiencing climate change. The reflections on climate 
change contextual knowledges (e.g. from women, rural and indigenous communities) 
could, for example, identify creative spaces for agency outside the culturally dominant 
narratives of predictive natural and social sciences (Hulme 2011; Nightingale 2016). 
In Chapter 7, I will analyse the informal networks of female farmers in Kasache as an 
expression of individual and collective agency – the result of conflict and negotiation 
between women’s local and situational knowledge and formal participatory processes 
drawing on colonial and developmentalist essentialist practices.
The risk of depriving colonised people (and colonised women) of their identity in 
the history of power relations is an issue that has also been extensively discussed in 
the context of postcolonial criticism by Subaltern Studies (Prakash 1994b; Williams 
2006; Louai 2012; Motta 2013). This intellectual movement was started in the early 
1980s by a group of Indian historiographers who intended to re-examine Indian 
history taking account of the subaltern voices hidden or removed by official middle-
class historiography (Prakash 1994b; Williams 2006). Subaltern Studies is grounded 
in Edward Thompson’s published work on the English working class (1963), which 
aimed to restore “the authentic experience of those sections of England’s pre-industrial 
working class absent from official histories, and to employ this recovered experience 
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to show how these groups were able, by recognising their essential identity and 
interests as a class, to become active historical agents, to exert some control over the 
conditions of their own existence” (O’Hanlon 1988, 198).
The term ‘subaltern’ also draws on Antonio Gramsci’s work referring to subordination 
in terms of class (Prakash 1994b). Later on, it also referred to subordination in relation 
to caste, age or gender (Spivak 1994) and was deployed to signify the centrality of 
dominant-dominated (or subject-object) relationships (O’Hanlon 1988; Prakash 
1994b; Williams 2006).  The concept of subalternity, despite the various shifts 
and usages since its formulation, was more specifically a response to the Marxist 
traditional difficulty in explaining how subaltern resistance could be constituted by 
and generated within the frame of dominant discourses and relationships (Prakash 
1994b). Constantly confronted with the terms of Western history, development or 
modernisation, non-Western histories and knowledges were deemed to be incapable 
of reacting to a condition of subjection (Prakash 1994b).
In the context of postcolonial studies, Bhabha (1994) elaborated the concept of 
hybridity as a way out of this binary thinking and as a space for the agency of the 
‘subaltern’ (Prabhu 2007). With the concept of cultural hybridity, Bhabha (1994) goes 
beyond the negative and oppositional idea of identity formation (West/Self-Other), 
arguing that colonial identities were generated in ambivalent and undistinguishable 
cultures, belonging neither to the colonisers nor to the colonised. Hybridity, especially 
in the domain of culture, emerges as a historical and contingent process involuntary 
generated by dominant institutions or actors (e.g. colonial authorities), where the 
resistant (e.g. the colonised) appropriates cultural elements in the interaction with the 
hegemonic narratives, and modifies products and processes for their own purposes. 
Cultural hybridity represents a way of resisting the cultural homogenisation of the 
Western model, which in fact, because of cultural hybridity, proves to be fractured, 
doubled and unstable.
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The focus on the multiplicity of mechanisms and networks in which individuals are 
physically immersed (embodied) allows identifying localised sites of power that 
enable all individuals to exert forms of power (not only repressive, but also creative, 
productive and alternative) (Everett 1997; Caldwell 2007), as further discussed in the 
next section.
4.4.3 Overcoming binaries through hybridity
Growing attention has recently been paid by critical human geographers to the 
concept of hybridity in the climate change scholarly debate (Hulme 2010; Birkenholtz 
2011; Burnham et al. 2016; Goldman et al. 2016; Popke 2016). Climate is increasingly 
conceived as a hybrid entity characterised by environmental and biophysical as well 
as socio-cultural elements (Popke 2016). As outlined by Popke (2016), climate change 
is described as an experience that, in various parts of the world, assembles diverse 
ways of knowing (global and local), variable spatialities and multiple temporalities 
(past, present and future). Burnham et al. (2016), for example, deployed the idea of 
hybridity to explore the tensions and interactions between smallholder perceptions 
of climate change (material, situated, partial and mediated by daily practices) and 
climate records for the same geographical areas, which hardly capture the local views 
and experiences of climate change.
According to Herod (2010), the hybrid spaces of dependence and engagement are 
specifically those areas where the actors build relationships and networks of 
association, interact with each other, and shift location according to their interests 
and needs. These sites of differentiation/resistance and integration, where identities 
are continuously renegotiated, have been named in different ways by several other 
authors: network or artefacts (Latour 2000), hybridities (Bhabha 1994), cyborgs 
(Haraway 1988), virtual realities (Cline-Cole 1998). They all share the characteristic 
of escaping from the dualistic boundaries of science/non-science, agential or passive 
(subject-object), living or inert, intentional or not (Latour 2000). From this perspective, 
a social and cultural construct does not oppose the natural, technical or physical, as 
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in positivist scientific thought, but emerges as a product of heterogeneous bundling of 
different spatial, temporal, physical, social and cultural elements (Latour 2000).
Most importantly, hybridity has been deployed to challenge the legacy of Western 
binaries (human-nature) in climate change reductionist discourses. Several scholars 
emphasise that the features of climate change are a hybrid, produced by collective and 
individual practices that bring together human and non-human elements and carry 
various definitions of nature and environment-human relationships (Popke 2016). 
Goldman et al. (2016) criticise the positivist epistemological approach by which there 
is one reality (ontology), which can be observed or known from multiple and different 
perspectives (epistemologies). ‘Epistemological pluralism’ assumes the possibility 
of translating ‘scientific’ data to local communities, of stakeholders co-producing 
knowledge, since it underpins the existence of an objective reality of climate change 
that can be interpreted through different knowledge perspectives. However, Goldman 
et al. (2016) question whether it is at all possible to distil and integrate indigenous 
or local views and knowledges on climate change into one climate science, as often 
prospected by international policy and scientific bodies. Weisser et al. (2014) reflect 
on the epistemology and ontology of adaptation from a spatial perspective. The 
authors discuss how the global idea of adaptation becomes local by interacting with 
situated, normative and symbolic processes. The central question posed by this body 
of scholarship is whether it is possible to dis-embed knowledge about the natural 
world from the indigenous and local ways of being in the world (Ingold 2010).
These reflections have deep political implications since, by recognising that there is not 
one unique epistemological and ontological reality on climate change but multiple ones, 
the Western dominant worldview of knowing and being legitimised by international 
policy processes becomes open to critique. In particular, a pluralist ontological 
approach (Goldman et al. 2016) recognises that multiple and diverse climate change 
ontologies are equally relevant and objective for decision-making as the ‘certified’ 
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climate science, thus destabilising the hegemonic primacy of Western scientific and 
political thought. These observations represent also a rich opportunity to unpack 
and reflect further on the mechanisms of power and social change that reproduce 
climate change vulnerability over time and space. Most importantly, exploring the 
climate change epistemology-ontology relation (Chapter 8) allows identifying and 
valuing the hybrid experiences through which people express their resistance towards 
dominant narratives (Lugones 2010). The concept of hybridity is central to exploring 
the individual and collective practices of compliance and resistance towards colonial 
and neo-liberal relations of power that I encountered in Malawi, and which are at the 
core of my research work.
This review has argued that the climate-resilient development paradigm, in its current 
formulation, seems inadequate to identify and address the political contents of the 
climate crisis. By relying on IPCC ‘certified’ climate science, it makes it hard to 
unveil the anthropocentric and instrumentalist conceptualisation of nature that levels 
out knowledge systems and worldviews about the role of humankind in relation to 
climate change. Or, by grounding in the centrality of capacity development in the 
UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, it reproduces the spatial and cultural primacy of 
the Northern/Western scientific and political thought, underpinned by unbalanced 
colonial and postcolonial international relations (Escobar 1995).
Contrary to expectations in the developing countries, linking climate change to 
the development apparatus did not entail a fundamental rethinking of international 
relationships and assistance paths. Rather, it replicated the epistemological and 
ontological dependency and essentialism of colonial times. The specific way climate 
change knowledge filters down into national contexts (as a scientific, global and 
developmentalist issue) shapes how international negotiations unfold, how funds are 
allocated, and how programmes are designed and implemented at national and local 
levels. Drawing on the case of Malawi, in Chapter 8 I will provide some guidance on 
126
the way the all-encompassing climate change epistemology could be reframed to be 
more inclusive – and transformative – towards alternative knowledges and practices.
4.5 Conclusions
By reviewing the establishment process of the international climate change policy 
regime, this chapter has highlighted how the ‘developmentalist’ trait of global climate 
change narratives was brought into being by specific socio-economic, political and 
historical processes. 
Since early negotiations, developing countries advocated for a development-centred, 
rather than science-based, view of climate change so as to facilitate their greater 
representation and negotiating capacity in the climate change international policy 
arena. The attempt from developing countries to politicise climate change led to 
its increasing encroachment into the discourse of development, linking climate 
change to an architecture that had hardly evolved since the 1950s. In particular, 
the interlinkages at the international policy level between climate change science, 
development theories and practices conveyed global climate change epistemologies 
to national development contexts through practices of development support and aid-
delivery. This further anchored climate change interventions to positivist paradigms 
of Western rationality and objectivity, for example through coupling the concept of 
sustainable development with the modernisation ideal. The necessity to deal with 
a quantitative and science-based issue created for developing countries the need to 
depend on the analytical capacities and strengths of national institutions.
PCSTS and FSTS theoretical tools have been fundamental to exploring the historical 
origins and critical aspects of the nexus between climate change science and climate-
resilient development, as well as stressing the gendered characteristics of colonial 
and postcolonial knowledge practices (Harding 2009). By shifting the focus to the 
role and agency of localised agents, feminist STS scholarship has emphasised the co-
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existence and interaction of multiple epistemologies and ontologies, refocusing on 
the knowledges and experiences left out from Western rationalism. Reflections on 
situated knowledges make it possible to ground the critique of dominant narratives 
and worldviews that have historically informed (Western) knowledge for policy 
support, as well as identifying spaces for agency outside Western dichotomies and 
(unidirectional) knowledge-power relationships.
In the next chapters, postcolonial STS critiques will help me to discuss the modes 
through which global discourses on climate change have trickled down to the 
policy context of Malawi (Chapter 5). Feminist critical contributions will allow 
me to identify the opportunities for climate change knowledges and practices in 
Malawi to carve out agency in spite of the supremacy accorded to positivism in the 
international climate change policy regime (Chapters 6 and 7). Furthermore, the 
feminist situated or standpoint methodologies (Karim 1993; Harding 1997, 1998 
and 2008; Lavis 2010; Reid and Taylor 2011; Smith 2012) have inspired my multi-
sited ethnography of climate change, which looks at how large-scale narratives are 
embedded into concrete and localised life-worlds (Marcus 2002). This perspective 
is particularly useful for mapping climate change as a mobile cultural construct 
that links global perspectives to national and local narratives and practices, cutting 
across the global/local dichotomy and giving form to new ontological constructs, 
introducing more nuanced elements to the representation of identities and power 
relations in the research field (Marcus 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Fischer 
1999; Crate 2011).
In effect, the narratives on climate change that I encountered in Lilongwe and Kasache 
carry the marks of historical encounters and relations with Europe and international 
development organisations. Yet, the grounded perspectives also speak for their own 
contingent hi-stories (Blaser 2014). In that regard, my empirical chapters will argue 
that, despite climate change having mainly materialised in Malawi through practices 
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of development support, national and local actors play an active role in redefining 
the issue, supporting or refuting the dominant epistemology and generating new 
ontologies on climate change.
The second part of my work will showcase the richness of climate change meanings, 
which intertwine at multiple levels: universalised by global reductionist narratives 
and hybridised through contextual processes of re-signification. New or alternative 
syntheses of climate change knowledge are co-constructed by local actors so as to 
meet particular needs or values, in a creative process that can hardly be taken into 
account by the all-encompassing climate change epistemology. 
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Chapter 5
The making of climate change knowledge in 
Malawi
5.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the ways in which ‘global climate knowledge’ has contributed to 
shaping national policy processes in Malawi. In the course of a series of consultations 
with national policy actors in Lilongwe in 2012 (see Chapter 2 for details), specific 
perceptions emerged regarding gaps in scientific, technical and institutional capacity. 
How do these views relate to the climate-resilient development paradigm? What are the 
repercussions of global discourses on climate change for the design and management of 
adaptation policies and projects in the country? How do national policy actors in Malawi 
shape policy decisions in the context of the climate-resilient development paradigm?
As claimed by many informants (section 5.2.2), scientific knowledge on climate 
change is highly skewed geographically, and the Global South is largely ‘invisible’ as a 
knowledge producer (Corbera et al. 2015). The gap in climate research and knowledge 
available for policy use between the Global North and South has been described as a 
knowledge divide (Biermann 2002; Karlsson et al. 2007; Ho-Lem et al. 2011, Kandlikar 
et al. 2011; Pasgaard and Strange 2013). This definition emphasises the lack of climate 
data, information or capacities to explain the uneven negotiating power between North 
and South in international policy processes.
My analysis will depart from the idea of ‘knowledge divide’, which partly echoes a 
postcolonial systemic perspective (hierarchy of knowledges, geopolitical dualism; see 
Chapter 4). Through a socio-constructivist analysis of knowledge, I will question the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying global climate science as well 
as the capacities deemed necessary to translate climate knowledge into relevant national 
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policies. I will focus on Malawian decision makers’ narratives about the relevance 
and usefulness of scientific claims for policymaking, highlighting the contrasting and 
hybrid views (e.g. aspirations for universality and locality of scientific knowledge) that 
simultaneously limit and enable the capacity to actively engage in political change.
5.2 How climate finance shapes knowledge and policy 
production in Malawi
In Chapter 4, I described Malawi’s climate finance architecture and the prominent role 
played by development partners in providing financial support for the formulation and 
implementation of national policies and programmes (Kosamu 2013; GoM 2014). In this 
section, I will argue that overdependence on external funds can deeply affect the dynamics 
of knowledge generation at country level, shaping not only narratives but also practices, 
and influencing the way projects are funded and international aid is accessed. 
The national government of Malawi has taken centre stage in policy formulation and 
implementation processes – following the model informing UNFCCC agreements (e.g. 
Cancun Agreements, 2010), which are closely aligned with the principles of national 
ownership and aid effectiveness established in the Monterrey Consensus (Tendler 1997; 
Dollar and Levin 2006). The Government of Malawi (GoM) ratified and approved the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997, with the aim of creating policy mechanisms that would mitigate the adverse 
effects of climate change on ecosystems and humankind (UNFCCC 1992). Article 3 of 
the UNFCCC states that, on the basis of the precautionary principle, lack of scientific 
information should not be a reason for postponing measures to anticipate, prevent and 
minimise the causes and effects of climate change. The GoM fulfilled its pledges to the 
Convention, developing a series of documents and policy papers through which the country’s 
aspirations and priorities were defined (see Table 6 for an overview). First came the National 
Environmental Action Plan (1994), followed by Vision 2020 (GoM 1998) and the Malawi 
National Strategy for Sustainable Development (MNSSD 2004), among others, which set 
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out strategic goals for sustainable environmental management (Table 6). Malawi’s National 
Adaptation Programme of Actions (NAPA) was developed in 2006 by the Environmental 
Affairs Department, with the aim of assessing the impacts of adverse climatic conditions 
in eight relevant economic sectors and addressing the more urgent needs (GoM 2006). The 
NAPA also provided a basis for understanding the required skills and competencies – and 
related gaps – to implement national programmes and initiatives (GoM 2011c).
Financial support is provided by multilateral and bilateral agencies (see Chapter 4 for 
a list of the main donors active in Malawi) and mainly directed at central government 
departments (Kosamu 2013). Financial support for the NAPA was provided through 
Table 6 – Malawi’s main climate change, environment and development strategic 
documents
Title Year Primary Editor
National Environmental Action Plan 1994 Government of Malawi
Vision 2020 1998 Government of Malawi
First National Communication 2002 Government of Malawi
Malawi National Strategy for Sustainable
Development
2004 Government of Malawi
National Adaptation Programmes of Action 2006 Government of Malawi
First Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2007 Government of Malawi
Second National Communication 2011 Government of Malawi
Capacity Needs Assessment 2011 Government of Malawi
Training Needs Assessment for Management Structures in 
Malawi 
2011 Government of Malawi
Second Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy
2012 Government of Malawi
National Climate Change Investment Plan 2013 Government of Malawi
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 2015 Government of Malawi
National Climate Change Management Policy 2016 Government of Malawi
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 2017 Government of Malawi
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funds established under the UNFCCC and managed by the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), such as the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate 
Change Fund. In Malawi, the majority of national policy actors I consulted perceive 
foreign funding as crucial to climate change data collection and assessment and to 
policy analyses. This creates complex relations, not seldom of dependency. During 
an informal conversation, a lecturer at the Bunda College of Agriculture in Lilongwe, 
one of the leading public universities in Malawi, explicitly stated that fulfilment of 
international policy pledges was essential to accessing financial resources: “When 
funds are lacking, a policy that reflects global mainstreaming becomes a means to get 
resources” (Individual interview, 23 February 2012). A junior government officer at the 
Ministry of Natural Resources remarked: “Every COP breeds new concepts, principally 
market-based instruments for climate change mitigation...I really don’t understand, they 
are in conflict with the needs of the country” (Questionnaire, 4 March 2012). This is 
therefore perceived as a distorting factor in identifying the needs of the country.
It was apparent from my consultations that the request for climate data and information 
needed to formulate Malawi’s NAPA was not taken as an opportunity to engage national 
scientists in producing context-specific knowledge: “Our NAPA was based on international 
knowledge standards and not at all on local knowledge” (Interview with a climate change 
scholar, 23 February 2012). According to my key informants, the dearth of climate knowledge 
in Malawi could be attributed to the limited research work of national academic institutions. 
As stated by a senior government officer from the Ministry of Natural Resources:
Scientific research is not contextualised in Malawi. Very little research 
work has been undertaken indigenously. The government does not fund 
research on climate change. Most of the research is carried out by external 
institutions, such as international organisations, through consultancy 
services (Individual interview, 9 February 2012). 
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The paucity of domestic financial resources is perceived as one of the major challenges 
to sustained science and knowledge production processes. A senior government official 
from the Ministry of Natural Resources commented during an interview:
I am aware that most of the information and knowledge on climate change 
is produced by Western countries. That’s why there is a need for more 
locally generated information. Malawian scientists are trying to fill the 
gap…The problem is that the government does not fund research, and, as 
decision makers, we don’t have a choice when selecting information to 
use for policymaking (Individual interview, 10 February 2012).
The same view was expressed in a study by CSAG and the World Bank, which stated that 
the main responsibility for producing locally relevant climate knowledge rests upon the 
often under-resourced and under-staffed national meteorological offices (NMHS), whose 
experience is limited to short-term or seasonal forecasts (CSAG and World Bank 2013). 
Kosamu (2013) has noted a lack of clarity in the tasks assigned to the Department 
of Climate Change and Meteorological Services, which oversees the technical and 
scientific aspects of climate change in the country. In that regard, Kosamu (2013) 
underscores the presence of fragmented national mandates on climate change in 
Malawi: while responsibilities have been historically distributed between environment 
and planning ministries, technical functions are assigned to the NMHS. This further 
hampers coordination, communication and resource sharing across government 
departments, leading to inaction or departmental fragmentation (Turnpenny et al. 2008; 
Berman et al. 2012). Turnpenny et al. (2008) define ‘policy integration’ as the capacity of 
government departments to manage policy issues across sectoral and government tiers, 
integrating multi-stakeholder perspectives, knowledges and conflicting interests. In the 
climate change policy domain, challenges in ensuring the integration of cross-cutting 
issues through joint sectoral policymaking are partly ascribed to siloed or hierarchical 
views of science. In Chapter 3, I discussed how positivism generated the division of 
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labour between academic disciplines, discriminating between natural and social science 
applications (Shackley and Wynne 1996). The difficulty of managing the diversity of 
science (‘interdisciplinarity’) is seen by Turnpenny et al. (2008) as one of the leading 
causes of the limited usability of research and scientific knowledge in policy domains 
(Gieryn 1983; Shackley and Wynne 1996). In Malawi, limited policy integration 
between sectoral tiers may explain some of the weaknesses of NAPA (discussed in 
section 5.2.1), such as the emphasis on quantifiable and monetisable project proposals 
– at the expenses of socio-cultural assessments – or the limited incorporation of multi-
stakeholder perspectives (e.g. local knowledges and women; section 5.3).
The scarcity of funds for climate research severely hinders the development of scientific 
research infrastructure, such as independent institutes of higher education. It has been 
observed (Ho-Lem et al. 2011) that countries with larger economies can provide greater 
funding for research on climate change and engage in international scientific efforts such 
as the IPCC (Kandlikar et al. 2011). In Malawi, a Capacity Needs Assessment Report 
(GoM 2011a) shows that national legislation does not encourage scientific research 
on climate change adaptation and mitigation, weakening the relationship between 
knowledge generation and policymaking. The lack of locally generated knowledge is 
therefore perceived by national policy actors as the main reason for having to resort 
to externally generated information. This tendency may have been occasioned by the 
UNFCCC pledge to base national climate policies on the best available science, thus 
creating a need for developing countries to depend on specific analytical capacities 
(e.g. climate numerical modelling) to mobilise resources, build partnerships and protect 
national interests in the international policy arena.
As argued by Dilling and Lemos (2011), the availability of international financial support 
for incorporating climate information into policy planning leads the Least Developed 
Countries to focus their negotiation strategies on issues of technology transfer and 
capacity building.  During an interview in Lilongwe, two senior government officers 
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with long-term expertise in applied meteorology and climatology and involved in the 
UNFCCC pointed out:
The science of climate change has started to be appreciated by 
stakeholders in Malawi. They are interested in short- and long-term 
climate projections. There has been growing attention to this matter 
since 1997, thanks to the influence of UNFCCC and COP processes 
(Group interview, 11 February 2012).
This statement underscores the influential role played by international scientific and 
policy bodies in shaping national views on the relevance of climate change science 
to sectoral public policy, as discussed in Chapter 3. This trend has been documented 
in different developed or developing world contexts: the activities of international 
scientific institutions such as the IPCC have led to an increased interest in climate 
change science from policymakers, reinforcing the widespread perception that policy-
useful knowledge coincides with scientifically generated (and expert) information, such 
as climate change models and projections (Haas 2004; Juntti et al. 2009; Dilling and 
Lemos 2011; Lidskog 2014).
In that regard, many of the decision makers I interviewed remarked that knowledge 
production in Malawi is mostly driven by external factors: international policy 
processes tend to influence the way knowledge is produced and assembled. One 
interviewee lamented: “Local scientists have not been active in the production of 
scientific knowledge, they were rather recipients, but are slowly getting involved, 
thanks also to donors’ requests for evidence” (Interview, 9 February 2012). The 
prevailing view emerging from my consultations was that when climate change science 
has direct relevance to national and international policy processes, such as national 
emission inventories or adaptation plans, international public sources of funding can be 
leveraged through multilateral and bilateral financial assistance. Scientific legitimacy 
and evidence-based policies are increasingly required by international development 
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organisations and bilateral donors, both to increase national accountability and as a 
condition for accessing financial resources. Likewise, they are increasingly regarded as 
an integral part of ‘good governance’ in EU countries and at a wider international level 
(Nowotny 2003; Rayner 2003; Kandlikar et al. 2011).
The reflections presented so far are all the more significant in light of the critiques of 
development policy mainstreaming discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of postcolonial 
and post-development studies (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Charlesworth 2005). 
Mainstreaming is associated with policy practices (e.g. evidence-based policy) that 
are deemed institutionally acceptable because they are more easily fundable. The 
international focus on evidence-based development projects has led to a greater emphasis 
on quantitative data in developing countries (Kandlikar et al. 2011). As argued by 
Nowotny (2003), with the use of standardised and internationalised measurements and 
techniques, such as climate change baseline data and models, trust in persons and their 
subjective judgement is replaced by trust in impersonal and hence objective devices. 
The separation between facts and values implicit in the donor’s request for evidence 
recalls the positivist criteria for objective and scientific rationales and justifications. 
This principle is embedded in and replicated through the systematic diffusion of auditing 
and assessment procedures, performance indicators and benchmarking exercises in the 
development process (Nowotny 2003), as further explored below.
5.2.1 The push for ‘evidence-based’ climate policymaking
The issue of accountability has found an entry point into policy mainstreaming discourse 
through Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) practices, described as important tools for 
identifying good practices and less effective approaches in the context of evidence-
based decision-making (OECD 2011; OECD 2012). More specifically, the international 
framework for accountability in developing countries is provided by the “Paris Declaration 
on Aid Development and Effectiveness” (2005), which commits participating donors and 
aid-recipient governments to maintain a coherent approach to development goals. The 
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donor community has recognised that the complex nature of climate change poses a 
challenge for on-the-ground monitoring and evaluation of OECD development assistance 
efforts (ODI et al. 2011; OECD 2011; World Bank, IMF and OECD 2011; OECD 2012). 
This can explain both the recent trend towards increasing aid’s ‘value for money’ in 
developing countries and the demand for rigorous assessments of the effectiveness of 
climate change programmes and projects, to which the release of funds is linked.
The need to enhance the ‘climate rationale’ of public finance investments and funding 
proposals (intended as the value-chain providing the best available scientific data and 
products for actions and decisions) has been recently reiterated by the newly established 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) on the occasion of several UNFCCC international 
gatherings, such as the National Adaptation Plan Expo 2018 and the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI) in May 2018. Climate science is increasingly perceived as 
being at the core of policy and project development and an opportunity for accessing 
international (bilateral and multilateral) funds (WMO-GCF forthcoming). In 2016, 
several multilateral development banks (MDBs 2016)1 agreed on the Common Principles 
for Climate Change Finance Tracking, defining the context of adaptation and mitigation 
finance in development. At the core of the joint approach was the need to identify definite 
links between the proposed project interventions, climate risk, and vulnerability. Hence 
the methodology was grounded in several steps, including climate trends analyses, 
which allow distinguishing between ‘climate’ and ‘development’ projects. Accordingly, 
funding institutions have launched programmes and initiatives aimed at facilitating 
project developers’ and decision makers’ access to scientific information (WMO-
GCF forthcoming). The World Bank’s Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment (ASRA) 
methodology offers an indicative categorisation of the climate hazards most relevant to 
the agricultural sector and a recommendation on relevant scientific inputs to be factored 
in sectoral investments.
1 Multilateral Development Banks: Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-American Investment Corporation, 
African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
European Investment Bank, World Bank.
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The GCF climate rationale methodology aims at strengthening the evidence base of 
projects, policies and investments through standardised methodological approaches 
(WMO-GCF forthcoming). In that regard, some developing countries see the value-for-
money approaches as a trend towards increased ‘aid selectivity’ where donors decide aid 
disbursements based on specific developmental criteria, such as income or institutional 
performance of recipient countries (Kandlikar and Sagar 1999; Dollar and Levin 2006; 
Pasgaard and Strange 2013). The emphasis on climate rationale may also be read as an 
attempt to further institutionalise the links and relations between global scientific (e.g. 
IPCC) and international governance organisations (e.g. UNFCCC) created in the last 30 
years. Hulme (2008) defines this trend as ‘geopolitical engineering’ aimed at designing 
solutions that bring together insights from climate scientists and policymakers across 
policy scales (Chapter 8).
Malawi is facing a donor-driven and exogenous demand for knowledge generation, in 
which analytical work tends to be focused on specific issues that may reflect external 
priorities and agendas. Not only does the donor-driven request for evidence influence 
the national research agenda, but also what is considered relevant in terms of scientific 
knowledge. Thus, knowledge generation and national policies are not always designed 
to meet the country’s needs, but rather the international standards that allow access to 
climate finance: “The knowledge produced in the southern countries is mostly designed 
to aid in tapping funds that are controlled by the rich North; one way or the other, this 
compromises the independence of the South’s think-tanks” (Questionnaire, junior-level 
government officer in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 14 March 2012). This statement 
reflects the concern that financial dependency may negatively affect policy processes in 
Malawi, which risk not being relevant to national or local contexts and needs, as well as 
project design and implementation. 
Dependence on international aid is compounded by the skewed balance of climate change 
knowledge production, which not only makes Malawi dependent on globally generated 
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knowledge but also affects the potential use and integration of locally generated knowledge 
into context-relevant policy advice, as explored in the next section.
5.2.2 Defining knowledge, determining capacities
The narrative of accountability in the international climate change policy framework, 
which has gradually contributed to defining capacity and technology gaps and needs in 
developing countries, has led to international initiatives aimed at equipping Malawi with 
evidence-based policies and projects.
Malawi has been especially active in international climate negotiations through the LDC 
Group, a body of “48 nations that are especially vulnerable to climate change but have 
done the least to cause the problem” (LDC Group 2014). The Malawi position paper 
(GoM 2011b), presented in Durban on the occasion of the 17th Conference of Parties to the 
UNFCCC, reflected the group’s position, focusing on enhanced action on capacity building 
to draw up National Communications and Greenhouse Gas Inventories, as well as fundable 
adaptation and mitigation programmes. The group was particularly active in demanding 
special treatment for the Least Developed Countries, such as support for the development 
of NAPAs mandated under the Marrakech Accords (2001).
Malawi’s NAPA (2006) underlines a strong political will to promote technology transfer and 
develop evidence-based systems for advising stakeholders, especially as regards climate and 
weather monitoring (GoM 2006). Out of five project profiles developed, one in particular, 
“Improving Community Resilience to Climate Change Through the Development of 
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods”, managed to secure the funds needed for implementation. 
The largest share of the funds (35%) would go to address gaps in meteorological information 
needed for the planning and decision-making processes. The GoM reiterated its position 
in the “Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II” (GoM 2012a), acknowledging the 
country’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change and stating the need for improved 
information management systems to increase resilience to climate risks. 
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However, several challenges to the implementation of NAPA were later identified 
by the GoM. Among them were difficulties in transferring technologies, poor 
infrastructure, and insufficient analytical capacity at the central and departmental 
government levels to assess threats and potential impacts of climate change on 
key sectors (GoM 2006). One of the main weaknesses of Malawi’s NAPA is that 
adaptation efforts were designed as specific and discrete actions, neglecting the 
cross-cutting value for multiple sectors (Stringer et al. 2010). Most of the projects 
included in the NAPA focused on specific sectors; furthermore, vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate change were analysed through sector-specific lenses (ECBI 
2007). The lack of an integrated approach – and a general disregard for the wealth 
of local experiences (section 5.3) – was apparent, especially in the projects targeting 
climate-affected communities (ECBI 2007; Stringer et al. 2010). My empirical 
chapters will further analyse the narratives of the climate-affected communities and 
suggest an integrated historical and socio-cultural approach to frame and understand 
climate change vulnerability and adaptation at the local level.
The challenges faced by Malawi as well as by many other LDCs while designing, 
financing and implementing their NAPAs (ECBI 2007) can be attributed to the 
specific assumptions underlying access to financial support, as policy-related or 
project demonstration activities were favoured over context-relevant research. Many 
of the projects that have since been designed and implemented in Malawi reflect 
the sector-specific and short-term risk-management approach endorsed by the 
NAPA. Some of them draw clear conceptual differences between climate change 
adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) in the country. A sharp policy 
differentiation between DRR and CCA has serious implications at the local level 
(Cardona et al. 2012). These boundary perspectives can hinder the integration of 
Kasache’s stakeholder perspectives (and interrelated socio-cultural values) into 
policymaking and the possibility of transformative outcomes, as further discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7.
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A political ontology approach (Blaser 2014) may offer helpful insights into the 
challenges linked to the implementation of NAPAs. The epistemological and ontological 
tension between the concepts of DRR and CCA in Malawi’s NAPA echoes the classic 
understanding of science in Western thought. In Chapter 3, I pointed to the separation 
between nature and culture, body and mind, as one of the distinct features of the positivist 
scientific apparatus (Merchant 2006; Blaser 2014; Glazebrook 2016). This binary, 
which disembodies the conditions of nature from daily livelihoods (society, culture and, 
ultimately, power), has been incorporated in the practice of climate risk management 
through the concept of ‘resilience’ (Birkenholtz 2011; Crate 2011). The idea of resilience 
originates in the ecological sciences, which disconnect socio-ecological systems from the 
political-economic relations in which they are embedded (Birkenholtz 2011). According 
to this view, the occurrence of natural and human-induced disasters largely depends on 
biophysical factors that tend to be analysed through the application of quantitative model-
based techniques (Hulme 2011).
In the early 2000s, the DRR and CCA research community and practitioners highlighted 
the necessity to shift the focus of resilience-based research and practice towards an 
integrated social-ecological approach (Mercer et. al 2010). The latest IPCC Special 
Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation” (2012) particularly stressed that a greater integration between CCA 
and DRR (linking CCA long-term and global perspectives with DRR short-term and 
local approaches) should centre on a shared concept of risk management. This would 
encompass socio-territorial and temporal considerations, since both adaptation and disaster 
risk management depend on the understanding of the local dimensions of exposure and 
vulnerability. The conceptual shift ushered in by the IPCC (2012), however, does not 
yet problematise in depth the ontological assumptions behind the concept of risk (e.g. 
how individuals interpret information in the context of experience and beliefs): it keeps 
prototyping nature and culture as separated, and treats human exposure and response to 
environmental perturbations as an outcome of ‘rational’ actors. Current approaches to 
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risk analysis, for example, acknowledge the role of social capital in shaping vulnerability, 
yet they fail to consider local structures of resource allocation or issues of social justice, 
human security and equity (Birkenholtz 2011). Neither the DRR’s nor the CCA’s approach 
to resilience questions the culturally biased ontological assumptions; thus, both struggle to 
identify the contextual underlying causes of vulnerability  and context-relevant solutions 
to extreme weather events and climate change (Birkenholtz 2011; Crate 2011). The case 
of Kasache in Chapters 6 and 7 paves the way for questioning the overall mainstreaming 
of climate vulnerability and risk-management approaches (e.g. gender vulnerability) 
with a focus on local processes of social power that mediate vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity, thus shaping the effects of climate change policies.
The capacity to perform risk analysis in public policy institutions is also linked to the 
availability of technical, managerial and planning skills, as risk assessment is mainly 
based on statistical forecasts of physical events, thus reinforcing specific framings of 
capacity gaps. As a consequence of risk-management mainstreaming, NAPA-funded 
projects in Malawi and elsewhere have been mainly focusing on capacity transfer in 
accordance with the global development agenda (ECBI 2007; Biagini et al. 2014).
While the emergence of climate change as a quantitative and science-based issue led to 
the perception that the transfer of capacities and technologies is a necessity, the attribution 
of specific features (technology-driven, data-led) to climate change knowledge influenced 
the perception of what was missing in terms of institutional capacities and individual 
skills, contributing to the definition of ‘climate change knowledge divide’.
5.2.3 The limits of the climate change knowledge divide 
Decision makers in Malawi perceive a widening gap between the Global North’s and 
South’s capacity to conduct climate research and analysis and, consequently, to contribute 
to international policy debates and processes. The majority of the policymakers I 
consulted emphasised the significance of knowledge gaps in Malawi, mainly related 
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to the lack of climate downscaling models and scenarios and the scantiness of climate 
data. There is a shared belief that prescriptive physical and quantitative sciences are at 
the core of decision-making. 
The academic literature on climate change knowledge gaps confirms this. As noted 
by Kandlikar and Sagar (1999) and Pasgaard and Strange (2013), the situation in the 
Global South is in stark contrast to the tremendous growth in scientific capability and 
infrastructure observed in the North through increased funding for climate change 
research. The wish to compensate for the lack of scientific capacity in the Global 
South was in fact one of the factors driving non-Annex I countries to shift the focus 
of international negotiations from an environmental to a more development-centred 
perspective (Bodansky 2001; Gupta et al. 2007).
Most research on climate change currently comes from the North, often with 
assumptions that cannot be transposed to the South (Kandlikar and Sagar 1999; 
Pasgaard and Strange 2013). Pasgaard and Strange (2013) noted that different 
knowledge domains and research themes characterise different global regions, 
reflecting divergent concerns about climate change. Research in developed countries 
particularly tends to focus on mitigation, while issues of adaptation and human and 
social impacts (droughts, floods, famine and diseases) dominate in the developing 
countries. In other words, most knowledge products do not reflect the needs of the 
majority of the global population dealing with climate impacts and extreme weather 
events (Pasgaard and Strange 2013).
The concept of knowledge divide is implicitly endorsed by IPCC global scientific 
assessments as well as by development policy practices (Hulme 2017). While the former 
frame knowledge gaps around the concern to reduce uncertainties through knowledge 
integration across scales and actors (section 5.3.1 for further discussion), the latter wish 
to bridge scientific knowledge and policy action through technological and capacity 
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transfer to countries in need. The idea of a North-South knowledge divide in turn 
implicitly shapes the way scientific, technical and policy capacities are perceived among 
decision makers in specific country contexts and tends to facilitate acceptance of the 
power-laden issues behind climate change knowledge gaps.
This theme has particularly emerged from the set of interviews (see Table 7) with 
government officers I conducted in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) during a regional training 
workshop on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in April 2014. On behalf of the United 
Table 7 – Perceived capacity gaps in adaptation in selected African developing 
countries
N° Country Position/Expertise Statement Key words
1. Malawi Senior-level 
government officer 
Environment
Malawi indeed has gaps in some areas 
where we definitely need assistance. 
For instance, when we are talking 
about adapting to climate change, we 
need to develop various scenarios and 






2. Rwanda Senior-level 
government officer 
Environment
Let us have scientific assessments…if 
you don’t have enough data on rainfall 
you can propose solutions that are 
not adequate. That is why we need 
capacity in terms of data collection, 
data processing, data reporting and 





3. Ethiopia Mid-level 
government officer 
Environment
As regards the capacity gaps, there 
are inadequately trained experts; 
that is a gap in skills, especially for 
vulnerability risk assessments, for 
climate change scenario development 
and sometimes for downscaling climate 









What is important is the availability of 
climate regional models…we need such 
technology to work on climate change 









For us to be able to implement the NAP 
we first need to identify and develop 
climate change future and current 
scenarios, as well as knowing how to 
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Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), I interviewed 19 people from 
different African countries, including Malawi. I specifically asked what capacity gaps 
they perceived in their country in relation to adaptation planning and what kind of 
international support they might need to develop and implement a national adaptation 
plan. Most of the respondents, namely 13 out of 19 (about 68%), clearly blamed national 
gaps in adaptation planning and climate change mainstreaming on the lack of capacity 
to produce climate models and scenarios and on the inability to link climate information 
with policy development.
The statements summarised in Table 7 underline the centrality of capacity building, 
which is linked to the technocratic nature of climate change needs (models, assessments, 
scenarios) and aims to maximise financial assistance and technology transfer from 
developed to developing countries. They also bring up the idea of a knowledge divide (in 
both technologies and capacities), which, however, does not facilitate the development 
of national adaptation plans or policies. 
Despite being overly endorsed by many national policy documents, the concept 
of knowledge divide does not adequately diagnose and address Malawi’s climate 
knowledge gaps, assuming that science and technology are universally valid and can be 
N° Country Position/Expertise Statement Key words
6. Zambia Mid-level 
government officer 
Environment
Capacity gaps, for instance, at the 
individual level mean that we don’t 
have adequate skills for doing scenario 






7. Guinea Senior-level 
government officer 
Environment
The main starting point for this 
programme is to solve this challenge 
about capacity. By providing capacities 
as well as relevant networks with other 
experts, this programme can help us 
to develop all the elements that we 
need to undertake scenario evaluation, 
identification and prioritisation of 
adaptation options, and all that is 
required for an integrated development 








seamlessly replicated or transferred from a northern to a southern context (Escobar 1995; 
Everett 1997). The idea of a knowledge divide implies the possibility that progress and 
capacities of developing countries might be measured against northern standards, and 
fails to recognise knowledge as co-produced in multiple cultures and linked to power 
processes. Postcolonial studies have already highlighted the inherent contradiction of 
a supposed universal and objective body of knowledge called ‘science’, which is in 
fact a context-specific experience linked to industrial capitalism in north-west Europe: 
“science was never uniquely Western, having its origins in a wide variety of cultures, 
including Islam, India and China” (Turnbull 1997, 552).
The concept of knowledge divide does not question the fundamental validity and 
applicability of a specific knowledge frame to a range of different contexts. Dilling 
and Lemos (2007) argue that the availability of high-resolution climate information 
is not always beneficial, since it often creates winners and losers at the local level in 
vulnerable contexts. For instance, poor farmers in Zimbabwe or Brazil risk being denied 
credit from bank managers when seasonal forecasts of reduced rainfall are disseminated 
and higher credit risk provisioning is expected (this case refers to climate variability, 
given the short/medium-term of the predictions, see Dilling and Lemos 2007). Climate 
science applications can produce negative outcomes at finer spatial scales when pre-
existing conditions of inequality and vulnerability are not adequately taken into account. 
In Chapter 7, I will discuss how climate change and variability responses among female 
farmers are linked to local power structures. Feminist science studies, such as Chandra 
Mohanty’s (1994) argue against the ideal of ‘Third World Women’, criticising the notion 
of a homogenous group, constructed against Western women’s educational, social or 
cultural standards, which does not explain the powerful effects of anthropocentric and 
androcentric knowledge traditions.
Furthermore, the idea of a predetermined science-led, highly technology-dependent 
knowledge ties decision makers to the availability of specific skills, locking developing 
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countries in a perpetual state of lack of capacities and donor-driven support. 
Fundamentally, by not criticising the ontological assumptions, scientific paradigms and 
ethical frameworks behind climate knowledge gaps, the concept of knowledge divide 
does not recognise the underlying power relations embedded in colonial and postcolonial 
history, which make developing countries’ efforts seem ‘deficient’ compared to Western 
knowledge standards. Several postcolonial scholars (Whitehead 1981; White 1996), for 
example, criticised British colonial education policies for influencing local knowledge 
systems through the epistemological process (from framing problems to generating 
questions). The British Colonial Office paid little attention to pre-existing forms of 
education in Africa – mostly happening in a community setting – and replicated the 
English syllabus and curriculum, focusing on literacy skills or preparing students 
for administrative and secretariat jobs. Many of the local schooling practices, which 
included story-telling, unconscious socialisation, apprenticeship and initiation practices, 
were gradually lost in favour of a greater attention to reading and writing, result-based 
performances, and certificates (White 1996). One of the signposts of British colonial 
education was the emphasis on rationality as a means of transforming the colonies into 
Western civilised societies through education (White 1996). As argued by White (1996), 
many former colonies in Africa still struggle to develop culturally sensitive school 
curricula that do not refer back to colonial education systems. In section 5.3 as well as 
in Chapter 6 and 7, I will further reflect on national and local actors’ possibilities for 
agency in Malawi within existing relations and structures of power.
Moreover, as extensively discussed in Chapter 4, development agencies promoted 
specific political and organisational models (centralised and output-based rather than 
process-based). Such models defined decision makers’ expectations about how the public 
sector should be organised as well as the perceived technical capacity gaps and needs, 
yet they were often in contrast with local historical and cultural ways of fulfilling public 
functions. Supply-driven assistance to LDCs, based on extensive expatriate technical 
support and proliferation of donor schemes, can undercut the domestic capacity to 
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reform, leading to confusion and duplication (Ferguson 1994; Michalopoulos 1999; 
Easterly 2002; Brautigam and Knack 2004).
Brautigam and Knack (2004) argued that aid support can be institutionally destructive 
in many ways: by lowering the tax effort, fragmenting the central capacity for policy 
formulation, undermining policy learning, reducing pressure to maintain a favourable 
environment to the private sector and, more generally, creating paths of aid dependency 
and instigating passivity and lack of disagreement towards donor requests in government 
officers (Brautigam and Knack 2004). In Malawi, many of the national decision 
makers I interviewed lamented both a lack of national research institutions supplying 
policymakers with context-relevant information and a lack of funding priorities on 
climate change research. According to them, this specific deficiency “exists by design” 
(Interview, 10 October 2012). This seems to reflect a common, documented situation 
in LDCs, where policy-planning processes have been mainly designed to ensure the 
right allocation of scarce resources rather than to encourage process-based learning or 
context-relevant research (Ferguson 1994; Easterly 2002; Brautigam and Knack 2004). 
The concept of knowledge divide neglects the influence of colonial authorities first, and 
development aid organisations later, on the reorganisation of the public and education 
sectors, civil service and bureaucracies in developing countries. In the following 
sections, I will explore Malawi’s policymakers’ narratives, holding in tension the 
epistemological pluralism (or the multiple ways of understanding climate science) 
expressed by interviewees and the Western ontological dualism underlying global climate 
change discourses. These reflections will show alternative (to the positivist) ways for 
experiences and worldviews from the South to gain visibility in the climate change 
knowledge debate, as well as the conditions that may unlock situated knowledges.
5.3 Situating science and knowledges
Global climate change discourses do not affect Malawi only at a national policy and 
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knowledge-making level. This is evident from the interviews with decision makers 
who deal with the day-to-day tensions between global standardised narratives and 
contextualised experiences of climate change. Although reflections on the knowledge 
and policy divide (section 5.2) may suggest that the country is ‘subjugated’ (Foucault 
1972; 1982) by the international hierarchies of economic and political power, at the very 
individual level policymakers expressed original and hybrid views (further discussed in 
section 5.3.2), carving out a space for agency and subjectivity. 
My consultations with decision makers in Malawi usually started with questions about 
individual perspectives on the interplay between climate change science, knowledge and 
policy in the country. My aim was to understand to what extent climate change science 
was perceived as central to day-to-day policy planning and decision-making. The 
responses from the interviews and questionnaires were in line with what had emerged 
thus far from the analysis of policy documents. The links between climate science and 
the policy sector are considered very relevant by the majority of interviewees. One of 
the senior interviewees from the Environmental Affairs Department remarked on the 
type of knowledge needed for decision-making: “Policymakers need evidence-based 
information in order to inform the policymaking process, specifically regarding climate 
change risks and impacts for the local context” (Individual interview, 10 February 2012). 
At first glance, climate change is perceived as a scientific issue, and knowledge should 
be produced by globally recognised organisations like the IPCC in order to be usable 
and reliable.
International institutions of science and policy assessment, such as the IPCC or the 
UNFCCC, stand out as the main reference sources for policy planning and decision-
making in Malawi. The responses shown in Table 8 suggest that decision makers in 
Malawi mostly reproduce a positivist narrative where value-free information is considered 
a necessary element for relevant policymaking on climate change. This has been also 
observed in other contexts (from the Global North) where institutionalised practices 
150
of decision-making seem to rely heavily on scientifically generated knowledge that is 
usually regarded as neutral and free from the influence of non-scientific interests (Juntti 
et al. 2009). In the case of EU policy assessments, for example, a narrow understanding 
of “what counts as evidence (particularly results from cost-beneﬁt analyses) tends to 
prevail” (Juntti et al. 2009, 212).
While, on the one hand, decision makers are highly attracted to physical and quantitative 
sciences, on the other hand, they believe that there is a close connection between science, 
knowledge and policymaking, which should be somehow strengthened in the climate 
change debate. As evidenced by the comments reported in Table 8, there seems to be an 
institutional disconnect between climate change science and policy in Malawi.
Unlike in developed countries, where government bodies often commission research 
from academic institutions or can access in-country expertise through well-established 
institutional channels (Grundmann 2007), global assessment reports are the main 
source of climate change knowledge in Malawi (Table 9). According to my interviewees, 
Table 8 – Perceptions of the climate change science-policy linkages
N° Organisation Position/Expertise Statement 
1. Government Senior-level government 
officer
Environment
There are no deliberate efforts to link science 
with policy, or academia with government 
institutions (Interview, 10 February 2012).
2. Government Senior-level government 
officer 
Environment
There are no formal and institutionalised links 
between academia and institutional structures in 
Malawi (Interview, 9 February 2012).
3. Government Senior-level government 
officers
Climate change
We seldom work with academia in Malawi. For 
example, consultations and data-sharing occur 
on individual and ad-hoc bases. There is no 
structure in place (Interview, 11 February 2012).
4. Academia Junior-level lecturer
Environment
What’s really missing is the gatekeepers, or 
bridges, whether institutions or individuals, 
between policymakers and scientists (Interview, 
13 December 2011).
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no significant efforts have been made in Malawi to link academia with government 
institutions, thus limiting the opportunities for local knowledge generation and 
increasing dependence on external sources. An interviewee from the Environmental 
Affairs Department pointed out that: “There is a strong and clear link between climate 
change science and policy, but that is not reflected in the institutional setting in Malawi” 
(Individual interview, 10 February 2012). There is a widespread perception that 
institutional spaces or organisations that may connect local knowledge producers with 
the final users are missing. A case in point is the lack of bridging institutions (such as the 
IPCC at the global level or the Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Climate Change in Italy) 
connecting the scientific and policy realms. Neither knowledge producers (Malawian 
academics) nor knowledge consumers (Malawian policymakers) have the capacity to 
produce policy-relevant knowledge. The weakness of its climate research institutions 
prevents Malawi from fully participating in the process of knowledge production, as 
well as impeding efforts to assess other knowledge traditions and incorporate them 
into policymaking.
Science and policy are thus perceived as two distinct entities separated by fixed and 
stable boundaries – and hence conceptualised as two discrete domains, for which the 
challenge resides in constructing bridges that will allow them to better communicate 
(Lidskog 2014). This is the science-policy model idea underlying the IPCC, where 
information and knowledge are seen as elements to be linearly transmitted to policy. 
An alternative conceptualisation, which gradually emerged from my consultations, 
highlights the presence of blurred, fluid and dynamic boundaries between the two 
entities and a process of mutual influence (Lidskog 2014). 
5.3.1 External influences and local knowledge: co-production 
or integration?
What emerged from interviews with national policy actors in Lilongwe indicates that 
a significant line of tension runs through Malawi’s policy production process. While 
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global climate science is perceived as culturally biased, its authority and legitimacy are 
rarely questioned.
The interview excerpts from Table 9 suggest the pervasive influence of scientific 
knowledge produced in the Global North on climate change international negotiations 
and in defining Malawi’s bargaining power (the IPCC reports are like “reference points”). 
Table 9 – Perceptions of the influence of Global North knowledge on policymaking 
in Malawi
N° Organisation Position/Expertise Statement 
1. Government Mid-level government 
officer
Environment
That [Global North knowledge] has always 
been part of the basis for individuals to 
understand and know more in the field of climate 
change. In other words, it is a reference point 
(Questionnaire, 12 March 2012).
2. Government Senior-level government 
officer and climate change 
negotiator
Environment
Global North knowledge influences knowledge-
policy production through Malawi’s 
participation in climate change debates and 
agreements (Questionnaire, 23 July 2012).
3. Government Senior-level government 
officer
Environment
Malawi signs climate change conventions and 
protocols that are influenced by climate change 
knowledge produced by the Global North 
(Questionnaire, 12 March 2012).
4. Government Mid-level government 
officer
Development and Planning
It [Global North knowledge] informs the 
decisions made by policy managers in 
government as well as in other non-state 
organisations; for example, the government 
of Malawi has identified climate change and 
environment management as a key priority area 
(Questionnaire, 15 March 2012).
5. Government Junior-level government 
officer
Environment
So yes, the Global North dictates to Malawi too, 
to some extent, and not all the dictates are bad, 
but one can’t effectively negotiate with another 
who is miles ahead in knowledge (Questionnaire, 
4 March 2012).
6. Academia Mid-level lecturer 
Environment
We are aware that most of the knowledge we 
use is produced in the Global North. There is an 
issue of trust – everybody trusts the IPCC – but 
there is a lack of data and skills that prevents 
us from being able to analyse data and question 
global phenomena from a local perspective 
(Interview, 23 February 2012).
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According to my informants, climate change knowledge is perceived as usable when 
it relies on positive criteria and is standardised and data-led. Among the defining 
elements of ‘certified’ science from a positivist perspective are its objectivity and 
freedom from distorting factors that may alter the way the object of study is detected, 
measured and reported (Juntti et al. 2009). The views reported in Table 9 reflect 
the pivotal role of predictive natural and earth sciences in shaping climate change 
discourses. What this entails is that the positivist epistemological fundamentals of 
climate science are not questioned; however, because of the North-South knowledge 
divide, climate science is widely acknowledged as benefitting those countries that 
are able to produce it and use it to their own political advantage (e.g. industrialised 
countries).
While global climate science is perceived as being culturally biased and influencing 
knowledge and policy production in Malawi (Table 9), the questionnaires administered 
to the same audience of policymakers show that its fundamental authority and 
legitimacy are not questioned. It seems that, at least in the context of my research, 
science’s exposure to culture is considered by decision makers as an added value 
(rather than something it should be purified from, as in positivist tradition). This may 
point to alternative criteria of rationality and judgement for science usability and may 
be explained by the fact that scientific knowledge is generally perceived by decision 
makers as providing both universal validity and usability (see the definition of policy-
usable knowledge discussed in Chapter 3) to policymaking. These contradictory views 
have also been documented in Global North contexts (Juntti et al. 2009). According to 
several authors, this paradox is explained by the fact that expert-led knowledge has been 
increasingly institutionalised through the IPCC and embedded into decision-making 
and knowledge production processes without questioning the implicit historical and 
geographical marks of power, projecting expert-led knowledge as truly objective and 
value-free (Hall and Taylor 1996; Juntti et al. 2009; Lidskog 2014).
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Policymakers’ hybrid views  open up the potential for a more nuanced and less essentialist 
approach to climate science and knowledge production. The responses above could 
be interpreted through an anthropological lens whereby ‘science’ (and its focus on the 
mastery of nature) carries different meanings in different contexts (Ingold 2010). Critical 
anthropological and socio-cultural constructivist perspectives highlighted the tensions 
and negotiations between positivist scientific contributions, which were attributed to 
disinterested observation and rational analysis, and non-Western rational accounts that 
generally seek the integration between subjective experiences and beliefs in the continuity 
from physical environment to social relations (Watson-Verran and Turnbull 2001; 
Gottlieb 2004; Snodgrass and Tiedje 2008; Neumann 2000; Eneji et al. 2012; Smith 2012; 
Turnbull 1997; Ingold 2010; Leach and Davies 2012). As I will argue in Chapter 6, some 
knowledge claims on climate change that emerged in Kasache could refer to relational 
ontologies, which interacted with the naturalist ontologies characterising the positivist 
scientific thought introduced during colonial rule. I will particularly discuss how local 
environmental beliefs were instrumentally appropriated by Scottish missionaries under 
colonial rule to foster acceptance of Christian precepts through spiritual practices.
In that perspective, the value and meaning of knowledge do not arise solely from a common 
cultural baseline (e.g. the superiority of mind over nature), but from the applicability and 
effectiveness of knowledge (in the form of skills or practices) in specific socio-cultural 
contexts, defined as situated rationalities or knowledges (Haraway 1991; Turnbull 1997; 
Nightingale 2016). The concept of situated knowledges (Haraway 1991) provides a useful 
frame for observing the epistemological and ontological tensions between different 
ways of understanding climate change. According to this perspective, different ways of 
knowing and experiencing climate change are always embodied in limited and partial 
(because originating in finite time and space) socio-historical and spatial locations. As 
Haraway (1991) points out, scientific accounts of reality do not depend on a positivist 
logic of discovery (which assumes that there is only one reality to be discovered), but on 
power-laden social relations. Individual stories, habits, disciplinary biases, etc. affect the 
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ways biophysical and socio-political change is conceptualised, learned and experienced 
by individuals (Nightingale 2016). Likewise, when reflecting on the authority of climate 
science, policy actors in Malawi offered situated and hybrid responses, mixing aspirations 
and commitment to universal standards of objectivity with the desire for context-relevant 
advice. The hybridity of climate change discourse emerged especially when discussing the 
validity and utility of climate science for national and local contexts. The ways in which 
local knowledge is understood are manifold. This diversity seems to match a variety of 
presumed policy needs. More profoundly, it accounts for the ways biophysical change 
interacts with socio-cultural understandings and practices of climate change. 
Government officers from Malawi’s meteorological department (DCCMS, Department of 
Climate Change and Meteorological Service) stressed the need to integrate local climate 
data into global and regional models. DCCMS interviewees expressed the wish to have 
the international knowledge produced by the IPCC translated into local-level scenarios. 
According to them, one of the greatest weaknesses is the lack of climate change assessment 
tools or models to be used at the finer spatial and temporal scales. Local knowledge, they 
believe, often coincides with downscaled climate models: “Policymakers in Malawi are 
especially interested in the use of seasonal forecasts, for example rainfall variability and 
distribution, to evaluate the impacts of weather variability on food security and disaster 
risk management” (Group interview, 11 February 2012). A similar interest for specific 
time- and place-sensitive climate change information was shared by the representatives of 
several ministries and departments that regularly demand seasonal forecasts for different 
purposes, mainly linked to agriculture, water and DRR planning.
Thus, just like numerical weather forecasts or global climate models, local knowledge is 
seemingly considered valuable when it shows a kind of predictive or projecting ability: 
“At the community level, indigenous knowledge of climate and weather allows the 
locals to know when to plant crops” (Questionnaire, junior-level government officer in 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, 14 March 2012). According to my informants, this 
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type of knowledge can enhance local-level coping mechanisms against increased climate 
variability, as it is embedded in the local context. In this sense, local knowledge is perceived 
to offset the limitations of global climate science in performing downscaled projections, 
providing evidence for site-specific issues and processes. Downscaling models are 
perceived in turn as valid substitutes for local knowledge. There is a risk, though, that 
these conceptualisations may standardise and transform local knowledge systems to fit 
the epistemological and ontological premises of Western science (Turnbull 1997; Nadasdy 
1999). Local knowledge usability is in fact assessed against scientific benchmarks and 
positively valued when showing scientific attributes. This narrative recalls the essentialising 
Western characterisations of indigenous knowledge or Third World Women (Chapter  4).
Policymakers who were more active in UNFCCC processes viewed local knowledge as 
a practice that facilitates socio-political relations. More specifically, local knowledge 
– in the form of weather indicators or maps – is perceived to be useful in international 
negotiation processes. The capacity to produce climate data is key to acquiring political 
leverage in international negotiations, since climate data allows localising climate 
change impacts, increasing the chances of mobilising financial and technical support. 
This view is probably linked to the international donors’ request for evidence and 
accountability (section 5.2):
Locally relevant knowledge about the impacts of climate change has 
a significant impact on climate change and policy issues discussed at 
international level in fora such as the COPs, where discussions focus on 
issues that include adaptation and funding of countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Questionnaire, junior-level 
government officer in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 13 March 2012).
The role and responsibilities of the junior government officer, regularly engaged in climate 
change negotiation processes, were seemingly central to his response.
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Another view that emerged from the questionnaires emphasised the experiential character 
of local knowledge from sedimented socio-cultural practices: “At the community level, 
knowledge of the effects and adaptation to climate change has evolved over time as a result 
of local experiences” (Questionnaire, senior analyst in a national NGO, 13 March 2012). A 
similar remark was made by a junior environmental expert working for the government: 
“People have been noticing that the climate started to change, they have been adapting and 
they have local knowledge of how to survive, it just hasn’t been documented” (Questionnaire, 
junior-level government officer in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 4 March 2012). 
This type of situated knowledge is gained through natural resource management, food 
production or household tasks, rather than by collecting documents, calculating indexes 
or developing maps. Knowledge produced through daily local practices and experiences is 
perceived as disconnected from the technical knowledge used by national decision makers 
to negotiate in the international arena. Local knowledges, seemingly excluded from the 
assessment process because devoid of certain positivist characteristics (e.g. abstraction, 
objectivity, etc.), are thus assigned a potential role in decision-making. The definition of 
useful knowledge is expanded to include practices that, although not abstracted nor made 
discursive, are relevant and effective because they match particular sets of values or needs 
(Turnbull 1997) in the context of Malawi.
These interviews offer insights into the multiple interpretations of local knowledge, 
which can be official, data-led and internationally standardised; informal, sparse and 
disaggregated when produced by local communities (and seldom used during conferences); 
practical and politically negotiated to pursue national strategic objectives. The terms 
local and indigenous were used interchangeably, showing a lack of awareness of the 
conceptualisations, struggles and debates behind these concepts (see Ingold 2010 for a 
reflection on the definition of ‘indigenous knowledge’). However, an understanding of 
the epistemological and ontological assumptions behind different kinds of knowledge is 
key to defining and negotiating their usability for policymaking. Most decision makers, 
for instance, perceive local or indigenous knowledge to be of complementary value to the 
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knowledge produced by global institutions. This understanding assumes the possibility 
for local knowledges to be purified or ‘extracted’ from the context of their production and 
integrated into the official scientific mainstream. The assumption is that the integration 
of local or indigenous knowledge with scientific expert advice will increase overall 
understanding of climate change impacts and response strategies, improving climate risk 
management and adaptation processes.
This view is intimately connected with an epistemological pluralism – the assumption that 
different viewpoints can be integrated and combined to better understand one reality – that, 
however, does not question the Western unilateral ontological approach to science (one 
reality, different viewpoints). Its emphasis is on the role of institutions (e.g. knowledge-
sharing platforms) or practices (e.g. nominal inclusion) upon which knowledge interactions 
are based. Furthermore, the recognition that socio-cultural values are embedded in all 
types of knowledge has encouraged the use of stakeholder participatory approaches to 
development (Cornwall 2013; Arcand and Wagner 2016; Buggy and McNamara 2016). In 
Chapter 7, I will explore the concept of community-based adaptation (CBA), which relies 
on the assumption that the quality of climate change projects will benefit from a greater 
involvement of local communities through the integration of inputs from contextual and 
practical knowledges, experiences and values. 
However, several STS scholars argue that, by breaking the links with local systems and 
relations of power, the integration process forecloses the formulation of locally appropriate 
and effective policy solutions, thus binding local knowledges to the ontological premises 
of Western thought (Popke 2015; Burnham et al. 2016; Goldman et al. 2016; Klenk et 
al. 2017). Some of the adaptation projects I analysed in Malawi, despite being inclusive 
and participatory in nature, relied on institutionalised expert knowledge, producing 
unintended impacts such as the exacerbation of gendered relations (Chapter 7). The hybrid 
views expressed by Malawi’s policymakers are further exemplified below, where I point to 
several policy implications of the North-centred knowledge approach in the global climate 
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change discourse. The recognition of different and situated understandings of ‘knowledge’ 
could challenge the standard and hegemonic definition, requalifying those practices that 
are effective for certain people in specific contexts (Ingold 2010; Leach and Davies 2012).
5.3.2 Unsettling knowledge hierarchies?
While my informants were aware of the influence of northern science on national policy 
processes and local knowledge systems, they seemed to have difficulty in discerning 
the level and forms of influence of positivist ontological assumptions (e.g. the nature-
culture dualism).
In this regard, the point made by a UN technical adviser from a former colonised African 
country is highly relevant:
We don’t feel that international science is imposed from the Global North 
to the South. We feel it as ours. Lots of professionals and scientists in 
developing countries don’t look back indeed, they don’t appreciate where 
they come from, and this is mainly because of the educational structure 
that embeds characteristics of Western sciences and knowledge systems. 
We really need to think about how to revise our education system 
(Interview, 13 February 2012).
His words reflect how Western conceptualisations of science and objectivity (and the 
worldview they are based upon) have been instilled in many professionals, scientists 
and decision makers from the South through the colonial education system (Whitehead 
1981; White 1996).
Despite the debates on educational reforms that started in south-eastern Africa after colonial 
independence and continued when neoliberal development policies were implemented, 
teaching and research curricula do not seem to have been substantially altered (Goodman 
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et al. 2009; Heleta 2016). As noted by Heleta (2016), South Africa’s higher education 
curriculum has not been significantly changed since the end of apartheid in 1994. It 
has remained largely Eurocentric, promoting Western standards of rationality through 
stereotyped representations of the African continent, skills, and figures, particularly in 
the humanities and social sciences. In Chapter 6, I will discuss some stereotyped views of 
natural resource management dating back to colonial British rule that keep emerging in 
farmers’ narratives in Kasache.
The pervasiveness of both the colonial British education system and the bureaucratic 
development machine help to understand why it is so hard to pinpoint the influence of global 
scientific institutions on the process of knowledge generation and acquisition in the South. 
As argued by PCSTS and FSTS scholarship (Harding 2008), positivist science has deep 
roots and foundations in many cultures and places around the globe, making traditional 
Western science more pervasive, even outside Europe and North America. Goodman et 
al. (2009) and Heleta (2016) suggest that a critical rethinking of the education curriculum 
will stem from reframing the history of Africa as the outcome of entrenched histories of 
patriarchy, slavery, imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. Simply placing ‘Africa’ (or 
African countries) at the centre of teaching, learning and research may, however, reproduce 
positivist binary thinking, and hence Goodman et al. (2009) propose an approach that looks 
at how race, ethnicity, gender, class and nationality interacted to determine marginalisation 
and erasure of local knowledge systems. This could unveil the colonial legacies and deep 
biases that keep permeating methods, formulations and substantive positions in African 
academy (Lugones 2010; Heleta 2016). In Chapter 7, I will further reflect on the possibility 
of ‘decolonising’ (Lugones 2010) gender mainstreaming and participatory approaches 
in development, by analysing women’s experiences in Kasache within co-constituting 
systems of power relations (colonialism, neoliberalism, patriarchy).
Similarly, the key open question in the climate change domain is how to ensure 
recognition of non-Western systems in the knowledge production and validation 
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processes. Among the suggestions made by the decision makers I interviewed was the 
creation of national and transnational interdisciplinary research communities or national 
and sub-regional IPCC working groups. Their assumption was that the main challenge 
facing research communities in the Global South is to develop local knowledge products 
and make them accessible to policymakers through national or regional networks. 
This perspective emphasises the technical and mechanistic nature of the knowledge 
integration process, portraying knowledges as a set of discrete intellectual products that 
can be separated from the place that originated them. Access, collection and translation 
of local knowledge into a suitable form for decision-making are then perceived as the 
key challenges to knowledge integration.
This approach is problematic, since it fundamentally ignores the political dimensions 
and underlying assumptions of the knowledge integration process. Critical feminist 
scholars (see Chapter 4) claim that scientific knowledge, especially when used in the 
public policy domain, should be deconstructed and negotiated among a wider group 
of social actors with different epistemological and ontological commitments (Wynne 
1992; Shackley and Wynne 1996; Charlesworth and Okereke 2010). Several crucial 
questions may facilitate this political analysis (Nadasdy 1999), such as: who is going to 
benefit from specific knowledge? What narratives and agendas are facilitated or limited 
by specific knowledges? How are thought and actions constrained or directed by those 
meanings? The answers to these questions may unveil the hidden power relations and 
cultural biases (the ontological aspects) masked behind well-established knowledge 
claims and open them to contestation. 
The solutions proposed by the interviewees focus on promoting South-South Cooperation 
(SSC) through the establishment of regional (South-East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa) 
or sub-regional (e.g. the Greater Horn of Africa) working groups in the IPCC. This 
approach emerged in 1955 from the Bandung Conference, held under the auspices of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to create a 
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network of mutual assistance between the most disadvantaged countries of the North-
dominated world system (Gosovic 2016; Gray and Gills 2016). Since its establishment, 
the SSC concept and practice have been the subject of several revisions (Gosovic 2016; 
Gray and Gills 2016). One of the major critiques concerns the actual ability of SSC to 
challenge the vertical relations and dependency path between the Global North and 
South (the former colonised countries) through mutual solidarity (in the form of trade, 
financial support, training, capacity building).
In light of the heterogeneity of the ‘Global South’, some authors have argued that a 
classification of countries according to this definition may reproduce hegemonic and 
neocolonial politics in the South itself: China, for instance, may use international aid to 
secure the rights to resource extraction (Gray and Gills 2016; Muhr 2016). Muhr (2016) 
has criticised the dichotomies underlying the SSC approach, especially the concept of 
national interest vs. international solidarity, which hinder the full emancipatory power 
of SSC. Such power has instead been increasingly emerging in the experiences of non-
state actors, such as transnational or grass-root movements (e.g. the Landless People’s 
Movement) that overcome the spatial, cultural or societal hierarchies underpinned by 
SSC ontological categories (‘nation’ or ‘South’).
Helpful insights may be drawn from both the critiques and the experiences of SSC, so 
as to accurately identify and challenge the South’s knowledge and power dependency. 
Malawian decision makers, for instance, should not limit themselves to proposing 
the creation of IPCC sub-regional working groups (e.g. collaborating on technical 
and procedural issues such as data dissemination and sharing between neighbouring 
countries or including experts on the basis of geographical representation). Cooperation 
could be expanded beyond homogeneous and unified classifications (by region or by 
discipline) to include joint efforts on specific vulnerability issues (e.g. malaria outbreaks 
in distinct societal groups) or multi-dimensional societal impacts (e.g. climate change 
gendered impacts).
Chapter 5 - The making of climate change knowledge in Malawi 163
In this section, I highlighted some of the difficulties faced by national decision makers 
in Malawi who are looking to challenge mainstreaming approaches to climate change, 
as well as pointing out alternative modes by which policy actors can exercise their 
agency and re-signify and question North-driven climate change knowledge. Decision 
makers in Malawi expressed alternative views about usability of climate science 
(grounding it in local cultural values) or deployed mainstreaming narratives (evidence-
based policy) to mobilise international financial support for NAPA implementation. 
As further explored in the following chapters, the possibility of acknowledging and 
challenging the established orthodoxy may arise from the recognition of the multiplicity 
of views that produce climate change knowledges and experiences. 
5.4 Conclusions and way forward
There is a widespread perception among Malawi’s decision makers, as evidenced by 
their responses about climate change knowledge, that the capacity to produce climate 
information and knowledge is limited by the lack of financial resources, human capital 
and infrastructure. 
Because of the disparity in knowledge production, international bodies such as the IPCC 
stand out as the main reference sources for decision makers in Malawi. However, the 
scientific knowledge produced by the IPCC is grounded in positivist ideals, namely the 
primacy of natural and physical sciences, which portray climate science as isolated from 
the socio-economic, political and cultural processes as well as from the geographical and 
historical settings that contribute to producing it (Hulme 2011). At the same time, the 
international donor community, by endorsing the climate science positivist framing, plays 
a key role in influencing the perception of what is usable and effective climate change 
knowledge. This epistemological premise has far-reaching ontological consequences.
The international pledge for accountability through quantitative climate data shapes 
the formulation of national adaptation programmes as well as the definition of new 
categories of capacity gaps and transfer. In Malawi, the skewed climate epistemology 
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produces specific conceptualisations of the required scientific and institutional capacities 
(compliant with ‘scientific’ standards) – and related gaps – for policy-relevant knowledge. 
My analysis shows that climate science produced by global scientific institutions is 
highly regarded by decision makers in Malawi. In their view, it acts as a neutral mediating 
force legitimising their expertise as they enter the international arena of climate change 
negotiations, and partly reconciles conflicting political, historical and economic 
interests, contributing to scientifically sound decisions for policymaking. Policymakers 
also showed a strong desire for greater integration between policy and science, in line 
with the concept of usable knowledge (see Chapter 3), which, in order to be applicable, 
needs to be linked to contextual factors such as local values and experiences (Juntti 
et al. 2009). Local knowledge is perceived as highly valuable because it originates in 
sedimented experiences, and there is widespread belief that it should be integrated with 
global science. 
At first glance, national decision makers seem to have internalised dominant science-
led and climate reductionist discourses. The conceptual categories they used when 
interviewed about climate change knowledge partly reflect Western assumptions of 
a homogenous and predetermined natural environment that do not take into account 
the historical, cultural and socio-economic specificities, such as issues of power and 
inequality, underlying the current lack of capacity. These assumptions have determined 
current patterns of global science and knowledge production. An apparent lack of agency 
in the knowledge generation and fruition process is however offset by the expression of 
mixed feelings towards climate science legitimacy and usability at the local level. 
Mixed perceptions speak to the multiple political, social and moral assumptions hiding – 
and struggling – behind the positivist concepts of science and evidence. As emphasised 
by STS, the generation and selection of evidence and science for decision-making is 
always mediated by social and cultural mechanisms (Juntti et al. 2009; Lidskog 2014). 
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Through the expression of hybrid and more situated feelings towards Western/northern 
science and knowledge, the interviewees unconsciously account for climate change 
as a physical phenomenon deeply embedded into local cultural, historical and socio-
economic systems, enriching and challenging the predominant positivist knowledge.
On the basis of these reflections, this chapter outlines the necessity of  re-conceptualising 
climate change knowledge from a wider social, historical and cultural perspective. 
Abstract and universal representations of scientific knowledge (what makes knowledge 
relevant and neutral) are in tension with the characteristics of usable knowledge as 
described by policymakers in Malawi, that is not disconnected from contextual factors 
and experiences. Most importantly, promoting an understanding of science as detached 
from policy, as is the case in the framework of climate reductionism, would prevent the 
formulation of context-relevant policy responses and exclude all the ‘non-scientifically 
compliant’ socio-cultural views and practices that could suggest meaningful solutions 
to climate change. 
In the following chapters, I will show that the influence of global climate change 
epistemology is not limited to the different narratives and meanings of climate change. 
Through the interaction with pre-existing socio-cultural narratives and practices, it 
contributes to the creation of peculiar ontologies.
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Chapter 6
Kusintha kwa nyengo: local meanings of
climate change
6.1 Climate change through socio-historical lenses
The first part of this work looked at how mutually legitimising science-policy actors and 
institutions managed to create a global knowledge and policy consensus on future climatic 
changes (Hulme 2011; Sarewitz 2011; Hulme 2015). Climate orthodoxy has gained 
legitimation through the positivist principles that recently informed the climate-resilient 
development paradigm. But how is the construction of current climate change meanings by 
international organisations, national decision makers and climate-exposed communities 
linked to past socio-political processes? How have these theories and practices contributed 
to socio-economic and biophysical vulnerabilities in present-day Malawi? 
This chapter will focus on the tensions and negotiations between colonial and 
postcolonial representations of climate change. Weather and climate representations 
originating in colonial ideologies (e.g. soil conservation) still permeate climate change 
narratives and practices in Malawi. How did these concepts travel diachronically to the 
point of influencing contemporary debates and practices? I will demonstrate continuity 
and resilience of discursive practices1 (Foucault 1972; 1982) across the colonial and 
postcolonial periods as well as across geographical contexts. 
I will explore stories from Kasache that may shed light on the way colonial discourses 
on climate change were recast following shifts in international power relations and re-
emerged in the guise of climate-resilient development, with material consequences in 
terms of resistance and compliance for the local communities. I will further develop this 
argument to build my critique of the reductionist approaches to climate change that fail 
1 According to Foucault, (1972;1982) discourses represent systematic structures through which knowledge-power 
dynamics unfold (Chapter 3).
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to convey the notion that standardised knowledge claims are the result of often forgotten 
historically and spatially rooted events.
6.2 Climate change as one and many
Conducting interviews with community members in Kasache helped me understand 
people’s perceptions of climate change, as well as physically grounding my multi-sited 
fieldwork. Narration through qualitative interviews was not only useful for grounding 
perspectives and individual experiences of climate change in a specific context. It also 
provided different actors (man and women farmers, elders, local chiefs) with a space to 
express conflicting and resisting views against hegemonic narratives.
My first concern during fieldwork was to understand how the community and individuals of 
Kasache perceived and described climate change. Therefore, my interviews would always 
start off with straightforward questions: “How do you see or define the issue of climate 
change? What do you think are the causes of current climatic changes?” Constructivist 
methodological perspectives would recommend caution with this kind of questions, which 
risk imposing a certain rhetoric (the assumption that climate change is happening). However, 
interviewees’ perceptions and attempts to give meaning to the world around them reveal 
a plurality of ways of framing and describing climate change. In the following sections, 
I will focus on some of them, particularly on those that most point to the tensions and 
continuities between colonial and postcolonial representations of the natural environment 
and their influence on societal change. The stories I collected will problematise some of the 
colonial and developmentalist narratives and practices on climate and soil conservation.
Most importantly, I will map local narratives both to account for the localness of meanings 
and to identify the locus of contestation, the space where local communities express 
themselves as agents of change in constructing, maintaining and modifying discourses 
and practices of climate change.
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6.2.1 Story 1 – Kusintha kwa nyengo or relational climate 
change
Most interviewees in Kasache showed awareness of a climate change issue. However, 
they expressed awareness of a change happening in the community, rather than of 
an abstract notion of climatic change based on quantitative features. When asked 
about climate change, they would recall personal experiences and how this shifting 
pattern was affecting their daily lives, especially in terms of loss of farming assets 
(crops, livestock, food, etc.). Community narratives largely defined climate change 
in terms of the effects of changing weather patterns on their livelihoods, especially 
as related to the timing and intensity of rains. 
Kasache is located in the Lingadzi River Valley, an area that is particularly prone to 
periodic droughts and flooding (see Annex IV for fieldwork pictures). The natural 
vegetation of the valley consists of grass and shrubs, interspersed with patches of 
more fertile sandy clay commonly found along the river banks. Agriculture is a 
risky business, yet it is a key source of livelihood for the local communities, who 
try to make the most of the river banks to grow their maize crops, the major staple 
in the area.
Their understanding of climate change is shaped by time-tested observation and 
practices, as attested by the following quote: “We don’t measure; we only observe 
and see from our experience. We can know that rain is late because it does not come 
in the month we expect it, and it stops earlier than before. We know it no longer 
comes in October” (FGD, 29 July 2012). This statement highlights how individuals 
experience climatic changes in Kasache, especially the tendency to compare the 
occurrence of events in different time spans (preceding years) through diachronic 
observations. Hulme (2008) indeed noted that climatic fluctuations are often adopted 
as anchors for personal memory and human experience in both industrialised and 
rural societies. 
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Similar perspectives were shared by the elders I interviewed in Kasache, who claimed 
to have never heard of climate change despite being able to experience it, especially 
through sight or hearing. An older woman, Busisiwe Muva,2 remarked: “I am not able 
to see exactly what is changing, because I am blind, but I can feel it (my emphasis). 
Right now, for example, everybody is going hungry in the village, this didn’t happen 
before” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012). Busisiwe’s words describe not only 
the effects of ageing and the impact of climate change on her experience of the 
environment, but also how the latter comes to be perceived in a local community – 
through the senses. Individuals talk not only about seeing climate change, but also 
about being able to feel it. The body is not a simple container for the mind, passively 
receiving external inputs mainly through the sense of sight; rather, it blends with 
the external world. Seeing is not different from hearing or feeling and the senses 
emerge as inseparable. This implies that feeling, remembering and speaking are all 
aspects of the individual’s engagement with the environment, forming his or her 
knowledge of the world (Feld 1996; Ingold 2010). Perceptual activity, in particular, 
does not unfold as the mind’s passive receptivity to sensorial inputs, but rather as 
an intentional and continuous relation of the whole being (body and mind) with its 
environment. This worldview also assumes that speech and sound are not only a 
mode of transmitting information or mental content –  a human peculiarity – but 
rather a way of being alive for non-human elements, too.
During a group discussion with farmers, the role of non-living beings in the 
experience of climate change was mentioned. The following quote is emblematic: 
“There are certain plants that tell us if rain will come earlier or not. The wind tells 
us  when rain is coming” (FGD, 29 July 2012; emphasis added). Wind is believed 
to signal the right time to plant; the senses are given the role of guiding towards 
the discovery and knowledge of the world: for societies such as that of Kasache, 
knowledge comes through the sense of hearing and the unmediated experience of 
2 In this as in previous chapters, I use fictitious names to protect the identity and opinions of the individuals who 
contributed to the field study.
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sound, generating a comprehensive and entangled account of the world.
From a critical feminist perspective, these claims seem to attribute to an earthly 
non-living entity – the wind – a mind/human-like quality: the ability to speak, 
advise and, possibly, care (Plumwood 1991; Bannon 2009). In this sense, no 
lines of demarcation are drawn between the sounds of nature and human speech. 
Consequently, wind cannot be disqualified for lacking a property that is considered 
valuable by human societies. This expands the rationalist and positivist thinking that 
denied physical, animal and feminine realms the possession of reason, according 
them an inferior and instrumental position in the natural and moral order (Plumwood 
1991). The anthropocentric view, which sets nature as a mere instrument to human 
self-interest, underpins many neoliberal theories (e.g. market theory), informing 
climate-resilient development interventions (e.g. cost-benefit analyses, technology 
focus), as further discussed in section 6.2.4. It also points to the different weight 
assigned to visual and aural perceptions in the positivist tradition, where vision 
occupies a more trustworthy position in the hierarchy of senses and pathways to an 
‘objective’ truth (Paterson 2009; Serres 2009; Ingold 2010).  
The statements above show that knowledge is not perceived as a bridge between 
mind and nature, but as an intrinsic part of being alive in a world deeply grounded 
in daily experience. This is also defined as ‘haptic knowledge’, by which individuals 
relate to the physical world through multiple interactions between internal bodily 
sensations (e.g. movement and perception of sounds, etc.) and outwardly oriented 
senses (e.g. hearing) (Feld 1996; Crang 2003; Paterson 2009). In this sense, visual, 
acoustic and, more generally, sensory activities are more than a way of experiencing 
and knowing things. They are the means through which a local community seems to 
have assessed and responded to weather and climatic changes across time (“we only 
observe and see from our experience”).
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Embodied sensory experiences have been often portrayed as context-dependent and 
value-laden ways of learning, holding an inferior hierarchical position with respect 
to rationalist and positivist ways of knowing that have reduced the importance 
of experiential learning (Feld 1996; Paterson 2009; Serres 2009; Ingold 2010). 
For the supporters of Western positivism (Chapter 3), there is a clear dichotomy 
between authoritative and credible science based on abstract, universalising and 
impersonal criteria (the facts) and the socio-culturally rooted values, worldviews 
and experiences that produce those facts. For cultural geography and anthropology 
(Feld 1996; Paterson 2009; Ingold 2010), however, perceptual experiences are not 
simply individual sensations, but can explain social and cosmological relations – 
how natural environment and climate change come into existence in relationship 
with human beings.
Locally rooted epistemologies also emerged from a conversation with a member of the 
Group Village Heads (GVHs):
It is not easy to define climate change in Chichewa, since this concept does 
not have a correspondent meaning and word in our local language. The 
closest meaning – kusintha kwa nyengo – relates to the word for short, 
temporary, transitional and reversible climatic change (FGD, 29 July 2012).
The chief’s statement underscores that naming the world implies a more profound 
understanding of it. This is not a neutral and a-historical process. Particularly, 
naming or labelling is the first step for giving things and facts the status of an 
object – the objectification process – making it manifest, nameable and describable 
(Foucault 1972). 
This process is not the same for different societies, periods and discourses. It is 
intrinsically historical, depending on contextual visions of the world (Foucault 
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1972). The situated knowledge of climate change, kusintha kwa nyengo3 as 
interviewees in Kasache called it, refers to a lived experience. The embodied 
understandings of climate change in the community seem to point to circumstantial 
practices connected to a relational ontology (Plumwood 1991; Ingold 2010) shared 
by many sub-Saharan African cultures (Ajayi 2011; Eneji et al. 2012). In these 
worldviews, the understanding of nature proceeds through personal, physical and 
spiritual experiences, since all objects in nature can be the domicile of Spirits 
(see section 6.2.2). Relational ontologies, in particular, tend to frame the universe 
through the continuous relationships between humans (the ancestors, the living, and 
the unborn), nature (an organic entity, as opposed to a mechanical thing that has no 
life or soul), and the gods (Ingold 2010; Ajayi 2011). They all depend on one another 
to survive and thrive, and human beings are conceived as a constituent part of the 
environment. Therefore, spiritual beliefs are connected to the way people perceive 
nature. These ontologies suggest that individual identities are shaped by systems of 
ecological and social interactions. While in a naturalistic ontology (underpinning 
the separation between culture and nature) the human self is in discontinuity (and 
in a higher epistemological and ontological position) with the natural, the animal 
and the bodily (Plumwood 1991; Bannon 2009), in relational ontologies there is 
substantial continuity between humanity and the natural world. In positivist 
ontology, the self is constructed in isolation and against the background of nature; in 
a relational ontology the self emerges in a shared and mutually constitutive context 
with cultural knowledge and the physical environment, inhabited by sentient and 
non-sentient elements. Through the story of nyau rituals in Malawi, in section 6.2.2 
I will show how individuals engage with human and non-human elements (animals, 
masks) to define their relationship with the natural environment and social order.
3 The individual Chichewa words that make up the expression kusintha kwa nyengo have numerous meanings 
(see Steven Paas, Oxford Chichewa Dictionary, 2018). For example, the word kusintha means change, adjustment, 
alterations or modifications, but it also refers to the inability to change or adapt; therefore it is often associated with a 
disability. The term kwa indicates possession and stands for the English words of, for or to. Most interestingly, nyengo 
is the term deployed to indicate seasons and weather patterns in expressions such as nyengo ya dzinja (rainy season), 
nyengo yokolola (harvest season) or nyengo yofunda (summer season). Nyengo is used to suggest occasional or short- 
term events or phenomena, such as in the expression nyengo ya chikondwerero (an occasion for celebration). At the 
same time, the word nyengo can refer to a time without end, or eternity (nyengo yosatha). These different connotations 
can affect the meanings assigned to climate change in Kasache. For example, kusintha kwa nyengo may be associated 
with both short- and a long-term timescales, or reversible and irreversible change in climatic patterns.  
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In other words, ways of imagining human and non-human subjects influence the way 
climate change is conceptualised and introduced into specific context. Kusintha kwa 
nyengo is a natural phenomenon that comes into existence and becomes self-evident if 
expressed in the local language and in accordance with context-relevant categories (e.g. 
local ontologies). That is why it is hard for the chief in Kasache (“it is not easy to define 
climate change”) to grasp it through a different language and thinking frame (Smith 2012).
The statements above are quite striking if compared to my earlier conversations with 
national decision makers. Most government officers I interviewed essentially framed 
climate change as an expert-led and technical issue. No mention of local meanings, 
naming or situated experiences was made; they put their faith in a regime of ‘climate 
truth’ governed by IPCC and UNFCCC processes. Furthermore, they emphasised 
that national planning processes on climate change generally respond to international 
scientific standards without considering or including local knowledges (Chapter 5). 
In their views, local knowledges exist as multiple perspectives on a single reality 
(climate change) – not as a historical, contingent and intersecting activity coproduced 
with society. The usability of local knowledge for policy planning purposes is in 
fact assessed against scientific benchmarks and positively valued when showing 
positivist scientific attributes. Such tendency in national policy actors is in tension 
with the relational ontologies expressed by several individuals in Kasache. While 
the former emphasise universality and objectivity as necessary characteristics of 
climate change knowledge, the latter point to the heterogeneity of elements producing 
situated knowledges (experience, rituals, relations, as further discussed below). 
The conceptualisation of knowledge by decision makers tends towards a universal 
homogenous representation of climate change and risks overlooking embodied 
knowledges and experiences, such as those that emerged in Kasache.
Of course, it would be a mistake to conceive the community of Kasache as completely 
isolated from the external world or occupying a polarised position with respect 
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to national decision makers and international narratives. In fact, externally driven 
definitions of climate change managed to infiltrate and influence the community 
itself. Several entities have acted as ‘authorities of delimitation’, subjects that can 
delimit, designate, name and establish climate change as an object (Foucault 1972). 
Many interviewees reported that a concept of climate change had been introduced 
by external sources of information such as TV and radio programmes, extension 
workers, or local and international NGOs. One of the elders told me: “The fact that 
people come to our village talking and asking about climate change means that the 
change is real and is happening” (Individual interview, 6 August 2016). The same 
opinion emerged during a group discussion with men farmers, hence the relevance 
of situated knowledges:
We know that change is happening, we can see it ourselves, but we didn’t 
know that it would be permanent; we thought it would be temporary. 
But then the radio and the agricultural advisers tell us this change is for 
good (FGD, 29 July 2012).
External information is seen as a source of legitimation. Everybody in the village knows 
from experience that a change is taking place, but the fact that national or international 
experts are talking about it grants climate change a reality status.  For example, many in 
the community claimed that adaptation was not a new practice in Kasache. Their parents 
and grandparents would adapt to changes in weather conditions by adopting winter 
cropping, irrigation farming, manure making or crop rotation techniques that only recently 
have been labelled as ‘climate change adaptation initiatives’ by development actors, thus 
reaching the status of an ‘objective’ reality. It seems that the community constructs the 
natural world by tapping into different cultures and knowledge systems, of which Western 
rationality is just one of many. This step is crucial to understanding how groups agree 
on standard meanings and create ‘objective’ realities (Cline-Cole 1998; Broch-Due and 
Schroeder 2000).
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In this section, I briefly outlined how the idea of climate change in Kasache assembles 
diverse ways of knowing. The next step in my analysis is to take a closer look at how and 
why daily lived experiences contribute to creating climate knowledge. To this end, I will 
provide specific examples illustrating the role of international and national discourses 
on climate change and development in transforming identities and relations in Kasache.
6.2.2 Story 2 – It’s God’s plan: how colonial climates have 
travelled to the present
I was introduced to Lackson Chalira in Kasache. He is a 46-year-old farmer and business 
man. We met outside his house for an interview and started discussing the meaning of 
the expression kusintha kwa nyengo. He told me that he was aware of climate change 
since he had heard about it on the radio, although what this meant in practice was 
difficult for him to say: 
I’ve heard of climate change, but I don’t know what it means. I see that we 
don’t have enough firewood, and rain patterns are changing. I think this is 
what climate change is about, but I don’t know. I never experienced these 
things before, so I’m just guessing. But I don’t know for sure, nobody told 
me…maybe it’s God’s plan (Individual interview, 6 August 2012).
Lackson was one of the first to allude to God’s responsibility when talking about climate 
change. I initially thought it was just a turn of phrase, but later discovered that it was a 
recurrent discursive pattern in the community. Four elders (two men and two women), 
aged between 70 and 80, reported in a group discussion:
We obviously see a change. Rainfall used to be reliable, especially the 
first rain. Now it’s no longer predictable. It starts very late in January, 
so yes, there is a change. And the Lingadzi River often floods. We think 
that God is the main cause, he has decided it (FGD, 8 August 2012).
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Both Lackson and the elders see climate change as caused by factors outside human 
control. Their view could be explained as an expression of the relational worldview 
common to many societies in south-east Africa, according to which humanity, nature and 
the gods belong to the same interrelated, complementary and interdependent ontological 
categories (Eneji et al. 2012). As all modes of existence are conceived in a necessary 
interrelationship, climate change may be a phenomenon all beings (human and non-
human) contribute to. Thus, because climate change is believed to be determined by 
God, who has free “will” and “plans”, it no longer depends entirely on human action, but 
rather acquires a degree of ‘autonomy’. Hulme (2008) reports on a long history of cultural 
interpretations of extreme weather as signifiers of divine blessings or judgements in 
European societies. The relationship between God and climate, especially droughts, is 
portrayed in the early Jewish scriptures and has remained dominant in Western Europe 
through the Middle Ages and until the early modern era. As argued by Hulme, fears of 
extreme events were caused by the belief that God and Nature were intrinsically related. 
Weather was, therefore, beyond human understanding and control. Originating in the 
lack of naturalistic or climatological explanations, this imaginary lasted well beyond 
the cusp of Enlightenment, when weather measurements and observations started 
being made in European countries (Hulme 2008). Moral discourses on regional climate 
introduced by European missionaries in Africa were likely influenced by this vision 
(Endfield and Nash 2002a; 2002b; section 6.2.2.1).
The identification of God as the main agent for climate change may have influenced 
Lackson’s reflection about individual engagement in adaptation activities: “In terms 
of climate change, there are no adaptation activities that we can (my emphasis) do 
together… everybody does it his own way, but water pumps may help reduce food 
insecurity” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012). The teleological conception of 
nature, according to which nature possesses ‘intentionality’ (Bannon 2009), may lead to 
a degree of individual passivity; however, it could also challenge positivist mechanistic 
and instrumental views of nature (and interconnected dualisms), leading to alternative 
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environmental ethics (Chapter 8). In section 6.2.4, I will reflect on the implications 
of specific rationalities and worldviews for the individual capacity to imagine social 
change and propensity to act in Kasache.
My reflections on the relational ontology emerging from the interviews were supported 
by the encounter with a masking ritual called nyau. While driving off the main roads 
between Lilongwe, Salima and Kasache, I came across people running and dancing 
on the roadside. They were wearing masks of crocodiles, elephants or lions. I could 
not interact directly with them, but my research assistant and interpreter, Ganizani, 
explained that nyau masks are part of a ritual tradition originating from the central 
districts of Malawi. The masks usually portray zirombo, wild animals that come to the 
village from the bush to facilitate the passage from youth to maturity and from life to 
death and the realm of the ancestors. Ganizani further explained that nyau performances 
generally take place during mortuary and initiation ceremonies and at specific times of 
the year. They follow the maize seasonal calendar and make their appearance only after 
the harvest, when enough food is available to feed the participants. 
I was particularly intrigued by the link between wild animals, village boundaries (the 
fact that the dancers travel between villages) and the calendrical rotation. The nyau 
ritual intimately links the perception of nature to moral values and social order (Probst 
2002; Kachapila 2006). The village, in particular, is conceived as a moral and social 
universe, and by crossing its spatial boundaries, dancers destroy and recreate that unity. 
The three main spatial categories – inside, outside and in-between – correspond to the 
three categories of participants: women, wild animals and men, and reproduce their role 
within the framework of social organisation.
A plurality of meanings can be ascribed to the practice of nyau: an affirmation of 
the identity and distinctiveness of society in relation to members within and outside 
villages; the connections between the cycle of life-(initiation)-and death and the 
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seasonal cycle in agriculture; a metaphor for fertility (Probst 2002). Further, nyau 
was fundamental to structuring and re-structuring socio-cultural and economic 
relations in the community during colonial administration (Chapter 7). As a form 
of association, nyau was deployed by men to improve their socio-economic status in 
matrilineal societies, as a space in which married men could experience a sense of 
belonging to the community through songs and rituals that largely excluded women.
Not only did the nyau practice serve to reorganise political, religious and economic 
relationships, but it also informed people’s practices and perceptions about the natural 
environment. The penetration of nyau into the domain of the rain shrines (see section 
6.2.2.1) is exemplary (Probst 2002). The seasonal cycle in agriculture corresponds 
to the calendrical cycle of nyau ceremonies: bush burning, in particular, signals the 
beginning of both the hot season and the season of nyau rituals. Black smoke rising 
from the fields is believed to transform itself into rain, leading to the first precipitation 
in the month of November. Human modification of climate through grass burning is 
assumed to yield tangible and positive, albeit unpredictable, benefits for the community. 
There is a clear contrast with the catastrophic tones of the international anthropogenic 
climate change discourse originating in European cultural explanations of weather 
extremes in the late Middle Ages (Hulme 2008). In the next section, I will discuss how 
vegetation removal through bush fires and tree cutting was blamed to be a destructive 
farming practice by missionaries and colonial administrators. The negative connotation 
attributed by European settlers to this ritual practice most likely also influenced current 
understandings of anthropogenic climate change in Kasache (section 6.2.3).
Interestingly, even the Local Civil Protection Committee (LCPC), acting as the main 
interlocutor with international organisations, described climate change in spiritual 
terms: “We think that climate change is a Malawian and local problem. It is determined 
by God’s will. But it is also caused by human beings who cut down trees” (FGD, 29 July 
2012). The conceptualisation of environment as “an eco-social sphere of a community 
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of beings, where human and non-human co-exist and interact daily” is even stronger in 
this claim (Snodgrass and Tiedje 2008, 9). Indeed, climate change seems to be caused 
by both God’s will and human action. At first glance, the reference to anthropogenic 
intervention on the environment (tree cutting) may seem casual (one of the many causes 
of climate change) and a-historical. Yet, in the next section, I will show how this too is 
rooted in colonial and postcolonial history. 
A tension between relational and rationalistic explanations for climate change seems to 
emerge from community narratives and practices. Did specific cultural and historical 
processes generate these hybrid meanings?
6.2.2.1 Religion and science in climate change narratives
The nyau practice is not the only Malawian ritual speaking to a relational ontology. 
The myth of Makewana, “the mother of all people”, played an important role in the 
diffusion of rain shrines across central Malawi. Makewana, one of the most powerful 
rainmakers in Central Africa, was believed to have direct access to God: “Without her 
it was believed that there would be no rain; nothing around Makewana could be white 
(my emphasis), or the rain would not come” (Smith 2005, 1028). This description 
echoes the accounts of the rainmaking power ascribed to nyau: “Week after week 
black (my emphasis) smoke rises from the fields, darkening the sky. As though it were 
transforming smoke into rain…the first rain clouds arrive” (Probst 2002, 185).
The origin of rain shrines in Malawi can be traced back to the later centuries of the first 
millennium. According to Smith (2005), the first Makewana was probably a priestess who 
arrived in Nyasaland in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, with the first wave of migration 
of Bantu-speaking people from the current Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The rainmaking ceremony was known as mgwetsa, or rain-dance (Rangeley 1953; 
Smith 2005). Like the nyau practice, rainmaking rituals were also timed with the 
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seasonal cycle of agricultural production and the passage from the rainy season 
(December–May) to the dry season (June–November). As smoke from the bush fires 
darkened the sky, it turned into clouds, ensuring that the first rain would arrive and 
marking the end of the ritual season, the beginning of the planting season, and a 
new cycle. With its cyclical repetition, this practice also granted the reproduction 
of the cosmological order in which feedback mechanisms were established between 
the beneficiaries of the earth’s productivity and its source (Probst 2002). From this 
perspective, rainmaking dances appeared to be a ritual reflection of the Chewa cyclical 
myth of creation (Probst 2002).
Nowadays, the Makewana, or deity ritual, is still performed in times of drought, 
providing a spiritual and practical framework for living and coping with unpredictable 
and highly variable climate (Endfield and Nash 2002b; Smith 2005). During a 
severe drought in the Blantyre District (1948), Southern Province of Malawi, a 
solid consensus emerged that the lack of rain was the work of God and could not 
be attributed to human action, nor to the anger of ancestors (Vaughan 1987). Shrine 
complexes deteriorated in the nineteenth century, when Malawi was first colonised4 
by Scottish Presbyterian Missionaries, followed by Anglicans, Catholics and Baptists 
among others. Rainmaking eventually declined when the old tribute system that used 
to maintain the shrines collapsed5.
According to PCSTS scholars, Christian evangelism in southern Africa reflected the 
increasing entrenchment between religion, science and politics that, starting from 
the sixteenth century, characterised the Western world (Restivo 2001; Endfield 
and Nash 2002a, 2002b). Evangelism was considered one of the first steps towards 
‘civilisation’, and missionaries spread Christian beliefs bearing in mind the class, 
cultural, commercial and political interests of their country of origin.
4 Nyasaland was officially established as a British Protectorate in 1891.
5iSacred sites for rainmaking still exist in Malawi as recognised by UNESCO (https://whc.unesco.org/en/
tentativelists/5602/) and documented by Rangeley (1953), Englund (1996), Ranger (1996), Englund (2007) and van 
Binsbergen (2011).
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The diffusion of a new form of political power harking back to Judaeo-Christian 
institutions attested to the links between religion, science and politics. Pastoralism6 
was the expression of the modern Western state that colonialism contributed to 
spreading globally (Foucault 1982). According to Foucault (1982), pastoral power was 
related to the scientific production of truth, or totalising conceptualisations of the 
individual and the universe. As discussed in Chapter 4, the parallel enforcement of 
capitalism through colonial expansionism and evangelism laid the foundations for the 
legitimation of modern Western science (Restivo 2001). Missionaries in Malawi did 
not limit themselves to imposing a Western political system and exogenous forms of 
power relations but deployed ‘climate discourses’ (Hulme 2008) within a framework 
of moral economy that equated ‘heathenism’ with environmental and moral decay 
(Endfield and Nash 2002a, 2002b). Human development and progress started to be 
associated with environmental narratives – an element that would later feature in 
developmentalist discourse and practices (Chapter 7).
In Chapter 3, I introduced the concept of ‘climate determinism’ in the positivist paradigm of 
science, contrasting it with contemporary ‘climate reductionism’ (Hulme 2011). While the 
former assigned physical climate the ability to explain the performance of environments, 
people and societies, the latter retains only the ‘explicative power’ of climate science, 
assigning to projecting and predictive techniques the primacy for ensuring objectivity and 
disinterestedness in policy making (Hulme 2011). Besides, cultural discourses on climate 
that emerged under colonialism – although they showed some elements of continuity 
as discussed below – should not be confused with the contemporary climate change 
narratives I analyse in my work. As outlined by Hulme (2008), discourses on climate 
have a long genealogy (dating back to fifth-century BC Greece), which is geographically 
and historically situated, but continue to condition present narratives on climate change.
6 Foucault (1982) defines ‘pastoralism’ as a very special form of power that integrates the power which originated in 
Christian institutions (geared towards salavation and implying  knowledge of the conscience and the ability to direct 
it) in the modern Western state. Pastoral power is exerted by the state apparatus or by a public institution such as the 
police, educational systems, and welfare societies, but also through medicine, psychiatry, and employers.
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Colonial discourses on climate were mainly constructed around the settler’s experience 
(Hulme 2008). The disease-ridden ‘tropical climates’ of Africa were deemed to be 
particularly unfavourable to human health and progress, except for a few suitable areas in 
central and southern Africa (Endfield and Nash 2002b; Hulme 2008). Vernacular stories 
played a crucial role in forging climatic tropes in colonial empires. Colonial settlers’ 
and sailors’ anecdotes, along with the missionaries’ correspondence and journals, were 
the only source of evidence and contributed to promoting a certain rhetoric on African 
climates (Carey 2011; Vogel 2011). Colonial climate tropes reproduced unifying visions of 
the natural environment; later promoted by post-World War II scientific internationalism 
(Mahony 2016), they went on to feed the international climate change orthodoxy. In that 
sense, colonial chronicles acted as a powerful means of communication, linking popular 
perceptions with expansionist interests and elitist scientific discourse, justifying the 
belief that once British environmental management was reproduced in the colonies, 
civilisation, industry and health would follow (Vogel 2011). The rise of the discourse on 
climate was linked to the growth of capitalism, the expansion of British colonialism and 
the early codification of empirical science. As argued by Hulme (2008), contemporary 
apocalyptic discourses on climate change stem from the European fearful imaginaries 
of tropical climates.
In Malawi, missionaries gradually eroded local environmental knowledge systems 
(Grove 1989; Endfield and Nash 2002a). Linking weather and climatic extremes to 
rainmaking traditions was seen by the colonisers as ‘folly’, an ‘erroneous’ ‘and ‘ridiculous’ 
superstition (Endfield and Nash 2002b). Local knowledges were benchmarked against 
positivist criteria of rationality. In fact, by the late eighteenth century climate had started 
to be measured in Europe through formalised and standardised meteorological practices 
(Hulme 2008). The causal link between God and climate extremes was dissolved through 
the separation between divine and natural laws and the attribution of extreme events to 
natural explanations (Hulme 2008). In Malawi, missionaries were especially concerned 
because rainmakers associated the failure of rains with the arrival of the Christian 
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mission, undermining their enterprise and persuading local communities of the negative 
impacts of European contact (Grove 1989; Endfield and Nash 2002b).
Despite the Christian missionaries playing a role in delegitimising local environmental 
knowledge, spiritual notions seem to have remained pervasive in current local discourses 
on climate change. Colonial narratives seem to have endured and emerged in different 
forms in current discourses. In that regard, Lackson Chalira’s claims could be read either 
as a sign of the local relational ontology that resisted colonial destruction or as a hybrid 
cultural understanding generated by the interplay between the colonial enterprise and 
local environmental beliefs. The reference to deities in current narratives on climate 
change seems to be the outcome of a cultural hybridisation process (Bhabha 1994) 
whereby narratives, identities and objects generated under colonial rule show ambivalent 
and undistinguishable cultural traits, which belong neither to the colonisers nor to 
colonised societies. For example, aspects of the rainmaking craft were appropriated 
by Christian missions in Malawi as a sign of their own exclusive religious power 
and authority (Endfield and Nash 2002b). In particular, they capitalised on people’s 
association of the missionary presence with the arrival of plentiful rains, exploiting the 
pre-existing significance of rainmaking and its implications for the well-being of local 
communities and the environment. In other words, colonial power appropriated the 
relational understandings of climatic variability, combining them with formal Western 
scientific ideas. This served to replicate power through local knowledge and worldviews 
in an interactive and highly contextualised way, which made – and still makes – it hard 
to uncritically separate the two. The ambivalence of knowledge-power processes made 
Western discursive and political domination pervasive and difficult to resist. 
Science, policy and religion became intertwined, as climate narratives were deployed to 
justify colonial ideology and practices. Western colonies relied on pastoralism’s cultural 
features, based on universalist and totalising theories, to promote and reinforce their own 
political stability and discredit local cultures and knowledges. Colonisation was regarded 
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as a necessary moral obligation to civilise and educate ‘savage’ populations (see Chapter 
4). Paradoxically, European colonialism flourished on a form of political power that 
linked moral salvation to the progress of material and spiritual life and, however illusorily, 
was driven by a-moral and rationalist scientific assumptions (Cozzens and Woodhouse 
2001). A parallel may be drawn with the current relevance of a ‘climate rationale’ in 
the international development community, where project approval and funding is 
increasingly linked to the use of best available scientific data. From an anthropological 
perspective (Hulme 2008), the emphasis on climate rationales contrasts with local beliefs 
about the spiritual – and ‘irrational’, from a positivist viewpoint – causes of adverse 
climatic experiences. Behind the claims to objectivity and neutrality, the contemporary 
‘climate rationale’ seems to paradoxically re-propose theological orientations (at least 
linguistically) suggesting moral ideals of climate and weather upon which to recast power 
hierarchies (Hulme 2008). ‘Climate’ seems to be the means through which notions of 
socio-cultural superiority or dominant relations of power are asserted both in colonial 
climate narratives and in current narratives on climate change (Chapter 5). Malawi’s 
decision makers’ remarks about the knowledge divide being the determinant of national 
capacities in international negotiating processes are a case in point.
Local stories on relational ontologies show that the encounter with European colonialism 
was not the only cultural and political determinant in the history of Malawi. The process 
of production of ‘truth’ on colonial climates was neither monolithic nor unidirectional, as 
relational ontologies interacted with Western rationalities during and after the colonial 
era. Alternative stories, moulded by contextual worldviews and practices, shaped the past 
and continue to influence the present, as emerged in individual narratives. Lackson’s and 
the elders’ accounts of how climate change is experienced through senses and its causes 
(“God’s will”) point to alternative views of human-nature relations erased or omitted in 
Western dualism. As the superiority of Western rationality has been historically justified 
through the polarisation of differences (in terms of privation or plenitude) in epistemological 
binaries (Plumwood 1991), formerly excluded worldviews can question the universality of 
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the Western scientific apparatus and enrich it with alternative ways of knowing and being. 
For example, depriving the natural world of ‘intentionality’ can produce entities that are 
void of ‘valuable’ qualities and can be mastered by rational human beings, generating 
instrumental approaches to natural resource management (Bannon 2009). At the same 
time, these stories embody specific relational ontologies that challenge or struggle to be 
compatible with reductionist representations of history or contemporary global climate 
change epistemologies and ontologies. This approach helps to scrutinise the lineage 
between colonial and developmentalist rationalities and the role of Western dualistic 
narratives in shaping weather and climate representations in Malawi, as well as unveiling 
opportunities for individual and collective agency emerging from epistemological and 
ontological conflicts and contradictions (section 6.2.4.2 and Chapter 8).
6.2.3 Story 3 – The masters of nature
“God’s will” is not the only identified cause of climate change in the narratives from 
Kasache. While some in the village seemingly see climate change as the intentional 
creation of a free being, others pointed to soil and natural resources degradation as 
one of the main determinants.
Robson Kawonga, a 26-year-old farmer, explicitly pointed to deforestation practices: 
“I think the causes of climate change are related to tree cutting” (Individual interview, 
6 August 2012). International and national development projects and activities share 
this belief. One of the priorities of local and international NGOs in Kasache is to 
find ways and means of encouraging conservative natural resource management 
practices while avoiding soil erosion, as mentioned by Robson and others: “People 
in the community plant flood-protecting trees. We were told this by COOPI, that 
for example elephant grass helps protect the riverbank” (Individual interview, 6 
August 2012; emphasis added). The recurring association between land practices 
and climate change may be explained by the fact that agriculture accounts for 35% 
of Malawi’s GDP and is central to the livelihood of 85% of the population.
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The formulation and implementation of national and subnational climate change 
programmes and initiatives in Malawi have been mainly shaped by international 
agendas and conceptualisations that linearly link LDCs livelihoods to rain-fed 
agriculture and food security or identify unsustainable land practices as the main 
cause of climate change in developing countries (FAO 2008; WFP 2011; FAO 2016).
In Chapter 4, I argued that multilateral and bilateral development actors play a 
key role in supporting the development and implementation of climate policies, 
especially NAPAs, within national and subnational contexts (Agrawala 2004; Janetos 
et al. 2012). The major donors in Malawi (e.g. USAID, DFID, NORAD, EU, JICA; 
see Chapter 4 for acronym explanation) emphasise the importance of aligning the 
country’s national development goals with national adaptation planning priorities 
(Yim et al. 2017). In Malawi, 86% of government projects on environment and 
climate change are financed by donors, with the Government of Malawi (GoM), and 
especially the Ministry of Environment, directly managing their implementation at 
district and community level (UNDP 2012; GoM 2014). In the district of Salima, 
where Kasache is located, the most active donors are the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), followed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 
and the European Union (EU). Unlike in the rest of the country, there is a high 
presence of NGOs implementing climate change projects in Salima (UNDP 2012). 
Malawi’s NAPA emphasises that: “The extensive land use, including the wanton 
cutting down of trees on the Middle and Upper Shire Valleys, has resulted in 
severe land degradation and soil erosion” (2006, 2; emphasis added). The idea of 
anthropogenic climate change has also been introduced in Kasache by external 
actors (e.g. NGOs) through a number of development initiatives aimed at enhancing 
community resilience under the framework of NAPA (GoM 2006) . A study from 
UNDP lists projects implemented in Salima between 2006 and 2016: seven out of 
Chapter 6 - Kusintha kwa nyengo: local meanings of climate change 187
twelve focus on reforestation, afforestation or broader natural resource conservation 
measures aimed at “securing the capacity of rural communities to adapt to climate 
change” (2012, 53). In the “Management for Adaptation of Rural Communities to 
Climate Change” project, funded by NORAD for a total amount of USD 6 billion, tree 
planting at the household level and sustainable management of natural woodlands 
and trees are identified as the main objectives (UNDP 2012).
In Kasache, interviewees identified several international actors who play a 
prominent role in promoting afforestation and tree plantation, in particular COOPI 
and the Red Cross Society. Research informants reported that these organisations 
are “helping with implementing adaptation solutions, such as for example promoting 
riverbank protection or distributing trees for plantation” (Individual interview, 6 
August 2012). The Local Civil Protection Committee, with the support of national 
and international development actors, spearheads the practice of tree planting as 
an adaptation response to climate change: “There are many NGOs that advise. The 
LCPC talks about planting trees. We plant trees and these trees help protect us from 
winds, I have many trees here to protect my house” (Individual interview, 6 August 
2012). Based on NAPA’s (2006) emphasis on tree plantation as a key measure to 
enhance food and water security and improve sustainable livelihoods in vulnerable 
rural communities, afforestation has been introduced in Kasache by international 
development projects as a possible solution to climate change: “We try to conserve 
nature…At every water source, we have a tree nursery so that we can plant a lot of 
trees” (Individual interview, 9 August 2012). According to my informants, NGOs 
particularly stress the active and participatory role of communities in preserving 
natural resources.
This practice, although aimed at promoting individual action, can actually increase 
essentialisation of farmers’ inefficiency and, especially when followed without 
awareness of and attention to the diversity of native plants and wild relatives, 
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can negatively affect local cultures and ecosystems (Ishizawa 2006). In Kasache, 
several interviewees claimed that new farming technologies and practices are 
often introduced without training or support from the international community 
(see section 6.2.4 and Chapter 7). Arguably, this practice can clash with contextual 
ontologies. Land clearing and tree removal have been historically linked to colonial 
narratives on soil conservation and described as the main cause of drought and soil 
infertility in the colonial past (Grove 1989; Carey 2011; Vogel 2011). In Malawi’s 
NAPA (GoM 2006), suggestions for improving land and forest protection include 
the management of bush fires at the community level. However, as I previously 
highlighted (section 6.2.2), bush fires are intimately linked to rainmaking practices. 
Therefore, a policy option promoted by the NAPA and financially supported by 
donors may conflict with contextual ontologies, undermining the effectiveness of 
policy measures (e.g. farmers’ religious beliefs may lead them to disobey advice), 
and disregard alternative solutions offered by contextual knowledges. Although 
not directly related to afforestation practices, in section 6.2.4 (ganyu labour) and 
Chapter 7 (women self-help groups), I will discuss adaptation practices that build on 
embodied worldviews and societal relations. 
The idea of associating anthropogenic removal of vegetation with rainfall decline 
and climatic changes is deeply connected to the history of Western science and 
colonialism. A brief historical vista could help to unveil the chain of events behind 
what later became a common and pre-conceived agenda around the African 
environment in international development theory and practice.
6.2.3.1 The spread of conservationism in Nyasaland
Lackson’s spiritual narrative made me question whether the idea of anthropogenic 
climate change in the context of Kasache was reflecting dated and stereotyped 
conceptions of nature, and how the link between soil conservation and climatic change 
became so pervasive in community narratives.
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The conservationist theory emerged as the European scientific response to a series 
of drought episodes in Southern Central Africa in the 1920s (Grove 1989). Colonial 
geography assumed that people could modify local climatic conditions by acting 
on land through cultivation. Additionally, colonial conventional wisdom was that 
African farmers, the practical users of the natural environment which they regarded 
as largely a livelihood issue (Tsing 2005),  were the major cause of environmental 
problems. Local and indigenous agriculture techniques were perceived as ‘inefficient’ 
and ‘destructive’. In this context, conservation ideas emerged as an attempt to protect 
or recreate idyllic environments and justify settlers’ land acquisition (Vaughan 1987; 
Grove 1989; Neumann 2000). In Malawi, European settlers took advantage of local 
chiefs’ rivalries7 to secure large segments of land and gain access to labour for their 
plantations (Neumann 2000; Bryceson 2006). The goal of the colonial government was 
not to improve farming and cultivation methods, but to ensure quality of cash crops 
and create efficient markets that could protect its financial interests (Vaughan 1987; 
Grove 1989; Green 2009). Large-scale European agricultural enterprises significantly 
expanded the production of coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco at various stages. 
Conservationism based its theories and practices on claims to universality and 
truth, specifically on the general idea that cultivation and agriculture would usher in 
‘civilisation’, improving land, climate and economic growth. Again, such as in the 
case of religion and weather, the colonial project linked its political and economic 
priorities to prescriptive scientific discourses. Colonial scientific claims were taken as 
a benchmark against which to classify other knowledges, whose systems were labelled 
as unproductive and inadequate to the task of managing natural resources.8
7iIn Malawi, local political structures were rearranged under Native or Traditional Authorities, positioned between 
the individual and the government (Eggen 2011). The highest chiefs were subjugated, defeated or dethroned, while 
the local chiefs were kept in their positions to perform duties for the colonial administration, such as tax collection, 
judicial and rule-making powers (Eggen 2011).
8iIt is worth noting, however, that colonial officials had different views on conservation. Grove (1989) reports that 
by the early twentieth century two main views were dominant in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Darwinian and the 
Evangelical, which differently influenced conservation measures. Ecological Darwinism envisioned the repopulation 
of the environment with ‘exotic’ vegetation and its protection from grazing animals and shifting cultivation. The 
evangelical and humanistic worldview envisaged local farmers and communities settling into protected areas and 
living in atavistic and ‘traditional’ ways, thus recreating the idyllic landscapes typical of the Eden.
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People and the environment were objectified and re-constructed in accordance with 
specific representations. As argued by Foucault (1972; 1982), objectification is one 
of the key processes by which pre-constructed ideas become persistent. Labelling, 
in particular, is a step in the objectification process by which people and nature are 
conceived as objects of policy and reproduced in convenient images. This usually 
goes in tandem with specific modes of enquiry, through which certain ideas about 
individuals and nature attain the status of scientific truth (Foucault 1982). In colonial 
Malawi, there was widespread belief that farming practices were destructive, especially 
shifting cultivation, burning stubble, lack of manuring and superficial hoeing; so was 
the increasing population density (Vaughan 1987). In the 1930s, one of the managers of 
British Central Africa Company, a large landholder in Malawi, commented on the link 
between land degradation and population increase:
If the natives of this country are left to their own devices, they will 
starve themselves in a very few years – soil erosion, deforestation, 
poor husbandry and complete disregard of soil fertility will completely 
impoverish the land of this country (Vaughan 1987, 64).
Not only does labelling construct specific representations, but it also ensures that 
pre-determined solutions become prescriptive, legitimising institutional settings 
and political interventions. In colonial Malawi, agriculture extension services were 
established to implement massive state interventions on soil conservation (Vaughan 
1987; Neumann 2000). Yet, these were based on superficial perceptions of local 
farming practices rather than on detailed knowledge of the local context (Green 
2009). Local experiences and history of environmental modification were disregarded 
(Vaughan 1987; Grove 1989). Consequently, many of the local farming techniques 
were considered harmful to the environment. The nyau ritual (section 6.2.2) is 
exemplary of a spiritually complex institution that was misunderstood and reduced to 
a destructive practice by colonial officials.
Chapter 6 - Kusintha kwa nyengo: local meanings of climate change 191
Soil conservation became a political tool to secure conceptual and instrumental 
control as well as subordinating groups of individuals. Colonial stereotypes of African 
farming served as justification for land alienation and redistribution among European 
colonisers9 (Pachai 1973; Kydd and Christiansen 1982; Vaughan 1987; Bryceson 2006). 
In Malawi, conservationist discourses did not just involve reconstructing people’s and 
the environment’s identities but also implied a material transformation (section 6.2.4.) 
The transfer of land to European settlers and the growth of commercial agriculture 
forced local farmers to seek wage employment in colonial estates, where they were 
exposed to fluctuations in world crop prices, fuelling men’s migration and women’s 
dependency on agricultural activities (Kydd and Christiansen 1982).
Against a historical background where local knowledges and practices have been 
sanctioned, neglected or erased in favour of policy protocols promoting naturalist (non-
indigenous) ontologies, tree planting in Kasache may risk supporting and replicating 
biased beliefs about the causes of climate change, such as notions of ‘destructive farmers’ 
and human-induced soil degradation (Leach and Mearns 1996). Not only do these 
adaptation practices imply a destructive role of local populations – a common colonial 
trope – but they also assume climate change as an exclusively behavioural outcome of 
a rational agent whose action is an outward expression of some inner resolution (Ingold 
2010). From an FSTS and political ontology perspective, tree planting may be read 
as a techno-managerial solution to climate change that values the inner rationality of 
humankind as well as the capacity to master and control nature. Yet, as I argued earlier, 
several narratives in Kasache explicitly link climate change with relational rather than 
naturalist ontologies, where climate change can be read as a spiritual and cultural all-
encompassing experience between nature, deities and community. Tree planting has 
been supported by international NGOs in Kasache as a practice promoting climate 
change mitigation. However, the underpinning ontological mismatch between Western 
9 The magnitude of the land alienation issue in Malawi can be measured by the fact that by 1945, 31 percent of the 
population of the country was living on a private estate representing 11 percent of the whole area of the British 
Protectorate (Pachai 1973). 
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and contextual knowledges may generate unintended outcomes, such as the oversight 
of alternative context-relevant solutions to climate change that may have a broader 
impact on local livelihoods (section 6.2.4) or the implementation of interventions that 
exacerbate unequal power relations in the community (Chapter 7).
The next section discusses how climate-resilient development in Kasache, despite being 
associated with ‘progressive’ ideas of capacity building and technology transfer, can 
hardly be regarded as emancipatory (Blaser 2014), fostering instead forms of dependency 
and passivity.
6.2.4 Story 4 - Discipline and resistance in coping with climate 
change
6.2.4.1 Hegemony of maize, dependency on aid
The adoption of hybrid seeds is one of the most mentioned adaptation practices in 
Kasache. Technologies are perceived by my research informants as fundamental to 
improving local plantations’ resilience to climate change, as evidenced by the words 
of Loveness Kapininga, a young female farmer:
I heard about climate change from organisations and radio programmes 
(COOPI and people from Salima). I think that climate change is real and 
is happening, unexpectedly…I’m trying to adapt to climate change in my 
farming activities. We are planting ‘senga’, which is an early maturing 
variety of maize… We just try to adapt on our own. Those that come 
to the community say that there is climate change and they ask how 
they can help. Farmers tell them about the problem and the challenges, 
but there is no solution. The organisations don’t provide much support. 
I have expectations from them: I’d be happy if they provided me with 
information on how climate change and business are related. I’d like to 
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receive some capital and tools to be more resilient in the face of hunger 
(Individual interview, 6 August 2012).
In her interview, Loveness stressed the link between climate change and food 
insecurity. Dependence on maize, a particularly labour-intense crop, makes her 
family more vulnerable to droughts (see Chapter 7 for women’s experiences of climate 
change in Kasache). She noted that shortages of maize are commonplace in Kasache, 
mostly due to the ubiquitous reliance on rain-fed agriculture (Dorward and Kydd 
2004; Katengeza et al. 2012). Most rural households run out of maize supplies at least 
three months before the following harvest. For Loveness’s family, who are subsistence 
farmers, price fluctuations are a major obstacle to food security.
Loveness was not the only one in Kasache to highlight the importance of maize for 
household sustenance. Despite the increased vulnerability introduced by this crop, 
maize is grown by 97% of farming households, followed by rice, sorghum and 
cassava, and provides on average 65% of the daily calories consumed by Malawians 
(Katengeza et al. 2012). 
Loveness’s reference to technology as a solution to environmental challenges points 
to the influence of colonial imaginaries on postcolonial and development structures 
and discourses. The practice of introducing alien species of plants and animals to 
modernise the natural landscape was launched during British colonial rule, when the 
Royal Botanic Gardens were established as imperial centres of plant collection and 
redistribution (Grove 1994; Smith 2012). In section 6.2.3.1, I argued that the paradigm 
of soil conservation was partially framed around the evolutionist idea of introducing 
‘exotic’ species into the colonies and protecting them from the destructive action of 
local farmers (Grove 1994). Technology and science were believed to be the markers of 
economic progress and human civilisation (Escobar 1995), while indigenous farming 
technologies were considered useless if not damaging, such as in the case of bush fires 
or crop rotation (see section 6.2.2.1).
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The colonial administration placed a strong emphasis on the introduction of specific 
crops in Malawi with a view to producing surpluses for sale in European markets 
(Vaughan 1987). Economic development was soon characterised by a conflict 
between plantation estates and smallholder subsistence agriculture, based on self-
consumption and low labour intensity (Grove 1994). The production of cash crops,10 
including maize, was successfully imposed through land grabbing and redistribution 
to European settlers, justified by the attempt to protect or recreate idyllic environments 
(Pachai 1973; Vaughan 1987; Neumann 2000; Bryceson 2006; Simtowe 2010; Kakota 
et al. 2011). Heavy reliance on specific crops increased people’s vulnerability to 
climatic and economic shocks. Maize eventually became Malawi’s main crop in the 
early twentieth century, when it started to replace sorghum (the indigenous crop) as a 
staple food (Vaughan 1987; Katengeza et al. 2012).
Loveness’s narrative reveals not only the pervasiveness of colonial discourses, but 
also how specific rationalities, such as those underpinning the conservation paradigm 
or the idea of human development as a naturalising and evolutionary process, have 
remained unchanged since the 1950s, when the developmentalist paradigm was 
introduced.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the construction of the postcolonial ‘Third World’ relied 
on depicting developing countries whose economy was mainly based on traditional 
agricultural production as peasant countries (Escobar 1995). Soil conservation was 
believed to be a precondition for economic growth (Green 2009). The discourse 
of underdevelopment also justified the establishment of the whole apparatus of 
development (from international organisations to local-level development agencies) 
and the projects designed and implemented under this label (Escobar 1995). The 
global reorganisation of power (which included the breakdown of colonial systems 
10 Colonial commercial agriculture in Malawi flourished on the substitution of food crops with cash crops such as 
coffee, tea and tobacco. The large-scale agricultural enterprises significantly extended the production of coffee, tea, 
cotton and tobacco at various stages between the 1920s and the 1930s into the Central and Southern Provinces of 
Malawi. By the mid-1940s, tobacco had become the most profitable cash crop.
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and the beginning of the Cold War) from which the development apparatus emerged 
had reflections at country level.
Malawi’s independence came at the height of the tensions between the United States 
and the USSR, whose geopolitics shaped Malawi’s foreign and domestic policy 
(Sagawa 2011). The preference of Malawi’s first president, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 
for pro-Western capitalistic systems paved the way for the introduction of the IMF’s 
and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes, and for a broader liberalisation 
process linking foreign aid to specific precepts or ‘aid conditionalities’ (Bryceson 
2006; Ihonvbere 2010; Kalinga 2011). Western nations, in particular, began to demand 
institutional change as a prerequisite for development aid, for instance by drastically 
reducing public sector wages (Kalinga 2011; Nkamleu and Kamgnia 2014). Nkamleu 
and Kamgnia (2014) argue that the sharp decline in civil servants’ wages provided 
incentives and opportunities for corruption and misuse of public resources, leading to 
a decline in efficiency and productivity in the public sector. For example, in the 1990s 
the UK and the World Bank froze budget aid to Malawi, linking assistance to human 
rights and political liberalisation (Ihonvbere 1997). For an aid-dependent economy like 
Malawi’s, aid cuts meant a drastic reduction in government spending in rural areas. In 
2009, when the late President Bingu wa Mutharika (2009–2012) spent USD 5 million 
of donor money on a presidential jet, the United Kingdom cut aid to Malawi by nearly 
USD 2 million (Riley and Chilanga 2018). In the wake of the 2013 ‘Cashgate’, a USD 
32 million fraud scandal, donors withdrew their support, equal to 40% of the country’s 
budget, which also resulted in serious shortages of imported goods such as fuel and 
medicines (Kayuni 2016; Riley and Chilanga 2018). Recently, Kayuni (2016) reported 
on the 2016 ‘Maizegate’ scandal in which the minister of Agriculture was implicated, 
revealing that the scheme was made possible by the Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) introduced in 2005 at the international donor community’s 
insistence to tighten controls on public expenditures and improve strategic planning 
and transparency. While donor aid contributes to poverty reduction and increases civil 
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servants’ motivation and productivity (e.g. through allowances), it can  generate perverse 
effects too, creating opportunities for corruption and misuse of public resources (Vian 
et al. 2013; Kayuni 2016).
The development apparatus relied on a network of power sites and regulatory 
controls that bound Malawi’s people to certain behaviours and production processes 
(Escobar 1985). As outlined in Chapter 4, donors’ propensity to support professional 
development and meeting attendance through per-diems, combined with low salaries 
and the need for savings, has been encouraging rent-seeking behaviour among 
civil servants, especially since structural adjustment programs demanded cuts to 
government salaries (Vian et al. 2013; Nkamleu and Kamgnia 2014). In Chapter 5, I 
highlighted how Malawi’s public policy processes have been largerly framed around 
the developmentalist institutionalised knowledge disseminated through aid-related 
programmes that promoted specific project rationalities (e.g. technology-oriented). 
The focus on economic growth and central planning influenced Malawi’s post-
independence land policies and practices.11 President Banda worked on institutional 
arrangements and coordination mechanisms for rural development. Investing in the 
centralised system of parastatals and channelling foreign aid, he ensured government 
control over land with a view to facilitating the transition from subsistence to a cash 
economy (Pachai 1973; Kalinga 1998; Dorward and Kydd 2004; Ihonvbere 2010; 
Sagawa 2011). The focus of his land policies was on large-scale maize production 
to maximise agricultural productivity. During the 40 years following independence, 
Malawi’s government tried to increase maize production through higher-yielding 
hybrid maize varieties, granting subsidies for fertilisers and agricultural extension 
services (Katengeza et al. 2012; Nordhagen and Pascual 2013).
11 Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda established the Republic of Malawi’s first political system. Marked by single-party 
politics, human rights abuses, and repression of political opposition, such as restrictions to press and academic 
freedom, absence of trade unions, and unfair parliamentary elections (Wiseman 1998; Ihonvbere 2010; Kalinga 2011) 
it ran from 1964 to 1994. Corruption and inefficiency were rampant. Banda’s private interest, personal ambition and 
authoritarian leadership were determinant factors in Malawi’s policy choices between 1964 and 1994, including 
relations with international development partners (Wiseman 1998; Ihonvbere 2010; Kalinga 2011).
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Yet, the parastatal system created inefficient and ineffective monopolies and state organs 
of patronage, which heavily relied on centralised state- and party-power to deliver 
top-down actions that benefitted commercial and mono-cropping farmers rather than 
smallholders (Neumann 2000; Dorward and Kydd, 2004). Investments for infrastructure 
in rural areas were minimal, while most rural dwellers failed to achieve food security 
(Vaughan 1987; Bryceson 2006). By ignoring other crops, colonial and post-independence 
land policies increased reliance on maize and failed to develop technologies, markets and 
information systems for other locally important and often drought-resistant crops such as 
finger-millet and sorghum (Vaughan 1987; Dorward and Kydd 2004). As emphasised by 
Loveness and other farmers in Kasache, the introduction of maize in the traditional crop 
system led to vulnerability:
Our harvest is low because we lack some pesticides to protect our crops, so 
even when we irrigate as an adaptive measure, the crop is affected because 
of pests. So, we need inputs but also advice on this (FGD, 7 August 2012).
In fact, the introduction of maize seems to have triggered the adoption of less resilient, 
highly technological and aid-dependent varieties.
Yet, this is not only the story of an ill-adapted crop. Dependency on specific crops 
made technical assistance and technology transfers vital to the resolution of long-term 
productivity problems, and key components of rural development projects (Escobar 
1995). A prominent role in the institutionalisation of the development apparatus was 
played by the proliferation of rationalist and anthropocentric knowledges and practices. 
Relying on processes of ‘technification’, these turned development into a technical issue. 
In Chapter 7, I will discuss in greater detail women’s perceptions of the project “Reducing 
the Risk of Disaster in Community Based Agriculture in Malawi”, funded by the EU 
and implemented by COOPI in the Kasache area. The project was designed to provide 
technical support to climate-affected communities, namely flood-resistant seed varieties 
and pumps.
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The introduction of mechanical and biological technologies through structural 
adjustment and adaptation projects has recently created the need for specific kinds 
of support. There is a strong focus on capacity building: “Capacity building would 
be important. We would also need farm inputs, especially seeds and irrigation 
equipment such as pumps, wheelbarrows, shovels” (FGD, 29 July 2012). However, 
several people in Kasache seemingly felt as though they did not have any intrinsic 
capacity to find solutions for a changing climate:
We are not trying to adapt to climate change, because nobody ever came to 
tell us what to do about the changes and what adaptation means. We need 
more information about climate change and what we can do, since we don’t 
understand the problem (FGD, 29 July 2012).
These words emphasise how some in Kasache portray themselves as unable to conceive 
of any technological change.
Development-driven interventions seem to have modified subjective identities, 
producing a narrative of passivity and inability to act individually and collectively, as 
emphasised during a conversation with the LCPC in Kasache:
We want to tell you that, as the committee in charge of climate change 
in Kasache, we need capacity building. We want to be trained, we want 
to learn how we can take care of our natural resources and environment. 
If possible, we want you to assist us on this issue of capacity building 
(FGD, 29 July 2012).
The need for capacity building was expressed as a precondition. At the same time, 
national authorities are often blamed for not providing enough assistance. The lack or 
inadequacy of government intervention in rural areas is one of the most lamented issues:
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We get a lot of assistance when we are hit by floods and natural disasters. 
We get seeds and other inputs. But we don’t get much assistance if there 
are no disasters. Like when we ask for advice on agricultural practices. 
Usually we don’t get it (FGD, 7 August 2012).
The reference is to some of the challenges faced by the GoM in implementing NAPA 
projects (Chapter 5). The disconnect between the DRR and CCA endorsed by the NAPA 
seems practically irrelevant at the local level, as farmers lament receiving siloed and 
fragmented support following natural disasters only (regardless of what caused them).
Considering the unintended identities I was associated with in Kasache (some 
interviewees interacted with me as if I were working for the NGO that introduced me to 
the community), these statements may have indeed been an attempt to receive further 
training or funding. Yet, they may have been an expression of the perception that an 
action that is not externally driven is somehow a non-action or cannot produce value in 
terms of adaptation to climate change. There is a widespread belief in Kasache that not 
much can be done to respond to climate change without the support of external actors. 
During a collective discussion about climate-resilient development initiatives, someone 
stated: “We do nothing on our own to adapt (my emphasis), but sometimes we plant 
trees with the assistance of the NGOs” (FGD, 29 July 2012). It seems as though the only 
adaptation measure perceived as real is both technological and managerial, nationally 
or internationally led.
This is an example of how identities and categories are negatively defined against 
sets of criteria that are introduced by external actors and replicated by national policy 
processes through essentialising discursive practices. Community members do not seem 
to be able to perceive themselves as agents of change. Colonial and developmentalist 
projects did not stop at shaping worldviews and knowledge patterns in Kasache. 
The introduction of mechanical and biological technologies in rural Malawi – such 
as hybrid seeds or farming techniques – contributed to influencing current narratives 
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and strategies of resilience. As argued in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1.2), the role of local 
knowledges in Malawi as a potential reference point for policy decision support has 
so far been disregarded. While a study on local knowledges and practices has been 
commissioned by the GoM (2012b), its goal is to assess community knowledge gaps 
(where the extent of the gap is measured against global climate science), as well as 
identifying ways of integrating scientific and local knowledge. In fact, as I discussed 
in Chapter 5, the knowledge integration process does not facilitate the formulation of 
locally appropriate and effective policy solutions since it does not unpack and build on 
the ontological premises of local knowledges. 
In summary, while Lackson’s claims about God (story 1) seem to point to the survival 
and reproduction of relational ontologies against colonial erasure, Robson’s and 
Loveness’s  references to external assistance in crop diversification (stories 3 and 4) 
highlight the persistence of colonial and postcolonial stereotypes that labelled local 
practices and technologies as ‘destructive’, inadequate and inefficient. Both Robson 
and Loveness don’t shy away from identifying themselves as those in need of advice 
and external support, unconsciously fuelling notions of passivity. In effect, the forms of 
power deployed by colonialism and developmentalism exerted political and economic 
control through the transformation of subjective identities, as shown by the missionaries’ 
appropriation of rainmaking practices.
What is most interesting to highlight is the disconnect between Lackson’s and Robson’s/
Loveness’s ontological underpinnings. While Lackson’s relational view of climate 
change implies recognition of human dependency on nature (or God), Robson’s and 
Loveness’s claims on technology and capacity building account for a mechanistic 
and instrumental approach to the solutions, which basically puts nature aside. Tree 
planting, for example, can imply a dualistic and hierarchical human-nature relation in 
which individuals are intentional and self-contained actors responsible for ecological 
modification and resource depletion. Possibly, Lackson’s reflections about the causes 
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of climate change allowed him to more easily express contextual worldviews (as less 
mediated by external actors and initiatives), while Robson’s and Loveness’s references 
to solutions to climate change, as introduced by international development actors, 
confined them to pre-constructed narratives.
These conflicting views point to the interplay and discrepancies between worldviews, 
where relational ontologies seem to have never been isolated, generating hybrid 
experiences (e.g. rainmaking). They could also point to the difficulty for climate-resilient 
development narratives and practices (i.e. capacity and technology transfer) to reach 
relevant and inclusive outcomes by operating in accordance with the nature-culture 
divide. As further discussed in the next section and in Chapter 7, the solutions proposed 
by the climate change international policy regime may turn out to be inadequate to 
understand and address the contextual and embodied processes constituting climate 
change vulnerability and adaptation at the local level. Most importantly, the conflicting 
and hybrid narratives may constitute the ‘hi-stories’ (Blaser 2014) created by the people 
in Kasache within and against the cultural and political hegemony of climate-resilient 
development, as shown next by the case of ganyu.
6.2.4.2 Ganyu labour: a local-based coping strategy
The contrast between different knowledges and experiences in Kasache points to 
the inadequacy of the unifying concepts upon which contemporary development 
interventions are based. Situated experiences challenge homogenous conceptions of 
climate change and nature, arguing against the dismissal of certain beliefs and practices 
in which individuals find a space to express their agency.
During an FGD, two women and two men aged between 70 and 80 stressed the role 
of ganyu – informal, short-term rural labour – as a livelihood and climate change 
coping strategy: “In terms of climate change adaptation, we are not doing anything in 
particular to cope. We just have informal employment relations to earn extra income 
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and survive crisis and hunger” (7 August 2012). In particular, ganyu was mentioned as 
sale of casual labour, a means for surviving in the face of degrading lands, declining 
yields and famine. 
As outlined in postcolonial and anthropological literature (Bryceson 2006; Kakota et 
al. 2011; Nordhagen and Pascual 2013), ganyu labour arose in the colonial period when 
shrinking land and dependence on cash crops forced Malawian farmers to switch to a 
more labour-intensive system (section 6.2.3). Local chiefs recruited labour for bush 
clearance in rural households in exchange for food, cash or in-kind payments (Bryceson 
2006). During the postcolonial period, ganyu was associated with poorer households 
seeking cash from better-off households through the sale of their labour in times of 
climate shocks12 (Vaughan 1987; Bryceson 2006). During interviews with the elders, 
women and men recalled how they managed to survive hunger in 1949, stressing the 
importance of informal employment relations in rescuing communities from starvation: 
“Well, people had to travel to Chia to do manual labour in cassava farms and receive 
tubers as payment” (FGD, 7 August 2012), or “We used to go and do manual labour for 
those who had some food to exchange” (FGD, 8 August 2012). Further, a woman farmer 
emphasised the role of local chiefs in managing job distribution in times of climate-
induced hunger: “As women, we usually go to our chiefs just to borrow money or to ask 
for ganyu” (FGD, 8 August 2012). Ganyu labour is thus regarded not only as a coping 
strategy, but also as a social and political mechanism that formalises expectations about 
the role of traditional leaders in ensuring community subsistence and resilience during 
a famine or a crisis.
Despite emerging from the literature as a longstanding socio-economic institution and a 
major coping mechanism to food insecurity in Malawi (Vaughan 1987; Bryceson 2006; 
Kakota et al. 2011; Nordhagen and Pascual 2013), ganyu is not immediately perceived as 
12 During the 1948–49 famine, ganyu labour emerged as a way for small farmers to cope with drought and hunger 
(Vaughan 1987). During the 1990s famine, three-quarters of villages in Salima District, where Kasache is located, 
had at least one better-off farmer who hired between 2 to 20 labourers for several months (Bryceson 2006). During 
the 2001–02 famine, ganyu food payments were the main means of procuring food, surpassing international food aid 
(Bryceson 2006).
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a climate change adaptation strategy in Kasache. Because of its historical embeddedness 
in economic, cultural and social structures, ganyu becomes invisible and hard to detect 
as a coping mechanism. Elders in Kasache emphasised the ‘invisibility’ of this practice: 
“We are not doing anything to adapt…” (FGD, 29 July 2012). Ganyu seems to be the 
‘nothing’ that especially vulnerable groups in Kasache are implementing to cope with 
climatic and economic changes. The lack of perceived visibility may be due to the 
fact that ganyu has been rarely approached or explored by policymakers, development 
organisations or researchers as a possible adaptation mechanism, as argued by Jørstad 
and Webersik (2016) in the case of the Lake Chilwa Basin Climate Change Adaptation 
Programme (LCBCCAP) discussed in Chapter 7.
It may also be related to the hybrid, open-ended and flexible nature of ganyu, which, 
as in the case of nyau, emerged as a product of the historical interplay between land 
alienation, crops dependency and men’s migration on one hand, and local systems of 
relations (leader-villager relationships, women’s dependency on farming) on the other. 
Thus, while ganyu was overlooked as a possible adaptation strategy for communities, 
endogenous solutions were promoted that often resulted in negative outcomes, such 
as extreme reliance and dependency on non-suitable crops and capacity development 
programmes (e.g. Loveness’s story).
The case of ganyu is representative of the modes of operation of subjection.13 Ganyu is 
the borderline situation in which individuals perform a context-relevant yet unconscious 
action to cope with climate change. The question now is: by resorting to labour strategies 
to adapt to climate change, are the farmers in Kasache acting as agents of change (since 
they adopt a solution that is not directly related to agriculture inputs such as seeds 
varieties) or are they passively adapting to a shift in the labour market introduced by 
colonial power?
13 As discussed in Chapter 3, in his knowledge-power theory (1972; 1982) Foucault distinguishes between several 
types of resistance or struggle against specific forms of power, one of them being against forms of ‘subjection’ 
where individuals are tied to their position/identity in the social system and not conscious of their subjectivity and 
submission.
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Farmers’ viewpoints might at first glance appear to be ‘subjugated’ by techno-
managerial narratives, since most interviewees, like Loveness, equated adaptation with 
technological solutions, appropriating the epistemological and ontological categories 
of dominant colonial and postcolonial discourses in the form of distinctive identities 
(O’Hanlon 1988), such as ‘those in need of technological support’ or ‘those that are not 
doing anything to adapt’.
However, ganyu labour can be regarded as a strategy by which vulnerable groups take 
agency over their livelihoods, trying to influence and determine available resources 
and their well-being. Loveness’s and Robson’s narratives clearly reveal how externally 
driven solutions create forms of subjection, hindering the capacity to react and take 
action. Ganyu, being much more rooted in local socio-economic systems, offers wider 
space for vulnerable groups to interact and negotiate their capacity to cope as well 
as their identity as active subjects. References to ganyu were not immediate during 
interviews, nor were they directly related to climate change narratives. It was only when 
talking in depth about the way knowledge and power are distributed in the community 
that ganyu was mentioned, as an alternative discursive strategy. 
Spivak (1994) suggests that in order to give visibility to subaltern views or knowledges 
(Chapter 4), one needs to look at their modes of ideation, practice, creativity, and 
therefore self-determination. In this sense, the case of ganyu reveals how communities, 
by deploying locally rooted socio-economic structures and relations as resources – such 
as local chiefs’ authority – mobilised themselves to build resilience during unfavourable 
times. Yet, ganyu emerged from wealth inequality, land alienation and the creation of 
new class divisions, which characterised colonial and postcolonial Malawi (Vaughan 
1987). According to critical feminist scholars (Renegar and Sowards 2009), agency can 
also arise from the fundamental historical constraints and inequalities that free or tie 
individuals to the condition of an object. In the case of ganyu, affirmative action, or the 
possibility for a farmer to enter an informal labour exchange shaping their individual 
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response to climate shocks, is inscribed into the same unequal relation of power from 
which the action is generated (ganyu is a product of colonialism, but it does provide a 
means of subsistence).  
The analysis of the knowledge-power nexus in the individual statements I collected 
in Kasache has provided me with the opportunity to challenge the holistic and one-
way view of climate reductionism. My experience in Kasache shows that knowledge 
framings are not mutually exclusive: climate change emerges as shaped at once by 
global, national and local forces of representation (neither modern nor traditional, 
global or local, Western or indigenous). Climate change in Kasache is perceived through 
locally rooted means (e.g. senses and experience), yet it becomes real when legitimised 
by external and high-tech sources of knowledge and expertise. Additionally, external 
capacity support is not perceived as repressive and negative, but rather as productive 
and positive, since it allows individuals to improve their well-being. Adaptation to 
climate change in Kasache has historically taken different forms, ranging from spiritual 
practices to labour divisions and societal reorganisation. Climate change increasingly 
emerges as a hybrid cultural object that adapts to heterogeneous needs and constraints 
through the interplay between different knowledge systems and heterogeneous practices 
– multiple meanings and experiences that are hardly captured by dominant discourses. 
6.3 Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the questions raised in the opening section through a discussion 
of anthropological, historical and narrative accounts, with a focus on the tensions and 
negotiations between colonial and postcolonial representations and practices of climate 
(change). What has emerged is a portrait of how climate change discourse travels across 
localities, carrying particular views of the world and generating specific definitions of 
nature, social relationships and policy interventions (Cline-Cole 1998; Broch-Due and 
Schroeder 2000; Smith 2012).
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The tensions between global and local epistemologies and ontologies are temporally and 
geographically dynamic. Following the traces of colonial attention to soil conservation, 
I showed how processes of co-production of knowledge-power unfolded across scales 
and timeframes. The historical continuity between colonial and neoliberal political and 
cultural projects has shaped narratives of climate change in Kasache. More recently, 
international interventions have reproduced European techno-scientific rationalities 
through climate-resilient development projects.
Most importantly, climate change discourses not only shape symbols and meanings, but 
also determine material transformations of society and environment. Ganyu labour, one of 
the most common climate change coping strategies in Malawi, emerged from rural distress 
and impoverishment dating back to colonial land alienation and biased representations of 
local farming systems (Vaughan 1987; Simtowe 2010; Kakota et al. 2011).
Climate change epistemologies and ontologies result from biophysical conditions as 
well as from historically stratified networks and relations of power. Historical and 
anthropological analyses (Plumwood 1991) are in that regard fundamental to contrasting 
the reductionist nature of the climate-resilient paradigm: it would be hard to grasp the 
meaning of the stories I discussed in this chapter without referencing Malawi’s world-
making practices. The porous interactions between colonial interventions and relational 
ontologies highlight how local cultures in Malawi variably attribute meaning and value 
to weather- and climate-related events. This in turn shapes people’s capacity to maintain 
a specific cultural orientation and symbolic framework in which to ground context-
relevant adaptation responses.
In the case of Kasache, local identities were affected by the introduction of climate change 
global narratives. Standardised practices introduced by international development 
organisations seem to replicate biased rationalities or systems of knowledge. The 
emphasis on technology-based adaptation, for example, underpins the concept of 
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human-induced climate change, echoing the colonial link between deforestation and 
climate change or the nature-culture dualism of Western ontology.
By not accounting for local ontologies and relational structures, these measures can 
hamper adaptation to climate change or variability. For example, technological solutions 
are reportedly implemented by community members in Kasache only when backed up 
by external support. Adaptation options are often tied to specific skills or technologies 
that may not be present or relevant in the local context, while the value of context-
relevant measures such as ganyu is currently not acknowledged (Chapter 7).
The case of Kasache illustrates several questionable outcomes of  naturalist 
epistemologies, such as tying individuals to specific capacities, silencing local 
worldviews, devaluing contextual practices and affecting the community’s ability to 
conceive of and introduce social change. The developmentalist objectification process, 
for example, has essentialised identities through specific categories that eventually 
make it hard for the Kasache community to identify forms of hegemony and react. Most 
actions taken outside official and certified adaptation channels are not recognised as 
relevant by individuals themselves (“we are not doing anything to adapt”). Nonetheless, 
the community actively adjusts to environmental, social and political changing 
conditions. Some of the narratives emphasised individual active roles in defining causes 
and responses to climate change (“God’s will” and ganyu labour). 
This chapter ultimately argues that dominant climate change narratives can hinder the 
individual capacity to respond to climatic challenges through context-relevant initiatives. 
In the next chapter, I will further challenge gender mainstreaming and climate change 
discourses that portray women as victims of climate change without considering why, 
how and when women became vulnerable to climate change in specific contexts.
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Chapter 7
Adaptation: a local gendered experience
7.1 Gender-proofing climate change
In Chapter 4, I discussed how climate change, emerging as a scientific and quantitative 
issue, became gradually interwoven with the developmentalist mantras, such as gender 
mainstreaming or participatory development (Charlesworth 2005; Cornwall 2013). Arora-
Jonsson (2011) noted that the theme of women’s vulnerability to climate change seems 
overly dominating in the policy debates on climate change where, echoing stereotypical 
ideas about their societal roles, they are often portrayed as an equally vulnerable, 
homogeneous group (LEG 2012). This echoes several salient traits of the ‘Third World 
Women’ trope (Chapter 4), which feminist scholarship stigmatises for conceptualising 
women as a uniformly subjugated group, in contrast with Western standards of progress 
(Mohanty 1994 and 2003; Leach 2007; Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Seppälä 2016).
A representation of women based on interrelated Western dualisms (nature-culture, 
rational-irrational) tends to frame social roles and expectations, such as the gendered 
division of labour, around a dichotomy of male domination versus female subordination. 
This risks hindering the identification of historically determined vulnerabilities, as well 
as restraining women’s individual and collective action (Escobar 1995; McNay 2000; 
Fox Keller 2001; Charlesworth 2005; Leach 2007).  Thus, an old controversial issue in 
development studies keeps emerging in a discourse on climate change that has seemingly 
failed to engage with critiques and advances in the gender and development debate (section 
7.2), overlooking the historical and socio-cultural specificity of women’s response.
Drawing on critical feminist concepts such as ‘intersectionality’ to unpack the dynamics 
of women’s participation and exclusion in Kasache (Cho et al. 2013; Mohanty 2013; Patil 
2013; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014; Liska 2015) and linking this case to the broader climate 
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change policy landscape, I will explore why and how climate-resilient development 
interventions may produce unintended impacts and even exacerbate gendered relations. 
By focusing on the way women in Kasache speak about their vulnerability and respond to 
climate change, I will show that gender cannot be conceptualised as a separate category 
from a range of multiple and interconnected factors (e.g. age, race, kin networks) that 
contribute to shaping gendered climatic impacts.
More specifically, I will identify key discourses (e.g. the feminisation of poverty) and 
socio-economic and historical relations that turned women’s vulnerability to climate 
change into a unifying and essentialising narrative, reproducing unequal power relations 
in the context of Kasache. Building on the critiques of the ‘Third World Women’ trope, I 
will challenge the notion of women’s inherent vulnerability to climate change, deploying 
the concept of situated knowledges to identify individual and collective forms of agency 
that dismantle the clear-cut separation between masculine and feminine spheres. My 
critical feminist reading of international development accounts about Malawi and 
field-based interviews in the community of Kasache will break down the dualistic and 
negative conceptualisation of subject-object formation1 underpinning the praxis of gender 
mainstreaming (see section 7.2). 
7.2 Story 1 - The gendered impacts of climate-resilient 
development
In the previous chapter, I introduced the story of Loveness Kapininga,2 a young woman 
farmer who talked about the challenges of adapting to kusintha kwa nyengo in Kasache: 
“I’m trying to adapt to climate change in my farming activities. For example, we are 
planting ‘senga’, an early maturing variety of maize…We just try to adapt on our own”. 
1 According to this theory, an object’s identities are mainly constructed in opposition to and denial of the subject’s 
identity and in isolation from the material conditions of appearance (see McNay 2000).
2 In this as in previous chapters, I will deploy fictitious names to protect the identity and opinions of individuals who 
contributed to the field study. 
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Loveness, among others, reported shorter and highly unpredictable rainfall seasons, 
stronger winds, more intense sunshine and heat, and increased drought and flood events. 
Recurring extreme weather events are generally perceived as related to a change in 
climate, regardless of their specific attribution to climate change or climate variability, 
as discussed in Chapter 6.
In Kasache, women more often than men talked about the links between unpredictable 
rainfall3 and crop failure on one hand, and decreased food security and health and 
livelihood standards on the other. Many think that climate change, through a series of 
extreme weather events, is affecting food production and storage, adding to already 
fragile livelihoods (FGD, 7 July 2012). Women in Kasache identified climate change 
as one of the key factors exacerbating poverty at the household level. During a group 
discussion, three elder women shared their views on the link between climate change 
and poverty:
Nowadays there’s hunger all around us, in the homes, everywhere. We often 
get sick and we don’t have anything to help us cope with climate change, 
such as livestock. We used to have enough maize and water. Floods were 
not so frequent. Now, without fertilisers and because of the drought, we 
can’t produce enough food nor have good yields (FGD, 7 July 2012).
Their statements highlight the joint role of gender and other factors, such as age, 
health, access to fertilisers, sufficient food and alternative livelihood opportunities, in 
determining vulnerability. Access to healthcare, opportunities for relocation in the event 
of disaster, or survival without livestock influence the way individuals perceive and 
respond to climate change. This resonates with intersectional perspectives pointing to 
how disability, immigration status, age, and religion, among others, intersect in multiple 
3 The end of the rainy season is normally expected in December. Whether or not this is associated with climate 
change, it is perceived as affecting agricultural productivity and food security. The perception of inadequate or 
unpredictable rains is a proxy of household vulnerability to climate change, since it differently affects households. 
Resource-poor households are especially affected even by small changes in water supply, since they have less access 
to cash.
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ways with race, gender and class to determine responsiveness and vulnerability to 
climate change (Garry 2011; Cho et al. 2013; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014). These factors 
define individual positions in context-specific power structures and may represent the 
major axes along which exclusion and marginalisation interact and materialise (see 
sections 7.3 and 7.4).
The gendered impacts of climate, as described by Loveness and other women in 
Kasache, are not limited to the immediate physical effects of changes in weather at 
the individual level (e.g. impacts on health and access to food). Women’s vulnerability 
and response to climate change is also influenced by biases in accessing agricultural 
services, technologies and capacities. The majority of female research participants 
emphasised a lack of access to technological improvements (e.g. seeds and fertilisers). 
Loveness, for instance, claimed: “I’d be happy if they provided me with information 
on how climate change and business are related. I’d like to receive some capital and 
tools to be more resilient in the face of hunger” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012). 
In Kasache, women’s challenges in subsistence farming have led to the creation of a 
self-help group (SHG), a collective form of action through mutual support. In section 
7.5, I will explore the impact of SHG membership on women’s ability to respond to 
climate variability and change, highlighting the potentially transformative role of SHGs 
in essentialised gender identities and relations (e.g. women as caregivers).
Loveness’s concerns reflect the broader situation of Malawi, where women suffer from 
uneven access to, and control over, production factors such as land, agricultural inputs, 
and technology (NORAD 2010). A 2005 study by the African Development Bank, 
the “Multi-sector Country Gender Profile”, shows that, despite women’s outstanding 
contribution to agriculture in Malawi (women provide 70% of labour for cash crops and 
97% for subsistence agriculture), their access to and control of production and support 
services is very poor.
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In the past decades, the Government of Malawi has formally engaged in the promotion of 
gender equality through its accession to international and regional treaties and conventions 
(e.g. the 1979 “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women” and the 2004 “African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality”). In 
2000, the National Gender Policy (GoM 2000) was adopted with the overall goal of 
“mainstream[ing] gender in the national development process to enhance the participation 
of women, men, boys and girls for sustainable and equitable development and poverty 
eradication” (Art. 3.1, NGP 2000). The National Gender Programme followed in 2004, 
and a second National Gender Policy in 2008. The emphasis in these policies is on equal 
participation of women and men at all governance levels as the main tool for achieving 
women’s equality. Furthermore, Malawi’s NAPA acknowledges women as a vulnerable 
group to climate change: “Women bear most of the burden in activities that are most 
impacted by adverse climate, including collection of water, firewood and ensuring daily 
access to food” (2006, xi). Several interventions in the NAPA target women, including 
microfinance, access to water and energy through boreholes and trees in woodlots, and 
to electricity through rural electrification programmes. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I described how the international finance and policy architecture 
shapes the projects and activities implemented in Malawi and in the area of Salima, where 
Kasache is located. Multilateral and bilateral development actors (through the Global 
Environmental Facility) financially support the implementation of climate policies at 
the subnational and local levels (Agrawala 2004; Janetos et al. 2012). The major donors 
in Salima are USAID, DFID, NORAD, JICA and the EU (see Chapter 4), which fund 
government projects on environment and climate change and implement them at the 
district and community levels through the Ministry of Environment or through NGOs 
(UNDP 2012; GoM 2014). 
In Kasache, many research participants specifically referred to activities implemented by 
the Malawi Red Cross and Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) – the NGO that assisted 
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me with the logistics of fieldwork. At the time of my research, COOPI was working 
on the implementation of the “Reducing the Risk of Disaster in Community Based 
Agriculture in Malawi” project, funded by the European Commission’s Humanitarian 
Aid Department (ECHO). The project was designed to support communities affected 
by disasters through maize and grain seeds distribution (ECHO 2011). In line with the 
NAPA’s priorities, COOPI acted as a mediator between ECHO and the community, 
providing the Local Civil Protection Committees with technical support, such as flood-
resistance maize seeds and treadle pumps to assist with the creation of irrigated gardens 
(2006, section 3.2, 6, “Adaptation Needs”).
Regarding the type and extent of support provided by international and national 
development organisations, Loveness noted that despite their talk of climate change, 
“organisations don’t provide much support” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012; 
section 6.2.4.1). During FGDs, women complained about the unaffordable price of 
pesticides or post-harvest technologies necessary for food storage (e.g. grain banks) 
that would help them increase their resilience in times of crisis: “Our harvest is low 
because we lack some pesticides to protect our crops, so even when we irrigate as an 
adaptive measure, the crop is damaged by pests. So, we need inputs but also advice 
on this” (FGD, 7 August 2012). These are common issues in the implementation of 
development interventions (Escobar 1995; Easterly 2002; Sharp et al. 2010; Buggy 
and McNamara 2016). Easterly (2002) notes that donors consistently refuse to finance 
project maintenance, with the idea that this is the responsibility of recipient governments. 
In the context of Kasache, there seems to be a tendency towards overlooking the 
importance of supplies (e.g. post-harvest technologies such as grain bins) that would 
allow maintenance of the irrigated gardens implemented by COOPI. Easterly (2002) 
specifically links this issue to the emphasis placed by the Monterrey Consensus (2002) 
on observable outputs, which require less costly site-by-site monitoring (Tendler 1997; 
Dollar and Levin 2006).
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Several female interviewees in Kasache emphasised that climate development projects 
have so far neglected to focus on women’s needs and perspectives and on the way 
climate change intersects with other issues: “NGOs came to the village for some 
initiatives on climate change, but as women we never received any advice on climate 
change” (FGD, 8 August 2012; my emphasis). There is an apparent contrast between 
the projects’ limited benefit to women and the numerous national gender and climate 
change policy devices designed to address Malawian women’s vulnerability to climate 
change (NAPA 2006; National Gender Policy 2008).
When reviewing ECHO policy documents on the project “Reducing the Risk of 
Disaster in Community Based Agriculture in Malawi” (ECHO 2004; ECHO 2010; 
ECHO 2011), one cannot help noticing a lack of attention to issues of gender, which are 
rarely mentioned – if not entirely absent from the reports. ECHO’s efforts to promote 
participation in the project seem to rely on the notion of community-based organisations 
(CBOs), as further discussed in next section. The supposed aim of the project is: “To 
demonstrate that community groups [my emphasis], when provided with appropriate 
tools and training, can effectively support their own communities before, during, 
and after a disaster strikes” (ECHO 2011, 1). It seems as though the community is 
ECHO’s preferred scale for implementing climate and development projects, reflecting 
an emerging trend in the design and implementation of adaptation projects that may 
obscure the importance of gender in shaping experiences of climate change (Arcand and 
Wagner 2016; Buggy and McNamara 2016). 
7.2.1 Women in community-based adaptation
The situation outlined by Loveness and other research participants in Kasache points to 
the problematic assumptions behind the concept and praxis of participatory development 
as applied in the context of gender and climate change. In the past few decades, 
community-based and participatory approaches have become recurring themes in 
development discourses and practices (Cornwall 2013; Arcand and Wagner 2016; Buggy 
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and McNamara 2016). This is a key result of post-development critiques of Western-led 
development aid programmes and their modest achievement in many communities across 
the globe (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Easterly 2002; Sharp et al. 2010). Reid and 
Huq define community-based adaptation (CBA) to climate change as: “a community-
led process, based on communities’ priorities, needs, knowledge, and capacities, which 
should empower people to plan for and cope with the impacts of climate change” (2014, 
1). Early CBA initiatives were implemented by non-governmental organisations, such 
as in the case of Kasache, primarily at the local level. This approach acknowledges 
the importance of integrating local environmental knowledge and using participatory 
processes throughout a project’s life cycle to facilitate the inclusion of communities 
(see section 7.2.2). Capacity development and technical support are also highlighted as 
key enabling factors for effective community-based adaptation initiatives (Cannon and 
Müller-Mahn 2010; Reid and Huq 2014; Buggy and McNamara 2016).
The existing critical development and human geography literature (Cannon and 
Müller-Mahn 2010; Arcand and Wagner 2016; Buggy and McNamara 2016) cautions 
against adopting the concept of community as the panacea for ensuring inclusion 
and participation in project delivery. The notion of ‘community’ as a purportedly 
harmonious and geographically unified space echoes the colonial trope of indigenous 
societies, stereotypically represented as ‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’ models of livelihood 
(Neumann 2000). The emphasis on a geographically circumscribed space as a means 
of complying with the principles of ownership and cost-effectiveness, established in 
the 2002 Monterrey Consensus (Tendler 1997; Dollar and Levin, 2006), risks reducing 
the understanding of the underlying socio-political context (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010; Arcand and Wagner 2016; Buggy and McNamara 2016). This conceptualisation 
ignores dynamics of power and marginalisation within the ‘community’, resulting in 
development interventions that often exacerbate them. Critical feminist perspectives 
argue that participatory approaches to development have often assumed ‘women’s’ 
participation through the idea of ‘community’ (Cornwall 2013; Cornwall and Rivas 2015). 
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Joint Forest Management (JFM) is an example of participatory development that, by 
acknowledging women’s role in tree planting and soil conservation, created community-
based institutions to involve women as key ‘stakeholders’ without checking first whether 
they had the required capacity. JFM committees seemingly undermined women’s ability 
to influence decision-making processes, exacerbating exclusion and living conditions 
(e.g. by increasing workloads through fuelwood collection) (Leach 2007). 
ECHO and COOPI initiatives in Kasache, with their emphasis on communities as a central 
project delivery unit, risk treating communities as ungendered and depoliticised sites, 
delinked from specific historical and spatial contexts and power patterns. This approach 
tends to essentialise identities and relations, overlooking the importance of gender, among 
other factors, in shaping women’s vulnerability to climate change – because of the impacts on 
women’s availability, capabilities and roles, and broader power relations (Cornwall 2013). 
For example, Loveness’s capacity to benefit from the distribution of technological inputs 
and training might have been constrained (“the organisations don’t provide much support”, 
Individual interview, 6 August 2012) by her lack of time for accessing agricultural extension 
services.4 In section 7.4, I will show how current workloads and responsibilities originate 
in the reorganisation of the economic system of production and family power relations 
initiated by the colonial administration. Essentialising categorisations of community 
dynamics can also contribute to reinforcing gender exclusion and marginalisation without 
any substantial redefinition of the relations and labour distribution between men and 
women, as further discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4.
The African Development Bank “Multi-sector Country Gender Profile” for Malawi 
(2005) reports that women farmers’ participation in agricultural development activities, 
such as extension services, has been constrained by the level of literacy and availability 
requested to attend trainings and field demonstration activities, which were designed 
4 As defined by FAO, agricultural extension and advisory services (AEAS) refers to “any organisation in the public 
or private sectors (e.g. NGOs, farmer organisations, private firms, etc.) that facilitates farmers’ access to knowledge, 
information and technologies to assist them with developing their own technical, organisational and management 
skills and practices and improving their livelihoods and well-being” (2017, 3).
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around a male-type audience (e.g. higher literacy levels and greater time availability). 
Similar observations emerged from a national stakeholders’ dialogue on “Women, Youth 
and Climate Change” organised in 2015 by the Civil Society Network on Climate Change 
(CISONECC) in Malawi. The press briefing note emphasises that women in  Malawi are 
facing discriminatory practices: men are favoured in terms of access to resources for 
climate change adaptation, including farm technologies, agricultural inputs, loans and 
agricultural services (CISONECC 2015). The multiple societal roles played by women 
have been identified as one of the key restraining factors, leading to poor participation 
(ADB 2005). In section 7.4, I will discuss women’s household roles in Kasache, and how 
they affect the distinct ways in which women and men experience climate change. 
7.2.2 Translating gender mainstreaming into practice
The sense from female research participants in Kasache was that projects implemented 
by NGOs have failed to grant gender inclusion in development initiatives. The climate 
change finance structure in Malawi – with a predominance of international development 
actors, bilateral or multilateral, requesting compliance with principles of ownership and 
inclusion – seems to have encouraged the use of essentialising conceptualisations of 
gender and community in project design and delivery. Some underlying ideas in Malawi’s 
NAPA (e.g. women’s vulnerability to climate change)  make this policy document seem 
slightly outdated when compared to well-established and ‘mainstreamed’ critiques of 
gender and development (Mohanty 1994; Neumann 2000; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 
2002; Charlesworth 2005).
Malawi’s NAPA describes women as particularly vulnerable with respect to climate 
change and focuses on nominal gender balance – the idea of mainstreaming gender 
in training and capacity development activities – as a means of reducing women’s 
vulnerability through participation (ECBI 2007; Stringer et al. 2010; CGIAR 2013).
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The idea that female-headed households tend to be more vulnerable to climate change 
thrives on the concept of the ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Demetriades and Esplen 2008; 
Arora-Jonsson 2011), according to which women increasingly represent a disproportionate 
percentage of the world’s poor due to a rising incidence of female household headship 
(Chant 2006). This thesis emerged during the 4th United Nations Conference on Women in 
Beijing (1995), which attempted to raise women’s visibility in international development 
fora on poverty reduction. Yet, no association has been demonstrated between female 
household headship, poverty and vulnerability (Chant 2006; Sen 2008; McNay 2000; 
Arora-Jonsson 2011; Asfaw and Maggio 2017). Chant (2006), in particular, argues 
that the assumption that women represent the majority of the world’s poor is anecdotal 
rather than empirically relevant. In the feminisation of poverty approach, women are 
either presented as a homogeneous mass or differentiated exclusively on the basis of 
household headship. Furthermore, the definition of poverty seems largely based on the 
monetary criterion, neglecting to consider women’s capabilities, livelihoods and social 
exclusion. With regard to climate change, Asfaw and Maggio (2017) note a historical 
lack of empirics showing the correlation between the impact of weather shocks and the 
gendered nature of households. Due to a lack of gender-disaggregated data for extreme 
weather events, the validity of the ‘feminisation of vulnerability’ thesis in Malawi cannot 
be confirmed. According to Gita Sen, this trope is not only empirically inaccurate, but 
also encourages a reductionist and homogenising approach to poverty, pre-determining 
women as a socially and economically marginal group: “Focusing on female-headed 
households is much simpler, since this avoids having to address the messy complexities 
posed by gender relations within households, or the ways in which development policies 
and programmes affect them” (2008, 6). Additionally, it overlooks the importance of 
situating unequal gendered household relations within broader historical frameworks 
(Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Arora-Jonsson 2011). In section 7.4, I will highlight the 
multi-dimensional aspects of gender disadvantage in Malawi, such as uneven decisional 
power at household level, and their impact on climate change responses.
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Furthermore, the NAPA’s emphasis on gender inclusiveness implies a practical 
equivalence between ‘gender’ and ‘women’, assuming that the participation of a 
woman farmer in training activities can be taken as representative of all women. The 
constructed idea of women’s identical interests, needs and vulnerabilities with respect to 
climate change echoes the universal and homogenous notion of ‘woman’ and obscures 
the importance of identifying male-female and female-female relationships of power 
(Plumwood 1991; Chandra Mohanty 1994). 
The term ‘mainstreaming’ was first used in the 1970s to describe an educational method 
that includes different kinds of learners without discriminating on the basis of learning 
abilities. In the 1980s it became standard jargon in gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights and 
environment contexts.  During the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), 
the concept of mainstreaming was adopted by the Gender and Development (GAD) 
movement and defined as a strategy for promoting a gender perspective in all policies 
and programmes. According to GAD, before policy decisions are made, an analysis 
(e.g. through gender-disaggregated data) of the implications for women and men of 
any planned action in all areas and at all levels should be undertaken (Hafner-Burton 
and Pollack 2002; Charlesworth 2005). According to critical feminist scholars (Burton 
and Pollack 2002; Charlesworth 2005), the concept of gender through mainstreaming 
practices became institutionally acceptable as a project variable, as well as easily 
identifiable by statisticians and more easily fundable. 
As a development worker in Malawi, and especially as a project manager with UNDP, 
I personally experienced the application of ‘gender mainstreaming’ to climate change 
interventions. Several practices were aimed at systematically and equally involving 
women in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development 
initiatives. Among them were the incorporation of references to their special burdens into 
climate change programmes, the production of quantitative and qualitative assessments 
of their condition within communities, the collection of gender-disaggregated data and 
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the enlisting of an equal number of female and male participants in development activities 
(e.g. workshops and national consultation events). Nominal inclusion was a way of 
securing legitimacy and ensuring compliance in the eyes of development partners. These 
practices were informed by a set of operational and management guidelines developed 
by UNDP to ensure monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of development projects. The 
“Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results” (UNDP 
2009), for example, provides guidelines for monitoring and assessing gender-related 
disparities that may result from development initiatives. While the handbook emphasises 
the importance of ensuring women’s inclusion in development projects, it suggests 
disaggregating “monitoring data by sex, age, location and so forth” so as “to ensure 
[my emphasis] that programming initiatives meet the wellbeing of marginalised people, 
especially women, youth and the elderly” (UNDP 2009, 110). There is an assumption in 
UNDP guidelines that gender mainstreaming should be sufficient to identify the biases 
in international and domestic legal and socio-cultural systems that engender women’s 
oppression or marginalisation. The second story in this chapter (section 7.3) points 
out that the Local Civil Protection Committee in Kasache, by merely securing gender 
inclusion in the knowledge-sharing platform, actually conceals the distinctiveness of 
women’s experiences, overlooking questions about who decides on and benefits from 
participatory development interventions.
Women’s uneven access to agricultural services in Kasache may also be linked to the fact 
that Malawi’s NAPA tends to associate women with projects that focus on improving 
access and delivery of services (e.g. water and energy) needed for caring activities 
(Anderson 2006). In Kasache, women reported being provided with water pumps rather 
than fertilisers. In fact, the NAPA’s focus on gender does not extend to technology-
intensive projects that include mapping, warning systems, or building and installing 
activities (e.g. the project “Improving Malawi’s Preparedness to Cope with Droughts and 
Floods”, NAPA 2006). This approach risks reproducing the positivist opposition between 
caring activities associated with the feminine sphere and the – supposedly morally 
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higher – care for society assigned to the masculine realm, reinforcing women’s ties to 
household and community caring tasks. On the assumption that feminine stereotyped 
characteristics (emotional, carnal, irrational) are inferior and should be controlled by 
masculine rationality, women tend to be excluded from the public sphere and confined 
to private spaces or to those activities that are seen as linked to the domain of nature, 
such as reproduction or caring (Haraway 1991; Plumwood 1991; Harding 2008). In the 
case of Kasache, women, whose farming activities mainly revolve around non-tradable 
subsistence maize crops (Katengeza et al. 2012), risk not being able to access the 
fertilisers needed for intensive growth. Thus, they are increasingly exposed to drought 
impacts, such as higher malnutrition rates. Further, uneven access to technologies may 
increase women’s dependency on their husbands’ capacity to buy fertilisers and inputs 
on their behalf (cash incentives are often designed to support tradable or export crops, 
generally produced by male farmers; see Gladwin 1992; Katengeza et al. 2012), loosening 
women’s control over household livelihood strategies (see section 7.4).
Post-development critiques (Escobar 1995; Leach 2007) pointed out that post-World 
War II Western programmes for agricultural development in Africa, Asia and Central-
South America tended to reproduce a biased perception of gender roles. Women, they 
argued, were excluded from agricultural extension services and targeted mainly as 
beneficiaries of health, family planning or child-care programmes. On the other hand, 
men’s role as productive workers was overly emphasised (Escobar 1995; Leach 2007). 
The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) particularly 
affected women in Malawi due to the withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies to the small 
farm sector (Gladwin 1992). Due to limited access to cash and credit, women farmers 
could no longer benefit from chemical fertilisers. Men farmers instead (especially land 
owners), who are the main cash-crop producers in Malawi, could still afford them and 
increase productivity. Gladwin illustrates the gender biases behind the macro-economic 
thinking of SAPs, which through monetary aggregates hide a specific set of assumptions 
related to the allocation of production (of mainly tradable goods) and household 
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responsibilities (male-centred). Nowadays, several agricultural policies promote the use 
of improved seeds varieties such as maize (e.g. the Farm Input Subsidy Programme,5 
the subject of considerable debate since it would decrease crop diversification, making 
farm households more vulnerable to uncertain climate conditions; see Chibwana and 
Fisher 2010). Farmers, however, generally fail to use them, either because they are not 
aware of the benefits of hybrid seeds or because they cannot afford them (Chibwana 
and Fisher 2010; Katengeza et al. 2012; Nordhagen and Pascual 2013; Chinsinga 2014). 
Kakota et al. (2011) have shown that in Malawi, for example, community grain banks are 
a real challenge because of the lack of appropriate post-harvest handling technologies. 
Women in Kasache, in particular, lamented the unaffordable price of pesticides, which 
are necessary for grain banks (FGD, 7 August 2012).
The NAPA’s essentialising arguments may have affected the design and implementation 
of projects in Kasache and their gendered impacts. Principles of aid effectiveness and 
legitimacy negotiated and agreed at international level (e.g. the Monterrey Consensus) 
seem to have been mostly translated to the local level by engaging with community-
based organisations (ECHO 2004; ECHO 2010; ECHO 2011). In Kasache, COOPI 
ensured community participation through compliance with ECHO’s recommendations 
about the inclusion of Local Civil Protection Committees (ECHO 2004; ECHO 2010; 
ECHO 2011). Yet, COOPI’s project in Kasache neglected the importance of broader 
and historically embedded socio-economic asymmetries that give shape and substance 
to gender unbalances in the community, women’s vulnerability, and their adaptive 
capacity to climate variability and change (e.g. women’s responsibilities/roles, divisions 
of assets, access to resources, etc; section 7.4).
5 The Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) enables smallholder farmers to purchase hybrid seeds and farming 
supplies such as pesticides and fertilizers at a reduced price through vouchers and coupons (Chibwana and Fisher 
2010). A study from Chibwana and Fisher (2010), however, highlights how FISP criteria used in 2008‒-2009 tended 
to exclude female-headed or poorer households from the coupon distribution system simply because their land is too 
small to be eligible or they failed to negotiate with village chiefs, who are to select the beneficiaries. Furthermore, 
Chinsinga (2014) outlined how the FISP represents 75 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS)’s expenditure, marginalising other critical public goods and key components of the agricultural investment 
such as research, extension services, and rural infrastructure (e.g. roads) which may hold huge promise for potential 
sustainable agrarian transformation and long-term sustained food security.
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Echoing the short-cycle focus of neoliberal development efforts (Pepper 1999), the 
short-term, project-oriented focus on adaptation in Malawi’s NAPA impairs the 
identification of the historical causes of climate vulnerability grounded in context-
specific power structures. The adaptation measures endorsed by COOPI through the 
provision of farming technologies seem to enable individuals to cope6 with the ongoing 
changing climate trends, supporting a form of spontaneous or ‘reactive’ adaptation 
(Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). According to Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010), a 
more proactive form of adaptation would seek to integrate long-term (i.e. bearing in 
mind future predictions and projections) climate policies with immediate interventions 
aimed at improving individuals’ lives through poverty reduction, diversified livelihoods, 
improved health and education. However, in the next section, I will show how even 
beneficial and progressive climate and development interventions – based on women’s 
inclusion and participation and livelihood diversification – can have questionable 
outcomes if not complemented by an analysis of the interplay between climate change 
and historically grounded social structures of power. Section 7.4 presents a historical 
overview inspired by the concept of intersectionality, where the multilayered factors that 
shaped women’s position in the household (e.g. land inheritance, access to technologies, 
support from matrilineal networks, etc.) are identified, including perceptions and social 
norms established under British rule that reinforced unequal power relationships and 
women’s vulnerability to climatic shocks.
7.2.3 The risk of universalising gender
Jørstad and Webersik (2016) recently highlighted the limits of the gender mainstreaming 
approach to climate change in Malawi through the case of the Lake Chilwa Basin 
Climate Change Adaptation Programme (LCBCCAP), funded by NORAD between 
2010 and 2014. The project was aimed at increasing the capacity of communities to 
6 Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010) associate coping strategies with spontaneous adaptation, a routine reaction in 
people (especially farmers and pastoralists) who may be unaware of climate change but respond to changes in 
the weather on the basis of previous experience, e.g. with changes in the planting calendar, crop varieties, grazing 
patterns, etc. It is defined as a post-reaction, which in the context of unprecedented and unpredictable climate change 
may be inadequate to alleviate impacts at the individual level.
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adopt sustainable livelihood and natural resource management practices in the face of 
changing climate patterns in the basin area (Jørstad and Webersik, 2016). NORAD was 
especially keen to include gender considerations in the project design, ensuring women’s 
participation and consultation in accordance with gender mainstreaming principles. 
The LCBCCAP was in fact successful in integrating gender-based knowledge into the 
formulation of gender-responsive solutions: women contributed to the design of solar 
fish driers based on local practices, which improved the quality of dried fish during 
periods of lake dryness (Jørstad and Webersik 2016).
One of the project’s goals was to improve traditional methods of processing fish that 
would increase women’s income and savings in a changing climate. Jørstad and Webersik 
(2016) note that women’s traditional knowledge was assumed to automatically lead to 
improved natural resource management. According to them, the project focused on 
women’s local knowledge and skills in isolation from wider power relations, disregarding 
gendered backup strategies for dry seasons, such as ganyu labour (see Chapter 6), 
mentioned during the project preparatory consultations. Jørstad and Webersik argue 
that the project ended up further anchoring the community to the fish sector, failing 
to increase the overall adaptive capacity through the adoption of alternative livelihood 
options. The authors do not explore why ganyu was not envisaged in the project design 
or implementation, despite being a common adaptation strategy.
The example of Lake Chilwa is particularly relevant to my analysis. Ganyu labour 
was often mentioned during my consultations with women in Kasache as a major 
coping mechanism to climatic shocks (Chapter 6). However, in my experience as well 
as in the case examined by Jørstad and Webersik (2016), the importance of ganyu 
as an adaptation mechanism has been neglected or dismissed by policymakers, 
development organisations and researchers. Dismissing ganyu, despite its origins 
in unequal transnational-to-local power relations, means neglecting the intangible 
resources and social networks that help women cope with climatic shocks. The 
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Lake Chilwa project strived to create opportunities for women to participate in the 
development of adaptation solutions. Its emphasis, however, was on women’s special 
role in managing local land and wildlife – assuming their inherent proximity to the 
natural and irrational world (Plumwood 1991) or favouring the supposedly intuitive and 
qualitative ‘traditional’ knowledge (Ingold 2010). The focus on traditional knowledge 
echoes some of the colonial stereotypes on indigenous and local practices, regarded 
as ‘authentic’ and effective models of livelihood and environmental management 
(Nadasdy 1999; Broch-Due and Schroeder 2000; Neumann 2000).
These assumptions might overlook the socio-political structures and mechanisms 
underpinning local practices of adaptation. During my interviews in Kasache, 
references to ganyu labour emerged as directly linked not to climate change but to the 
ways knowledge and power are distributed in the community. Ganyu seems to be not 
only a major coping strategy, but also a social and political mechanism that formalises 
expectations about the role of traditional leaders in ensuring community’s subsistence 
and resilience during a famine or a climate shock (Vaughan 1987; Bryceson 2006; 
Kakota et al. 2011; Nordhagen and Pascual 2013). In this sense, gender mainstreaming 
approaches would allow international development organisations (but also national 
and non-government actors, see White 1996) to more or less purposely disengage from 
tensions and negotiations within communities. White (1996) provides the example of 
the women’s groups created in Zambia by the government to increase participation in 
agricultural development projects, noting that rather than addressing access to credit 
or the much sought-after fertilisers, they ended up increasing women’s production of 
handicrafts. Nominal participation and the timing of the meetings (coinciding with the 
agricultural season) prevented many women from attending and raising issues related 
to the local gendered division of labour (e.g. lack of access to resources). White (1996) 
further argues that while these groups allowed the government to purport inclusion 
and legitimation, they did not help to advocate for agricultural service delivery to 
women farmers.
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My work in Kasache further illustrates how gender mainstreaming in adaptation 
interventions can reinforce the authority of specific groups and fuel structural 
inequalities, especially when women’s interests are assumed to coincide with those of 
the community at large.
7.3 Story 2 - Ensuring participation, excluding 
women 
This story, too, emerges from the conversations I had with Loveness Kapininga in 
Kasache (section 7.2). When I asked about women’s opportunities for sharing knowledge 
on adaptation practices, she could not hide her discomfort: there were no structured 
ways of collecting experiences from women’s perspective: “There are no platforms on 
climate change or adaptive farming practices, nothing like the village meetings with the 
chiefs to discuss community development. When it comes to climate change, we just try 
and adapt on our own” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012).
During my consultations in Kasache, the majority of female interviewees emphasised 
that, despite the gender-differentiated impacts (section 7.2.1 and 7.4), they are rarely 
consulted on climate change issues, either by local or by external organisations. It 
seemed as though women in Kasache were appealing to the very principle of gender 
mainstreaming and inclusion I am criticising in this chapter. In an FGD with female 
elders about participatory mechanisms, a woman noted:
Nobody in the village has ever come asking for advice or information 
on climate change. Sometimes local chiefs ask for advice on how to run 
and manage the village, but they never enquired about climate change 
adaptation. We have never been involved in Civil Protection Committee 
meetings about disaster-related issues either (FGD, 7 July 2012).
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When looking closer at interviewees’ claims, it is evident that the issue is not the lack of 
formal inclusion in local decision-making platforms (which partly happens, as discussed 
below), but rather the opportunity for women to increase visibility of their concerns and 
practices in men-centred platforms.
Yet, Malawi’s National Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy (GoM 2011f) 
assigns LCPCs a central role in connecting central planning entities and community 
representatives to ensure local-level representation (Eggen 2011). The Local Civil 
Protection Committee (LCPC) should act as a key vehicle to grant community and 
gender inclusion in Kasache. A project manager from COOPI stressed the gender 
balance in the structure:
The LCPCs were established in 2004 through funding from UNDP and 
the Department of Disaster Management Affairs to address weather-related 
risk in Malawi’s vulnerable districts. Usually, an LCPC is composed of 10 
or 12 people, half of whom are women (Individual interview, 28 July 2012).
This aspect was also emphasised by the chairperson of the LCPC in Kasache, Themba 
Ngalande:
Women are in the majority in all our meetings, so they are very 
important for our activities. But it’s difficult with older women, they 
don’t always come to the meetings, so we rely on the younger ones to 
inform them…There are several ways we share knowledge. Women are 
usually active in communicating messages through drama and dance 
only. That’s not because of an inferiority complex. It’s not that easy to 
tell a woman to share knowledge in bigger platforms or at meetings...
(Individual interview, 9 August 2012).
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Women’s equal representation by virtue of their gender at these events seems to 
provide Themba with a justification for their feelings of exclusion. 
By allowing and favouring women’s participation mainly through drama and dance, 
the LCPC reproduces, rather than challenges, men’s perceptions of the constraints 
on women’s speaking in public, according to which the public arena would make it 
difficult for women to attend and express their concerns (Cornwall 2013). Having 
women attend the meetings without providing them with the opportunity to influence 
decision-making processes was considered sufficient to grant gender inclusion, on 
the assumption that women’s experiences are always and necessarily ‘authentic’ and 
representative of all women’s voices and needs (McNay 2000). However, operating 
on the basis of nominal inclusion and the assumption that ‘traditional’ practices 
(e.g. drama) are culturally and socially unbiased, the LCPC risks exacerbating 
marginalisation, as discussed in the next section.
7.3.1 Women’s voices in participatory development
My experience resonates with critical feminist reflections (Cornwall 2013) on gender 
participatory development approaches, which, emphasising single-type variables to 
climate change as in the ‘feminisation of poverty’ trope, fail to grant gender inclusion 
and equality. Cornwall (2013) provides the example of a gender-progressive NGO 
that, in the attempt to address women’s inclusion in resilience-building programmes, 
ended up supporting élite women with the power to influence decision-making in 
the community. The NGO struggled to address women’s needs, since these were 
perceived as supporting ‘traditional’ gender roles holding back women in their 
subaltern positions (Cornwall 2013).
In Kasache, certain groups of women seemed to support interventions that would 
reinforce their subordinate and marginal roles. For example, when I interviewed 
Pauline Mwale, one of the women sitting in the LCPC, her climate-related concerns 
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were substantially different from those expressed by Loveness. While the latter 
lamented a lack of female participation, emphasising the need for household support 
(e.g. seeds and technologies), Pauline’s main concern was the LCPC’s need for donor-
driven financial support. She actually had a positive view of women’s inclusion: “All 
ideas and experiences are welcome, whether they come from men or women. The 
LCPC would just love to receive training to better guide the rest of the community” 
(Individual interview, 9 August 2012). Interestingly, both perspectives could be 
reinforcing the exclusionary effects of the existing structures and processes. On 
one hand, Loveness’s concerns may seem to reinforce gender oppression, such as 
women’s reproductive role at the household level. On the other hand, Pauline’s claims 
could fuel development interventions that reinforce female subordination in male-
run committees. However, some women in Kasache do not see participation in the 
LCPC as undermining their cultural autonomy, since these initiatives are perceived 
as valuable means for connecting with sources of power. In fact, both Loveness and 
Pauline expressed a desire to take part in participatory interventions.
As the LCPC case illustrates, while the focus on formal institutions and practices 
can increase women’s formal participation, it offers little prospects of eliminating 
inequalities and improving women’s condition. This is emblematic of some of the 
limits of contemporary gender and climate change interventions, which ‘simply’ seek 
to provide women with improved access to material means (e.g. microfinance, training, 
farming technologies, etc.) that increase their negotiating position within existing and 
unequal power relations, without transforming them (McNay 2000; Cornwall 2013; 
Motta 2013). 
This example points to one of the challenges of assuming women as a homogenous 
category: the idea that women have common interests by virtue of their gender. 
Critical feminists elaborated on this assumption by reflecting on the concept of 
‘women’s interests’ and the fact that women’s interests do not always and fully 
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coincide with gender interests (Molyneaux 1985; McNay 2000; Cornwall 2013; Motta 
2013). Molyneaux (1985) notes the impossibility of abstracting women’s common 
interests, since their oppression is multi-causal and mediated through a variety of 
different structures and mechanisms that may vary considerably across space and 
time. A woman’s interests, for instance, may depend on her interpersonal relations of 
power or be mediated by institutional structures or the law. Accordingly, as a female 
leader Pauline may not necessarily identify with other women in Kasache and their 
interests. She might comply with participatory mechanisms to achieve personal goals 
(e.g. accessing resources, maintaining relationships with influential men, etc.) and 
maintain her leadership position. At the same time, Pauline’s claims seem in line with 
the interests of the LCPC chairperson, Themba, who also asked for additional donor 
support (Individual interview, 9 August 2012).
What emerges is that different groups of women (e.g. women leaders or farmers) 
might be differently affected by gender participatory approaches and act differently 
to account for the particularity of their social positioning. The intersection between 
overlapping factors (property ownership, access to employment, support from 
kin, etc.) that determine women’s roles and responsibilities at the household and 
community levels influence the reasons why societal groups ally even when different 
or contrasting interests are at stake (Garry 2011). By uniformly classifying all 
women as poor and vulnerable, gender mainstreaming assumes the existence of an 
all-encompassing gender category (Blaser 2014), overlooking the historical, cultural 
and socio-economic specificities that determined women’s condition of vulnerability 
(Motta 2013). In this sense, projects underpinned by homogenising gender categories 
may risk reproducing existing relations of inequality – between women and men and 
among women – rather than laying the foundation for more equitable gender relations 
(Molyneaux 1985; Cornwall 2013).
My reflection is in line with critical feminist perspectives on the necessity of a 
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historical, intersectional and situated approach to women’s conditions and struggles 
(Plumwood 1993; Lugones 2010; Mohanty 2013). Lugones (2010), for example, calls 
for the overcoming of the dualistic approach of white/Western or women of colour 
feminisms that place women’s situations in a hierarchical relation (European bourgeois 
women vs. Third World Women), reproducing colonial and racial differences. A 
truly ‘decolonising’ feminist approach would analyse woment’s experiences against 
the world’s systems of power (colonialism, neoliberalism, patriarchy7) through 
multilayered historical, economic, cultural and political processes and structures 
(Mohanty 2013). More broadly, this would conceptualise ‘coloniality’ (Mignolo 
2005) as an epistemological and ontological condition (recalling the Foucauldian 
subject-object relation) where individuals, not necessarily belonging to colonial or 
postcolonial contexts but still affected by unbalanced power dynamics, can articulate 
active roles by raising critiques, expressing divergent views and learning from each 
other’s experiences (see section 7.5 on self-help groups and Chapter 8).
In the next section, I will provide an analysis of the power dimensions and historical 
frameworks that produced gender inequalities and vulnerability to climate variability 
and change. This kind of analysis may help to better design adaptation interventions 
and avoid cases of maladaptation linked to single-variable approaches (gender, culture, 
income, etc.).
7.4 Story 3 – Women’s vulnerabilities to climate 
change: a socio-historical location
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (2010) identified the 
‘patriarchal social structure’ as one of the key factors of women’s exclusion in Malawi. 
As highlighted by NORAD (2010) and FAO (2011), the implementation of gender 
policies and programmes in Malawi has been hampered by the existence of “cultural 
7 The concept of patriarchy has been described as a Western-based construct fuelling the notion of homogenising 
and totalising gender oppression (Patil 2013). However, critical feminist scholars (Mohanty 2013; Patil 2013; Liska 
2015) have revised the concept under the term ‘intersectionality’ to reflect on the historical and cross-border gender 
dynamics of hegemonic cultural and geopolitical projects.
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practices, beliefs, traditions and social norms” (FAO 2011, 7) that characterise the 
country as “a strongly patriarchal society where women’s rights are weak” (NORAD 
2010, 23). By emphasising the presence of gendered cultural structures to justify the 
shortcomings of policy implementation, these approaches tend to explain gender 
inequality – and vulnerability – through single variables (e.g. culture, time/history) 
and in isolation from wider power relations (Nadasdy 1999). 
Bilateral and multilateral development organisations’ definition of Malawi as 
a patriarchal society, represented as almost immobile and locked out of history, 
contrasts with the country’s basic societal units – mbumba – characterised by 
matrilineal lineages. In mbumba, the provision of household needs is historically 
the responsibility of men, while women can exert a greater influence on decisions 
related to income and labour (Kerr 2005; Kakota 2011; Kuzara 2014).
The village of Kasache is located in the central region of Malawi, a historically and 
ethnographically matrilineal area in which the Chewa group constitute the majority 
of the population – a societal feature that, as shown by the quotes below, appears 
to be in tension with women’s concerns about their limited influence on household 
spending in times of food crisis. When discussing the ability to cope with climate 
change at household level, women frequently mentioned men’s drinking habits: 
“Let’s say you don’t have food, it’s the children who suffer the most, and women. 
The men usually go for drinks. Sometimes we [men and women] farm together, but 
sometimes they don’t even show up” (FGD,  8 August 2012). This statement points 
to the gendered character of community daily care activities. When describing 
this occurrence (“men just leave for drinks”, FGD, 27 July 2012), women seemed 
incapable of exerting any influence on a situation that compromises their ability to 
decide over household coping strategies (“a woman cannot leave the house and go 
eat, and let the kids go hungry”, FGD , 27 July 2012). These statements highlight 
how difficult it is for women to disagree with their husbands’ decisions about how 
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to spend family income in times of crisis. Besides access to resources, household 
decision-making is thus another key element shaping gendered climate change 
vulnerabilities.
The contradictions between women’s experiences of household decision-making 
and the matrilineal features of society in Kasache are probably due to the gradual 
transformation of mbumba that placed men-headed houses at the core of welfare 
policies (Kerr 2005). Yet, it is hard to establish what gender roles and relationships 
in the country might have looked like before the colonial period8 (Phiri 1983; 
Kachapila 2006; Kuzara 2014); as soon as British colonial rule was established, it 
began to influence household and gender roles. The restructured intra-household 
relationships triggered women’s access to cash, waged labour and fertile land.
Historically, mbumba societies (Phiri 1983) accorded greater social respect to 
women than men as the reproducers of the lineage. A married man was referred to 
as a mkamwini (‘someone who belongs somewhere else’), and he could not aspire 
to any improvement in social status (Kachapila 2006). The transfer and inheritance 
of land was matrilineal (from mother or grandmother to daughter). The family was 
economically dependent on a larger social unit to which it was affiliated, embracing 
most of the women’s relatives. For example, men used to be occupied in collective 
and family-based horticultural practices – banja – which guaranteed food production 
and self-subsistence (Phiri 1983; Kuzara 2014). Mbumba provided a system of 
female solidarity, meaning that, if for some reason (illness, labour shortage, old 
age) a woman was not able to provide her household unit with food, other female 
relatives would step in. Mbumba represented a coping strategy in case of weather 
shocks and food shortages, especially thanks to the banja practice (Vaughan 1987; 
Kuzara 2014).
8 Studies of social structures in central Malawi, including kinship, family and marriage, suffer from a lack of written 
and oral sources. Before the advent of contemporary documented literature this methodological challenge (noted 
by scholars such as Phiri 1983; Kachapila 2006; Kuzara 2014), was overcome through the study of the evolution of 
societal structures in relation to a variety of documented transformations of the Chewa society, such as migrations, 
warfare, slave trade and colonisation . 
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Men had, however, other ways of affirming and performing their social status. Nyau9 
was one of them. In Chapter 6, I introduced nyau as an expression of a relational 
ontology that was deployed to withstand the spread of Christianity in Malawi. Nyau 
provided spaces in which married men could exercise power within mbumba societies 
and experience a sense of belonging to the community through songs and rituals from 
which women were largely excluded (see Chapter 6 for details on nyau rituals related to 
agricultural production, crop rotation and fertility).
Under colonial rule, the definition of a household unit was revised to include man, wife 
and children; so were the right and duties of husbands (e.g. taxation and inheritance 
of wealth) (Stoler 1995). Malawi’s ethnicity-based matrilineal structures were blamed 
for unstable marriages and moral degeneration (Kuzara 2014). This process profoundly 
reshaped the organisation of intra-household responsibilities and gender control over 
resources. Kuzara (2014) describes how missionaries awarded land to men and women 
who decided to be married in a Christian ritual. Yet Christian precepts implied that the 
husband was the head of the household, and marriage became a fundamental factor in 
influencing the very structure of society through land inheritance transmission and 
ownership. Kachapila (2006) reports that matrilocal married husbands welcomed the 
Christian precepts on marriage that accorded them more control over families. On the 
other hand, since Christian missionaries openly condemned nyau practices and societies, 
these underwent gradual transformations and became a central venue for resistance to 
the destabilisation of some aspects of the matrilineal systems, reinforcing men’s power 
and authority within mbumba societies (Phiri 1983). 
This analysis suggests that women’s selective vulnerability to climate shocks in Malawi 
does not exclusively stem from inherent patriarchal societal features, as argued by 
NORAD (2010) or FAO (2011) studies, but also from the intersection of several social 
changes, such as the gradual erasure of local networks of solidarity based on mbumba. 
9 In Chapter 6, I described how the nyau ritual intimately links the perception of nature to moral values and social 
order. Nyau is underpinned by a worldview based on ontological unity and can be interpreted as a means of affirming 
the identity and distinctiveness of a society in relation to members within and outside villages (Probst 2002).
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As described above, the mkamwini and banja practices offered alternative strategies of 
subsistence during climate-related food shortages. The colonial process, by regulating 
access to land, cash and labour on the basis of racialised and gendered lines, redesigned 
household responsibilities and women’s and men’s decision-making power, as well 
as their capacity to adapt (Kachapila 2006; Kuzara 2014). As climate variability and 
change started having an impact on nutrition (e.g. through droughts and food shortages), 
discrimination in the allocation of and access to household resources, including food 
or income, made women (especially those who were landless or dependent on male 
remittances) particularly exposed to the impacts of climate shocks (Vaughan 1987).
These modifications to men’s and women’s status were further reinforced and 
accelerated by transformation in the economic and productive structures. The shift from 
subsistence to large-scale farming had a destabilising effect, as estate owners allocated 
land to male-headed households. The colonial hut tax (Phiri 1983; Vaughan 1987; Kerr 
2005; Kachapila 2006) systematically deprived mbumba societies of their mkamwini, 
decentralising production from family- to cash crop-based farms and pushing men to 
seek wage labour in European estates. Women were forced to carry out the bulk of 
activities related to subsistence and family-based food production, while becoming more 
dependent on male wages for the purchase of inorganic fertilisers and food surplus, 
especially in times of environmental shocks.
This aligns with women farmers’ narratives, and their perception of their own 
vulnerability (see also section 7.2). When I enquired about climate change impacts on 
their lives, women talked about the different effects of seasonal climate variability on 
women and men. As shown by the quotes below, women feel they are more affected 
than men and are able to identify some of the sources of their vulnerability, such as 
child-care duties. Women in Kasache are responsible for the daily care of children, 
food preparation, and firewood and water collection. The majority are also engaged in 
smallholder agriculture:
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During the winter season, when the rain stops, we try to adapt to kusintha 
kwa nyengo [original wording] climate change by practising winter 
cropping. We irrigate yields using residual moisture. At this time of the 
year, we feel that women work harder than men in the fields, spending the 
longest hours outdoor (FGD, 8 August 2012).
I asked them to specify in which activities women are disproportionately engaged: 
“Water collection is one of them, but this is not really a problem for women. But 
gathering firewood, that really is a challenge” (FGD, 8 August 2012). In effect, with 
the introduction of colonial capitalist economy, men gradually abandoned the banja 
practice and the related obligation to cultivate family gardens, increasing women’s 
dependence on smallholder agriculture and their economic insecurity during droughts 
or flood events (Phiri 1983). 
Nowadays, women in Kasache do not only feel they are disproportionally affected 
by climate change. They also think they have weaker coping strategies, which, in 
their words, stem from household responsibilities: “If the harvest is not enough, it’s 
women and children who suffer. Men usually leave the house and eat somewhere else. 
A woman cannot leave the house and go eat, letting the kids go hungry” (FGD, 29 
July 2012). Several interviewees stressed that men are free to go out and find food 
elsewhere, they are free to be responsible only for themselves. Furthermore, women 
are entirely responsible for the cultivation, storage and processing of food crops, seen 
as an extension of gender-defined domestic duties.
Further, my female informants in Kasache specifically referred to the division of 
in-house labour and access to resources (land, cash, labour and time) as key factors 
shaping men’s and women’s capacity to adapt to climate risks. As testified by 
interviewees, while women react to climatic shocks by increasing the time spent 
on subsistence work or reducing consumption levels, men take on more paid work 
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or migrate. The differential vulnerability between men and women is shaped by 
intra-household relations, such as responsibilities at the family level and differential 
access to resources. From this perspective, women show selective vulnerability. 
Being the ones responsible for most household activities, including food provisions, 
they are more likely to be affected by climate change and variability. In the case of 
Kasache, uneven workload distribution within households limits women’s choice of 
income-earning opportunities (beyond low-paid ganyu) or the ability to benefit from 
government programmes, such as agricultural extension services. Inequality does not 
only manifest itself in the disproportionate amount of labour required from women, 
but also in the lack of control over the resources – such as paid off-farm work – 
resulting from their societal position.
This historical snapshot shows a clear tension with the gender mainstreaming 
approaches explored in previous sections, where gender inequalities are mainly 
projected along biological or structural lines, overlooking generational, class or racial 
sources of marginalisation (McNay 1992). This is exemplified by the NORAD (2010) 
and ADB (2005) reports where gender vulnerability in Malawi is linked to structural 
features of societal (patriarchal) and household (female-headed) organisations. 
Contrary to the generalisation that female-headed households are inherently more 
vulnerable to climate change, the matrilineal land-tenure system appeared to be more 
resilient to climate variability thanks to the social networks it was built upon. As 
happened during colonial rule, climate vulnerability is shaped by the intersection of 
different types of inequalities determined in turn by specific societal and historical 
contexts, such as the opportunity to benefit from the means of production. 
This analysis can help to explain the unbalanced household dynamics described by 
many women in Kasache (e.g. limited decision-making power at the household level) 
during interviews. The colonial experience altered the gender balance of mbumba, 
introducing Eurocentric gender ideologies while at the same time establishing a 
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dialogue between patriarchies, such as through links between the Western-based 
nuclear family and the patrilineal features of mbumba (leveraging on the role of 
mkamwini).
Furthermore, this section outlines how a binary interpretation of gender relations 
(section 7.2) overlooks women’s and men’s active experiences and interactions 
within socio-cultural hegemonic projects: encouraging the dichotomy between male 
dominance and female subordination, it risks locking women in dominant and gendered 
norms and practices. Women in Malawi, however, were not simply victims of colonial 
familial structures stemming from British colonialism. By appropriating and combining 
indigenous (e.g. nyau) and European/Western-based elements (e.g. man-headed 
families), matrilineal societies devised internal strategies to resist the political and 
cultural transformation introduced by British rule (Probst 2002; Robins 2003; Kachapila 
2006). Women managed to negotiate and redefine gender relations within pre-existing 
lineage systems, also as a way to endure, resist and adapt to colonial dominance. Thus, 
matrilineal systems were not completely swiped away, as shown by the experience of 
self-help groups discussed in section 7.5.
7.4.1 The plurality of silence
Women and elders sometimes expressed feelings of exclusion from family and 
community decision-making patterns through uneasiness when speaking, or silence. 
When I asked questions about participation and knowledge-sharing (e.g. “Have you ever 
been consulted on issues related to climate change in your community?”, Annex II), a 
sense of discomfort and embarrassment emerged. Interviewees appeared unwilling to 
express their concern: “We don’t know if we feel excluded from decision-making…” 
(FGD, 7 July 2012). A sense of uneasiness also emerged during interviews with the 
elders. Busisiwe Muva, a woman in her 70s, told me she never discussed climate change 
with anyone. She felt incapable of providing useful insights on how to respond to floods 
and food insecurity: “As an old person, I don’t feel I’m able to give any advice on how 
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to adapt to climate change” (Individual interview, 6 August 2012). During another FGD 
with the elders, the group commented: “We have never been involved in knowledge-
sharing inside the community. Nobody has ever come asking for information or advice. 
Yet we have been sometimes interviewed by outsiders like you” (FGD, 8 July 2012).
The analytical tools offered by Subaltern Studies in the context of postcolonial criticism 
helped me to explore the potential meanings of silence against the history of power 
relations (Loomba 1993; Spivak 1994; Prakash 1994b; Williams 2006; Louai 2012; 
Wagner 2012; Motta 2013; Liska 2015). As shown in the previous section, women’s 
social status and household decision-making power in Malawi were influenced by 
the changes introduced during colonial rule, which increasingly confined them to 
private and non-public roles. Women were often responding with silence to my specific 
questions on knowledge and inclusion at the village level. 
A possible reading of women’s silence in Kasache may be linked to their long-standing 
marginalisation from the ‘Western-authorised’ socio-economic structures introduced 
by British colonialism (Prakash 1994b; Spivak 1994) and carried over in postcolonial 
development processes. Considering women’s historically produced subalternity 
in Malawi, silence may have been related to the discursive mechanisms that, from 
a subaltern’s viewpoint, make a statement appear senseless, useless and unworthy 
of mentioning. The sense of inability expressed through silence by Busisiwe Muva 
could be interpreted as a matter of failure or passivity. In Chapter 6, I reflected on the 
‘invisibility’ of local coping mechanisms. The perceived lack of initiative emerging from 
the elders’ claims (“In terms of climate change adaptation, we are not doing anything in 
particular to cope”, 7 August 2012) may be linked to the missing recognition of ganyu 
as a coping mechanism by national and international policy actors. The climate change 
initiatives implemented in Kasache (e.g. the project led by COOPI), in which measures 
grounded in market and liberal theory are often the only ones regarded as effective, 
influence self-perceptions, impairing the ability to express views that could better 
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describe specific situations (see the reference to God’s influence on climate change in 
Chapter 6) or point to practices that are more effective in certain contexts (ganyu).
Additionally, since community knowledge platforms are legitimised by development 
actors as truly inclusive and encompassing, individuals may not feel justified in asking 
for additional participatory space. In the case of Kasache, participatory development 
formally positions the subaltern individual in the driving seat of community-based 
platforms by ensuring nominal representation. By persuading elders and women that 
they are fairly represented in decision-making, this ‘disciplined’ condition makes them 
uncomfortable or unable to challenge power structures and raises concerns about their 
substantial lack of participation (Phelan 1990; Prakash 1994b; Wagner 2012).
The politics of climate change ontology (Blaser 2014) can also provide helpful insights. 
Busisiwe’s sense of inability may be related to the hegemony and epistemological 
asymmetry of the categories used in climate-resilient development projects (e.g. evidence-
based knowledge) that ontologically materialise in elders’ feelings of inadequateness. 
An example is provided by the type of knowledge underlying the activity of Local Civil 
Protection Committees. Given their emphasis on science-based and techno-managerial 
knowledge, the elders may feel that their experience-driven and relational knowledge 
(see Chapter 6) would be disregarded and not considered useful. In the previous chapter, 
I proposed an anthropological lens that may help explain how individuals in Kasache 
understand climate change mainly through their direct and personal experiences. The 
knowledge platforms promoted by some international development projects may risk 
privileging a positivist knowledge in which Western rationalities are embedded. This 
could end up reinforcing the marginalisation and silencing of non-Western knowledges 
and experiences, including those represented by women or elders. 
Yet, it would be erroneous to read women’s statements and silences exclusively on the 
basis of a subjugated or subdued subjectivity. In my field experience, understanding 
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whether women’s and elders’ silence is the expression of a conscious agency (where there 
is a will to be silent and resist hegemonic socio-cultural projects) or an ‘unarticulated’ 
subjectivity (the individual is not aware of his/her socio-political exclusion and not able 
to identify the causes of marginalisation) was not straightforward (Prakash 1994b; Smith 
2012; Wagner 2012). The fact that women might not be fully aware of the reasons for 
their exclusion from the LCPC, a purportedly gender-neutral structure, could engender 
feelings of discomfort when talking – or not talking – about marginalisation. Whether 
resulting from a passive or active subjectivity, I sensed a strong feeling of uneasiness 
when talking about certain issues, and it was extremely hard for me to further probe 
into this inability to speak, since my questions were unsettling. In fact, I preferred 
not to ‘invade’ that sphere of silence, as I feared that my insistence – as a privileged 
Western researcher – could be taken as an arrogant and numb effort to interpret and 
represent the silence ‘from above’ (O’Hanlon 1988; Wagner 2012).
While it may be difficult to directly draw firm conclusions about this experience, 
silence and embarrassment – also possibly linked to shyness, lack of interest in the 
research topic or concerns about the implications of what was claimed – highlighted 
the problematic nature of doing research in marginalised contexts. One of the main 
challenges was to interpret and write about the interviewees’ pauses and silences. In 
this regard, critical feminist methodologies (Chapter 4) helped me to better understand 
silences, emphasising – through the concept of ontological pluralism – the importance 
of thinking across borders and liminal spaces to identify alternative logics of knowing, 
thinking and, ultimately, being (Blaser 2014; Popke 2016). From a methodological 
perspective, silences challenged the possibility of identifying and interpreting narrative 
patterns and discursive strategies. However, the value of the unspoken (O’Hanlon 1988; 
Wagner 2012) and textual and narrative messiness (Law 2004) highlighted by critical 
postcolonial, feminist and ethnographic (Gupta and Ferguson 1997) perspectives 
helped me to recognise continuities and ruptures between colonial and postcolonial/
developmentalist climate change narratives and practices in marginal discourses. 
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Most importantly, silences (more than actual speech) revealed underlying worldviews, 
assumptions, conflicts and struggles, allowing me to follow unconventional paths. 
Silences valuably signposted where I should dig more through historical and socio-
constructivist analysis, as strongly argued by intersectional scholars. Women’s silences 
on participation and inclusion in Kasache urged me to reflect on the inequality of existing 
social structures and their causal links with colonial and contemporary development 
narratives and interventions. Furthermore, the uneasiness I experienced in Kasache 
forced me to critically think about the impact of the international development projects 
I was directly engaged in professionally. The question now is, how is marginalisation 
resisted or counteracted by women in Kasache?
7.5 Self-help groups: a place of creativity and 
resistance
Some PCSTS scholars interpret silence as a collective or individual form of resistance, 
the place where marginal groups express their dissent and discomfort (Spivak 1994; 
Phelan 1990; Wagner 2012). In Foucault’s view, anonymity is an antidote to European 
cultural imperialism since it allows individuals to withhold the knowledge that can be 
used by hegemonic projects, through observations and records, to create and discipline 
identities (Phelan 1990; Wagner 2012). By refusing to take part in the dominant 
discursive formation, the silent subjects become irreducibly unclassified and escape 
from social structures that are formally inclusionary and supposedly politically neutral.
During consultations in Kasache, some women farmers told me about their ‘self-help 
groups’,10 which they described as forms of collective action originating within informal 
networks. They talked about what they do ‘differently’ (i.e. not influenced by external 
actors) to adapt to climate change: “Some groups of women from other villages come 
to our group to learn what we are doing to adapt to climate change. NGOs have not 
yet come to us to learn from our group activities” (FGD, 8 August 2012). Self-help 
10 Women’s self-help groups have also been observed in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Several women from 
the same village, generally between ten and twenty, come together and contribute their savings, often providing loans 
to group members (AWID 2008; IFAD 2010; Arora-Jonsson 2009; CGIAR 2013; Alemu et al. 2018).
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groups in Kasache share tools, seeds, and knowledge of several farming methods, (e.g. 
application of compost manure) with women from other villages. Thriving outside 
the well-established system of legitimised platforms, these spontaneous initiatives 
seemingly escape developmentalist classifications, rejecting their gendered culture and 
institutionalised elitist power. 
As noted by Alemu et al. (2018), SHG have been emerging in those contexts where 
extension services were mainly targeted at men, and where community leadership is 
mainly exerted by male-dominated collective structures. These are some of the societal 
features emphasised by women in Kasache (sections 7.2 and 7.3), who lamented a 
lack of substantial inclusion in decision-making platforms and their inability to access 
agricultural inputs. In fact, the reference to self-help groups emerged within the same 
Focus Group Discussions where female farmers mentioned the challenges of accessing 
credit, tools, knowledge and technologies, and uneven household responsibilities. This 
could point to a connection between disadvantageous positions in accessing agricultural 
services and women’s affiliation to self-help groups in Kasache. 
These groups seem to be a response to donor- or nationally led support measures (see 
Loveness’s case on seed varieties), designed around the assumption that men are the 
key productive actors in the community. In this sense, women’s self-help groups may 
be interpreted as a sign of resistance and as a creative way of responding to gendered 
development interventions.
These groups are not an isolated case in Malawi. A study from Kakota et al. (2011) 
highlighted for instance that women have been particularly active in establishing 
community woodlots to deal with firewood depletion and increased workload. SHG 
contribute to challenging women’s marginality in many ways, for example increasing 
access to financial aid and involvement in economic activities (AWID 2008; Arora-
Jonsson 2009; IFAD 2010; CGIAR 2013). Women in Kasache have formed banking 
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groups to support their farming activities with a view to increasing production and 
preventing loss of food and income: “First we formed a banking group for women, 
a saving group that can be accessed when needed. We try to raise funds, which we 
put in our savings, and we grow rice together as a group, sharing it or selling it after 
the harvest season” (FGD, 8 August 2012). Unlike the LCBCCAP experience (section 
7.2.3), which locked women into a specific and climate-vulnerable sector (fishing), 
SHG allow women to diversify their response to climate risks and explore different 
sources of livelihood, thus enabling households to become more resilient to climate 
shocks. They also reinforce social networks, which, as demonstrated by the role of 
mbumba in the history of famines in Malawi (Vaughan 1987), can lead to better income 
opportunities and food security. 
The claim that self-help groups have not yet been ‘classified’ by external actors (“NGOs 
have not yet come to us to learn from our group activities”, FGD, 8 August 2012) may 
imply a form of female ‘anonymity’ to counter anthropocentrism and androcentrism 
in the development context (Mohanty 1994; Louai 2012; Motta 2013; Liska 2015; 
Seppälä 2016). Gender mainstreaming  assumes elitist forms of political engagement 
as the main form of mobilisation and considers women in the Global South as passive, 
victimised subjects also because of their specific forms of resistance, which substantially 
differ from those conceived by Western political thought (Motta 2013; Seppälä 2016). 
Western political engagement, historically linked to the public sphere or parties, trade 
unions, and official state organs, entails active forms of protest that emerged as inherent 
constituents of neoliberal economic frameworks based on masculinised formal labour 
(Chant 2006; Louai 2012; Motta 2013; Seppälä 2016). With the greater involvement 
of women in the workforce, women’s struggles extended across sites of production 
(e.g. factories, trade unions) and reproduction (e.g. families) – the informal and private 
sphere where they have been historically marginalised (Patil 2013). As discussed with 
reference to nyau (section 7.4), subaltern mobilisation in Malawi also went through 
different forms of organisation, such as family, kin relations or territorial affiliations. 
Chapter 7 - Adaptation: a local gendered experience 245
Moreover, self-help groups allow women to affirm their agency, as their voices emerge 
from their resilience-building practices (Cornwall 2013; Motta 2013). Subject and 
object identities are not mutually exclusive, as women are able to cover both object (e.g. 
marginalised by colonial discourses and socio-economic changes) and subject positions 
(e.g. leading self-help groups). Women themselves describe these groups as outside the 
domain of NGOs and international organisations: rather than conforming to dominant 
participatory standards, they created something different. While men-run committees 
allow incorporating women’s interests ‘into the world of men’ (Phelan 1990; Escobar 
1995), thus reproducing lines of patriarchal and gendered roles, self-help groups enable 
women to question productive and reproductive structures. Self-help groups in Kasache, 
for instance, build on and revive matrilineal solidarity as a distinct possibility for the 
future of Malawian rural communities, as shown in section 7.4. 
Through their experiences, women ensure survival and create networks of solidarity for 
themselves and their dependents. In the case of nyau, long-standing gender relations 
were redefined in the context of socio-economic changes introduced by colonialism as 
a way of ensuring the survival of mbumba, and actually reinforced some elements of the 
matrilineal lineage (men and chiefs’ authority). Likewise, women in Kasache adopted and 
reconfigured some elements of participatory development (e.g. consultation, women’s 
inclusion) around locally rooted structures, such as matrilineal solidarity, creating new 
forms of participation as well as transformative practices of climate change adaptation. 
Most importantly, from a critical feminist perspective, self-help groups speak to different 
practices about women’s societal roles. In Kasache, women support participatory 
development (see Loveness’s case) and gender mainstreaming while, at the same time, 
relying on practices grounded in indigenous structures (matrilineal). Self-help groups 
build on the familial, private and caring matrilineal connections to respond to ‘public’ 
and collective concerns about access to technology. They fundamentally break down the 
anthropocentric and androcentric dualism that looks at women as mainly reproductive 
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and caring agents. In that sense, self-help groups in Kasache should not be read as 
the outcome of women’s history without (or in isolation from) gendered colonial and 
postcolonial practices, but in spite of them. Embedded cultural traditions and values 
in self-help groups show that women’s history and experiences are not merely (and 
passively) shaped by their encounters with colonialism and neoliberal development – nor 
by the history of Europe – but also by local constitutive factors. Self-helps groups could 
be read as the result of hybrid (Appadurai 1996; Robins 2003) interrelations (also shaped 
by contextual historical events) between women’s groups, donors, NGOs and national 
structures, in which women appear actively engaged in developing contingent solutions. 
Self-help groups have been shaped by encounters and negotiations between local and 
wider processes, at times drawing on colonial and developmentalist categories. Hegemonic 
narratives and relations can be resisted through porous venues and flexible strategies 
in existing power relations. In this sense, not only does women’s experience with self-
help groups enhance female decision-making power in Kasache, but it also highlights 
specific practices, ideas and relations that, although disregarded or removed by colonial 
and developmentalist practices, can contribute to changing women’s role in society.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter explored the continuities and ruptures between present developmentalist 
and past colonial discourses on gender. Most importantly, it offered a critique of 
the a-historical and unidirectional account of gender identity formation typical of 
mainstreaming approaches to gender, climate change and development, pointing to the 
risk of depriving agency of its socio-historical specificity.
The construction of categorisations (e.g. Third World Women) described as inherently 
vulnerable to climate change on the basis of rationalist terms (culture vs. nature, 
masculine vs. feminine) led to taking for granted specific descriptions and solutions to 
vulnerability whose causes need to be unveiled and deconstructed. My analysis drew 
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on the intersectional framework of social structures (Garry 2011), which revealed how 
climate change vulnerabilities in Malawi partially result from collusion and alliances 
between Western and indigenous patriarchies in transforming matrilineal gender 
relations across colonial and postcolonial encounters. Through a series of discursive 
moves (e.g. moral superiority of men-centred families), hegemonic cultural and political 
projects concealed the roots of female disadvantage stemming from historical change. 
Crystallising or naturalising women’s marginal role in societal structures (nowadays 
assumed to be inherently patriarchal and productive-centred), they deprived them of 
the opportunity to question masked forms of subordination. Women in Kasache find 
it difficult to speak about a system that, while permeated with the concept of gender 
equality, is intimately felt as oppressive and discriminatory. At the same time, the 
experience of self-help groups may reveal how, far from annihilating local cultural 
autonomy, colonialism and neoliberal development acted, in certain instances, as a 
catalyst that protected socio-cultural practices that are functional to the survival of 
context-relevant relations and worldviews. 
However, by drawing on mutually reinforcing positivist dualisms, the climate-resilient 
development paradigm risks hindering the understanding of the complexity of climate 
change vulnerability and adaptation policy outcomes. Furthermore, it risks essentialising 
gender identities and relations, generating institutions and processes that reproduce and 
exacerbate unequal structures of power. Climate change narratives and praxis based on 
formal equality and expressed through the idea of gender mainstreaming may preclude 
the identification and criticism of substantive inequality. Key to this chapter are the 
reflections on how epistemological conflicts (e.g. around the definition of climate 
gender vulnerability) actually involve ontological struggles over the fundamental role 
assigned to women in Western-inspired men-women relations (Plumwood 1991; Blaser 
2014; Popke 2015; Goldman et al. 2016). Through my critical feminist and ontological 
reading, gender and climate change mainstreaming policies and programmes in Malawi 
are revealed to be inadequate to address local concerns (adaptation to climate change, 
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inclusion, participation). They tend indeed to reinstate the positivist ontological 
assumption that there is only one reality (rationalist, male-centred) to be described, 
understood and supported, thus erasing or domesticating situated knowledges or 
practices, such as those grounded on caring and familial relations. In the case of Malawi, 
climate-resilient development projects seem to be lacking or neglecting the conceptual 
categories that allow recognising or supporting knowledges and practices that are 
relevant to specific contexts (e.g. ganyu or self-help groups). As emerged from my 
empirical chapters, the inclusion and consideration of alternative epistemologies and 
ontologies of climate change may reveal the fundamental connections between climate-
resilient development paradigms, dominant rationalities (anthropocentric, ethnocentric, 
androcentric), and unbalanced international or local  relations of power. 
Women’s voices in Kasache are not only valuable because they offer alternative strategies 
for adapting to climate change. Beyond the individual stories, they account for the 
processes by which women’s marginality is produced, concealed, recast, questioned. 
This chapter ultimately argues that an intersectional and ontological approach to gender 
and climate change may provide helpful insights for ‘decolonising’ climate-resilient 
development tropes (Plumwood 1993; Lugones 2010; Mohanty 2013), as further 
explored in the next and final part of this work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Climate change in Malawi: the making of a hybrid 
In this chapter, I will present my conclusions on the way processes of climate change 
policy and knowledge production engage with grounded practices and worldviews in 
the context of Malawi. In the following sections, my final observations will cross-
refer to my initial research questions to explore the emerging features of a multi-sited 
climate change epistemology (Table 10).
The analysis of the multi-scale relationships between climate change knowledge and 
policy unveiled a multiplicity of ways in which the co-production of knowledge on 
climate change articulates between and within spatial (international, national, local), 
historical (colonialism, neo-liberalism) and epistemological (élite/subaltern, expert/
non-expert, gender) localities. My research highlights how various sets of actors 
(international development organisations, policymakers, NGOs, farmers) differently 
perceive, recognise and in turn experience and practice climate change. Climate change 
representations come into existence simultaneously, reinforcing and/or contrasting 
each other within and between communities, and across geographical and temporal 
scales. The case of Malawi shows how encounters between experiential, sensorial 
and embodied knowledges of climate change on one hand, and globally produced 
representations on the other, generate new ontologies, opening up alternative and 
additional meanings, worldviews and practices. 
My analysis shows that three key features characterise the hybrid climate change 
epistemology in Malawi:
1. It is a mobile, culturally and politically embedded construct that shows ruptures 
and continuities with colonial and postcolonial representations of weather, 
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climate and societal development;
2. It is situated and grounded on context-specific practices connected to relational 
and/or positivist  ontologies;
3. It is power-laden, shaping identities and agencies through its interplay with 
contextual structures of power (capabilities, roles, networks).
My findings particularly highlight interactions and overlapping traits between 
the epistemological and ontological spheres across the three observed features. 
Furthermore, the analysis of a multi-sited and hybrid climate change epistemology 
points to an alternative way of framing climate change adaptation, which may potentially 
overcome the ‘all-encompassing’ (Blaser 2014) climate change epistemology and 
provide a space for alternative knowledges, practices and solutions to emerge. 
8.1.1 Climate change as a travelling cultural construct
My first research question concerned the ways in which global climate change 
epistemologies acquire legitimacy and authority in Malawi’s public policy domain. My 
consultations with national climate change decision makers in Lilongwe highlighted how 
climate change is mainly understood as an issue pertaining to the natural science and 
techno-managerial domains. 
Table 10 – Research questions
Research questions
1. How does knowledge and policy production on climate change in Malawi interact with dominant 
discourses emanating from international scientific and policy frameworks for climate-resilient 
development?
2. How do interventions inspired by the climate-resilient development paradigm relate to 
temporally situated (colonial and postcolonial) and cultural framings on weather and climate in 
Kasache?
3. How are individual and collective vulnerability, adaptation and agency in Kasache enabled, 
limited or otherwise affected by international policy discourses on gender and community 
empowerment?
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From their perspectives, climate policy decisions should be based on ‘certified’ (by 
international scientific and policy bodies) scientific knowledge. Because of the perceived 
analytical purity (Eriksen et al. 2015) of climate science, the knowledge produced by 
global scientific institutions is highly regarded by national decision makers. 
STS and PCSTS critiques of universal scientific paradigms and structural power marks 
in knowledge constructs were particularly useful for outlining several interesting 
insights. First, the decision makers’ bias towards quantitative and abstract techniques 
and expertise is likely to be rooted in the positivist epistemological belief that natural 
science is a superior source of knowledge to socio-cultural accounts. My analysis 
highlighted the influence of the positivist conceptualisation of climate change on policy 
actors’ perceptions of knowledge usability in policymaking. According to most, an 
evidence-based response to climate change needs to be translated into measurable and 
quantifiable policy targets and requires expert (technical or managerial) competences.
Second, interviews confirmed that the international donor community played a key 
role in influencing the perception of what is usable climate change knowledge for 
policymaking. The conceptual shift from a ‘climate-first’ to a ‘development-first’ 
approach, aimed at addressing the societal inequalities deriving from climate change, 
did not question the dualistic foundational view defining the international scientific 
and policy regime on climate change. Financial support, provided by multilateral and 
bilateral development agencies and mainly directed at central government departments 
in Malawi, influenced the formulation and implementation of national policies and 
programmes in Kasache. On the basis of the ‘climate rationale’, access to public 
investments has been increasingly linked to the use of the best available scientific 
data, ‘certified’ by global bodies of scientific knowledge (e.g. the IPCC). Malawi’s 
NAPA, for example, is grounded in an abstract and universalistic concept of risk and in 
single-sector and techno-managerial approaches, neglecting the possible contribution 
of grounded knowledges and experiences (Chapter 5).
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The construction of climate change meanings and practices emerged as transversally 
connected across multiple spatial scales: from international policy and scientific 
organisations to national decision makers, from non-state actors to climate-exposed 
communities. However, universalising and reductionist conceptualisations of climate 
change led centralised policy-planning practices to guide multi-level policy interaction. 
In Malawi, climate-resilient development policies have been translated at the local 
level by state or non-state actors who have not necessarily enquired into the spatial 
relations of power governing climate change knowledge-making. 
Third, policymakers expressed an interest in the ‘non-certified’ elements of climate 
change knowledge (e.g. cultural and geographical specificity), showing a strong desire 
for a greater integration between policy and science and, at the same time, expressing 
their agency. Decision makers in Malawi shared alternative views about the usability 
of climate science (grounding it in local cultural practices) and, at the same time, 
deployed mainstreaming narratives (evidence-based policy) to mobilise international 
financial support for NAPA implementation. Since knowledge is conceived of as 
usable and applicable when it is deeply linked to contextual factors such as local 
experience and social and cultural values, the recognition of different and situated 
understandings of climate ‘knowledge’ may challenge the standard hegemonic 
definition of knowledge. Practices that have proven effective for certain people in 
specific contexts but were historically neglected by colonial and neoliberal naturalist 
epistemologies may be recovered. This could point to a more or less conscious desire 
to legitimise the ‘excluded’ epistemologies and their qualities.
My analysis shows how weather and climate representations travel not only synchronically 
across geopolitical spatial scales (international/national/local), but also diachronically 
across time. Current understandings of climate change were shaped in the lineage and 
continuity of power processes across history. They originated in colonial ideologies 
and still permeate contemporary climate change narratives and practices in Malawi. 
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Contemporary climate reductionism, for instance, retains the ‘explicative power’ of 
positivist climate determinism, assigning primacy to predictive techniques for ensuring 
objectivity and disinterestedness in policymaking (Hulme 2011). Similarly, the recent 
emphasis on the ‘climate rationale’ in the international development community upholds 
the possibility of managing climate-resilient development on the basis of unbiased and 
rationalist scientific assumptions, while actually grounding it in partial and situated 
knowledge systems (positivism, rationalism).
As evidenced by my case study, these epistemological premises have far-reaching 
epistemological and ontological consequences in Malawi. The different ways in which 
climate change is approached reflect different underlying views of the relationships 
between and within human societies and ecosystems that are seldom questioned. My 
research, as further detailed below, revealed the interplay between different – spatially 
and temporally located – perceptions and knowledges (epistemologies) and the 
multiple ways (ontologies) in which climate change is experienced by people, shaping 
opportunities for context-relevant policymaking. This interaction may explain why 
the inclusion of women’s views in community-based adaptation is not sufficient to 
increase women’s capacity to adapt to climate change and variability in Kasache, as 
power imbalances in household decision-making (ontologies) influence the outcome 
of adaptation initiatives in the community.
The emphasis on climate science influences the nature of knowledge and expertise 
flowing into policy actions at the national and subnational levels. The positivist 
nature-culture binary and interrelated dualisms (masculine-feminine) have been 
systematically integrated into the main national policy documents, such as the NAPA, 
and translated to the community of Kasache through homogenising perspectives on 
community and gender vulnerability. The gender and climate change interventions I 
analysed explain human exposure and response to climate perturbations through single 
variables (e.g. gender, space, economic status) and along binary (men vs. women) axes 
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of identity. On the assumption that female-headed households are less resilient to 
climate change, women are provided with improved access to material means (e.g. 
technology, finance, trainings, etc.). Yet, by neglecting the importance of situating 
unequal household relations within broader historical frameworks and interconnected 
forms of oppression (Eriksen et al. 2015), these interventions hardly have an effect on 
gendered conditions of vulnerability. Most likely, they end up serving only part of the 
households or communities, such as male farmers or women in élite positions.
Furthermore, the construction of climate change as a technological-scientific problem 
led to a specific typology of aid to Malawi, based on technology and capacity transfers, 
as attested by NAPA pilot projects. National decision makers often emphasised the 
lack of climate data, information or capacities to explain the country’s difficulty 
in negotiating in international climate change policy processes, its perpetual lack 
of capacities, and the need for donor-driven support. By benchmarking Malawi’s 
scientific, technical and policy capacities against positivist standards of science and 
technology, these perceptions echo the idea of a North-South knowledge divide, which 
assumes that science and technology can be seamlessly transferred from a Northern to a 
Southern context (Escobar 1995; Everett 1997). In other words, policy actors in Malawi 
project themselves as those in need, as a result of which specific conceptualisations 
of capacity or knowledge gaps are taken for granted. Nonetheless, national policy 
actors also identified potential ways of expanding Western-led knowledge production, 
for example by advocating the creation of South-South Cooperation groups within 
the IPCC (in section 8.2, I will further elaborate on the opportunities for agency 
expressed by national decision makers).
The global epistemology of climate change emerges from my research as culturally 
and politically rooted, as well as spatially and historically mobile. National decision 
makers’ perspectives accounted for variations and/or dissent within the rationalist 
climate change epistemology, yet they highlighted the existence of alternative 
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worldviews of climate change that are deeply embedded into cultural, historical and 
socio-economic systems, as further discussed in the next section.
8.1.2 Kusintha kwa nyengo through situated knowledges
The findings I have discussed so far highlight the difficulty in separating the idea 
of climate change as observed and known through different historical and spatial 
perspectives (e.g. colonialism/developmentalism/national/local) from the way climate 
change is experienced, lived and enacted (Goldman et al. 2016). My experience in 
Kasache provided examples of alternative framings and response actions engendered 
by climate change knowledge in particular geographical and historical contexts.
At the community level, several individuals started their interview expressing 
uncertainty about how to define and identify a change in climate. From an FSTS 
perspective that tackles conceptual problems as ontological issues, these interviews 
show that the understanding of climate change proceeds through personal, physical 
and spiritual experience rather than through abstract and quantitative features only, 
as framed by national policymakers (section 8.1.1). Climate change seems to be 
experienced mainly through the senses, where perceptual activity emerges in the 
continuous relation of the whole being (body and mind) with its environment (Feld 
1996; Paterson 2009; Serres 2009). There is a special relationship with the elements of 
the physical environment (the wind is a sort of good ‘adviser’), and a feeling of care 
between nature and the individual (as evidenced by the rainmaking rituals) could point 
to an ethical responsibility towards nature, which differs from the anthropocentric ideal 
of human (masculine) mastering of nature (Plumwood 1991). According to a recurring 
discursive pattern in interviews, God and the Spirits share joint responsibility – along 
with human action (e.g. through deforestation) – for climate change. 
The statements I collected in Kasache are quite striking compared to the conversations 
on climate change I had with national decision makers (section 8.1.1). Most of the 
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government officers I interviewed framed climate change as an expert-led technical 
issue, emphasising that national planning processes are generally guided by international 
scientific standards, with limited consideration of local knowledges. Malawi’s national 
policy actors displayed faith in the ‘climate rationale’ criteria for public finance 
investments and policy promoted by the international development community. In their 
views, local knowledges exist as plural perspectives on a singular reality of climate 
change – rather than as a historical, contingent and intersecting activity coproduced 
with society. Policymakers’ perceptions are in tension with the relational ontologies 
expressed by several individuals in Kasache. While the former emphasise universality 
and objectivity as necessary characteristics of climate change knowledge, the latter 
refer to the heterogeneity and intersectionality of the components coproducing situated 
knowledges (beliefs, experiences, kin networks).
Another key trait of climate change knowledge emerging from my work is the 
epistemological pluralism generated by the interaction between spatial and historical 
scales (Goldman et al. 2016; Popke 2016). In my research experience, climate change 
evoked a multiplicity of meanings expressed by interviewees in apparently distinct but 
profoundly (historically and/or spatially) related discourses. For instance, the persistence 
of spiritual beliefs in current community narratives points to the circulation of colonial 
power within locally based knowledges and world visions under missionaries’ control. 
Furthermore, it shows the deep spirituality characterising Malawian local communities, 
who deploy spiritual discourses (about witchcraft, rainmaking, secret rituals) embedded 
in the local cultural heritage to configure and withstand socio-political change and 
relationships (Englund 1996; Ranger 1996; Englund 2007; van Binsbergen 2011). I 
argued that the concept of human-induced climate change in Kasache echoes the link 
between deforestation, land degradation and climate change (and the fundamental 
anthropocentric idea of human rational control over natural resources) disseminated 
during colonial rule, which has remained unchanged in the developmentalist paradigm.
Not only did these representations spread from ‘the West’ to the local through 
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global narratives, but to a degree they are also independently produced at each scale. 
Farmers’ narratives in Kasache not only reflect ideas put forward by international 
development and non-state organisations but are also symptomatic of positivist 
ideologies that travelled from the colonial past to the present day, blending into 
contextual epistemologies and ontologies.
Contemporary ‘progressive’ climate and development practices – labelled as ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ or ‘community-based adaptation’ – recognise a plurality of ways of 
perceiving and understanding climate change, which assume that inclusive and democratic 
decisional processes can be achieved by integrating the various perspectives (Blaser 2014).
However, epistemological pluralism does not account for the many ways of being (not only 
knowing or perceiving) in the world (Ingold 2010; Goldman et al. 2016; Popke 2016). As 
illustrated by this case study, individuals intimately relate to climate change in different 
ways and hence act differently. In Kasache, this was evidenced by examples of deep 
relational interactions with the natural environment (e.g. the wind ‘telling’ individuals 
when to plant), which may foster either mutual caring or ‘passive’ attitudes (e.g. being 
a part of “God’s will and plan”, climate change does not require individual action). Or 
by more instrumental and rational relations emerging from individuals’ willingness to 
govern nature and address human-induced climate change (tree planting or farming 
technologies). Furthermore, I showed how adaptation to climate change in Malawi 
has historically come into being in different forms, from labour division to societal 
re-organisation (e.g. men’s outward migration, women’s household responsibilities, 
informal job relations), in response to cultural, political and economic changes.
On the basis of these findings, my work offers a critique of the mainstreaming 
climate-resilient development paradigm and initiatives introduced by multilateral, 
bilateral and non-governmental development organisations in Malawi. My argument 
is that a focus on the plurality of knowledges does not question the fundamental 
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ontological apparatus (e.g. hegemonic relations of power) underlying the multiple 
perspectives and responses to climate change. For example, the concept of women’s 
inherent vulnerability to climate change, introduced in Kasache by international 
organisations through standardised practices of community and gender participatory 
development, is potentially hampering their adaptation to climate change and 
variability. These interventions seem to exacerbate gender unbalances that are 
deeply rooted in patriarchal, anthropocentric, mechanistic cultures. Cases in point 
are women’s reliance on male access to technology and dependence on subsistence 
farming, which substantiate women’s vulnerability and adaptive capacity to climate 
change in Kasache. Alternative and possibly relevant measures, such as ganyu, women 
self-help groups or options that leverage the relational connection with the natural 
environment (e.g. nyau), are hardly acknowledged by mainstreaming approaches.
From this perspective, many of the conflicting perceptions on climate change I 
encountered in Kasache may be ascribed to the way the international policy regime 
defines this issue. Or to the way climate change is embedded and experienced locally, 
on the basis of intimate, personal and life-based experiences as well as historically 
stratified meanings and power relations. The climate rationale concept, for instance, 
by solely relying on greater integration between disciplines (planners, scientists, 
communities), risks overlooking the spatial relationships of power embedded in 
colonial and postcolonial history that make developing countries ‘deficient’ in ‘rational’ 
knowledge standards. Most importantly, it does not recognise that knowing and acting 
are essentially blended into the historical and political power processes from which they 
originated, as further discussed in the next section.
8.1.3 Vulnerabilities and power asymmetries in Kasache
My fieldwork in Kasache revealed another key feature of multi-sited climate change 
epistemology: its embodiment in power processes and ability to shape subjective 
agency and aspirations. The impacts of specific categorisations embedded in 
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political and cultural projects (e.g. international development projects) can be at once 
marginalising or empowering. 
As regards the first set of impacts, in Malawi these emerged from the interviews 
I conducted with national decision makers and farmers. While the former perceive 
Western expertise, through the work of the IPCC, as best positioned to ensure policy 
legitimisation (see section 8.1.1), the latter seem to view technology-based measures 
as necessary for climate change adaptation. Farmers in Kasache, for example, openly 
valued technical and managerial support from external organisations. This perception, 
however, fuels notions of passivity since it increases dependency in specific relations 
of power (e.g. international aid or expert-advice dependency).
These narratives confirm the pervasiveness of positivist rationality in Malawi. First, 
colonialism succeeded in introducing the nature-culture dualism by appropriating 
local belief systems on weather and climate. Then, the developmentalist paradigm 
deployed under Banda’s regime increased dependency on specific crops on the basis 
of technological-managerial prescriptions, making technical assistance and technology 
transfers vital to a successful resolution of productivity issues. At the same time, it 
ensured compliance with the international and national development apparatuses. 
In both cases, the alternative worldviews (relational) and practices (e.g. informal 
kin networks) characterising the context of Malawi were excluded by the dominant 
paradigms of science, knowledge and technology. In other words, climate change 
reductionist narratives do not simply generate labels (‘climate vulnerable’), but they also 
influence the way individuals and groups perceive and project themselves. Therefore, 
both the decision makers and the farmers demand support, identifying themselves as 
those in need. Similarly, the women I interviewed in Kasache, despite being aware of 
their different vulnerability, tend to portray themselves as a uniform group that suffers 
because of its marginal position compared to men. Like farmers and decision makers, 
they are also longing to take part in international development initiatives.
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This finding is crucial. Hegemonic cultural/economic epistemologies risk reinforcing 
identities and categorisations that prevent both contestation and the production or 
recognition of empowering and non-hegemonic solutions. 
Women’s self-help groups (SHG) in Kasache are a revealing case in point. These 
groups were formed as the answer to women’s unmet need for useful information 
and tools to diversify livelihoods in a changing climate. SHG have evolved from 
informal networks, and seemingly build on the historical matrilineal solidarity that 
played a crucial role in safeguarding household food security during climate shocks. 
In Kasache, they represent a creative and alternative way of responding to those 
development interventions that replicate anthropocentric and androcentric dualisms 
(women as mainly reproductive and caring agents) that relegate women to the private 
sphere and hinder their access to agricultural extension services.
FSTS argues that individual and collective agency – mainly expressed in the daily 
habits, routines, and skills through which individuals shape their important choices – 
can emerge from situations of conflict and contradiction that allow new possibilities 
for action to become visible. From this perspective, the women in Kasache, whose 
material needs, social circumstances and agency were silenced by dominant decision 
models and interventions (e.g. LCPC), developed alternative consultative and 
supportive methods that may eventually counter colonial and patriarchal structures. 
Self-help groups can be read as a way of challenging traditional notions of identity 
based on the clear-cut separation between masculine and feminine spheres. Since they 
build on intimate, special and familial matrilineal connections to address the ‘public’ 
and collective problem of accessing farming services, SHG situate women’s identity 
and roles in the realm between private and public. More broadly, they challenge the 
North/South and tradition/modernity dualisms. By incorporating values and ideas 
from local cultural traditions, self-help groups show that women’s experiences are not 
exclusively and passively shaped by the knowledge- and world-making apparatuses 
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of international policy processes (e.g. UNFCCC, IPCC), but also by local constitutive 
factors.
In short, essentialising knowledges can produce empowering outcomes originating 
from the multiplicity, conflicts and messiness that these epistemologies generate in 
their encounters with grounded (past and present) worldviews and experiences. As 
such, many of the analytical concepts informing the climate-resilient development 
paradigm should be rethought from a multi-sited (spatial and temporal) ontological 
perspective. This would allow tracing the legacy of culturally dominant projects in 
current narratives and practices, as well as digging into daily habits and routines that, 
through the identification of ambiguities and divergences, allow creating spaces for 
agency.
To sum up, climate change emerged in my work as a hybrid construct of biophysical 
and socio-cultural practices, variable spatialities and multiple temporalities, at once 
binding and empowering. The same meanings and categories can generate either 
compliance or resistance, depending on the hierarchical positions and narrative power 
of the single subjects. The case of Malawi offers plenty of supporting statements 
for inherently oppressive power systems (e.g. North-South knowledge and capacity 
transfer). As these have been merging and blending with local worldviews and 
practices, it is now very hard for individuals to detect them and detach. In effect, 
an ontological separation is hardly achievable. After centuries of dynamic and 
transformative interactions, a radical distinction would reassert the rationalist dualism 
that sees traditional societies as isolated, static and backward and opposed to the 
Western world (Blaser 2014).
The next question, then, is: how can individual and collective agency be fostered in 
a fuzzy and porous situation in which no ‘authentic’ local knowledges on climate 
change exist?
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8.2 Decolonising climate change knowledge: 
reflections from the case of Malawi
My framing of climate change knowledge as a hybrid construct aligns with many 
critical geography reviews that have recently explored and documented the nature of 
climate change as a hybrid entity, where ‘hybrid’ is interpreted as a feature that holds 
together and merges different ways of knowing and being (Carr and Owusu-Daaku 
2016; Goldman et al. 2016; Nightingale 2016; Popke 2016; Hulme 2017). However, 
little attention has been paid in these studies to the emancipating power of the concept 
of hybridity. Given my strong focus on PCSTS and FSTS, the use of the term hybridity 
(Bhabha 1994) indicates the repositioning and empowering of alternative knowledges 
and experiences in the dominant discourse of climate change. 
Because of the way climate change knowledge is enacted in the context of 
development – a space that embraces colonial and Western-influenced conditions 
of identity formation – the idea of a hybrid climate change epistemology can 
help destabilise the foundations of well-consolidated stereotypes (e.g. vulnerable 
developing countries or women). 
My work outlines how a hybrid climate change epistemology creates new ontologies 
and practices where the space for negotiation of identities and categories is provided 
by the everyday experiences of climate change at different policy scales. To argue 
my point, I will refer to the case of women in Kasache. Some of the women I 
interviewed believe they have been excluded from internationally legitimised 
decision-making platforms. At the same time, women’s exclusion from the main 
decision platforms emerged as a key factor for the reconfiguration of imported 
elements of participatory development (e.g. community-based) around context-
relevant structures, such as matrilineal solidarity. Women’s marginal condition 
allowed self-help groups to emerge. In the imitation of or aspiration to external 
knowledge and praxis, women in Kasache showed agency, creating something new 
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and irreducible to hegemonic models. They managed to counter the marginalising 
effects of mainstreaming climate-resilient development by altering the meanings of 
stereotyped categorisations and practices.
The framing conditions of individual agency, which determine more or less liberating 
results, certainly depend upon historically and context-specific power structures 
and the position of individuals with respect to those power relations. For example, 
women’s inclusion in climate-related decision processes in Kasache is limited by 
how gender participation is internationally framed (formal) and locally translated 
(shaped by transformation of household roles during British colonialism).
However, it is in the erasure and transgression of established roles (e.g. dancers 
or drama performers in knowledge platforms) and structures (e.g. LCPC) that 
women manage to establish new and empowering relations. As a result of the 
contradictions experienced by women in Kasache, other options materialised that 
transcended commonly accepted and dichotomous choices (e.g. women are either 
included yet ‘invisible’ in the LCPC or excluded and vulnerable at home) that do 
not substantially improve women’s situation. Self-help groups in Kasache allowed 
alternative worldviews and perspectives about societal women’s roles to emerge, 
suggesting different and more effective ways of articulating needs and designing 
policy solutions.
In this sense, the mismatches and tensions between spatial, historical, temporal and 
epistemological scales I experienced in my journey (women’s mixed feeling about 
gender mainstreaming or the decision makers’ desire for integration/independence 
from positivist climate science), can be related to more profound political and 
ontological disconnections. By not considering the various ways knowledges 
interact and interfere, mainstreaming climate change policy practices can only be 
moderately adequate to speak for different ontologies and design fully inclusive 
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and transformative solutions. The value of hybrid solutions such as women’s self-
help groups resides exactly in providing a space for negotiating and revisiting fixed 
identities and roles.
Because of its hybrid outcomes, multi-sited climate change epistemologies can allow 
contradictions and hidden assumptions in the understanding of climate change to 
emerge and be questioned. Acknowledging the hybrid, contested and political nature of 
climate change can help recast the focus of climate change adaptation knowledge and 
praxis from exclusive policy-planning support to a socially empowering element.
In that sense, climate change knowledge should undergo a systematic ‘decolonising’ 
reading to unveil the climate change-related experiences of individuals against the world 
systems of power (colonialism, neo-liberalism, patriarchy) (Lugones 2010). This process 
should be especially undertaken by scientific and policy organisations (international to 
national) working in the development context of climate change, which, as in the case 
of Malawi, played a major role in translating reductionist epistemologies to national and 
local scales. The process of decolonising climate change will pose some theoretical and 
practical challenges, which I will discuss in the following and final sections.
8.2.1 Detecting conflict, transforming adaptation
In order to be identified and explored, climate change multi-sited epistemologies and 
ontologies required a novel form of inquiry that mixed a series of theoretical and 
methodological approaches. While there is a growing body of literature (Crate 2011; 
Eriksen et al. 2015; Popke 2016) demanding a cross-scale, multi-stakeholder and 
interdisciplinary approach to climate change, the specific methods and praxis remain 
so far largely unexplored. Hence the value of my experimental methodology, which, 
by combining several conceptual resources (social constructivism, power-agency, 
multi-sited ethnography, etc.), appears to be suitable for exploring different empirical 
complexities without erasing tensions and contradictions. 
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One of the key theoretical challenges in my research was related to identifying the 
narrative and material ‘places’ in which power and agency operate in relation to 
climate change. 
In Malawi, where climate change emerges as closely entrenched, signified and enacted 
through development practices, and therefore dependent on Western situated rationalities 
(section 8.1.1), it was particularly hard to detect a space for national decision makers’ or 
communities’ agency. In their statements, decision makers and men and women farmers 
expressed the desire to take part in and benefit from global scientific, technological, 
economic and socio-political advancements. From a postcolonial perspective, their 
position might have appeared as ‘subjugated’ (Foucault 1972; 1982) and reliant on 
external categories, worldviews and self-perceptions. Most of the contacts I had during 
this research process showed that some forms of (epistemological and practical) resistance 
through hybridity are only happening within the working frames of postcolonial and 
neoliberal relations. So, how to deploy the concept of hybrid, multi-sited climate change 
in an inclusive and transformative manner? 
8.2.2 The policy implications of my research
My entire research was intentionally and extensively connected to my professional field, 
making the ‘after’ stage of my fieldwork not a one-period experience but a continuous 
unwinding between professional and academic life. My position sometimes allows me 
to influence thinking processes through the analytical contribution I am requested to 
provide. A fundamental way of making the most of my research observations is to act as 
a catalyst introducing change and new perspectives.
For instance, I have been working on several publications on behalf of my former employer, 
the Geneva-based UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), focusing on 
issues of skills development, policy planning and international negotiation for adaptation 
planning. In this process, I have introduced some of the key concepts explored during my 
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research. In Chapter 4, I highlighted how the concept of climate-resilient development 
encouraged the institutionalisation of rationalist planning, budgeting, implementation 
and monitoring techniques in LDCs, which pin countries and individuals to specific 
skills and policy results. Being aware of that, I contributed to a recent publication, “Skills 
Assessment for National Adaptation Planning: How Countries Can Identify the Gap” 
(UNITAR, UNDP and GEF 2015), urging the application of the Socio-Cultural Action 
Analysis (SOCAA) approach (Renshaw et al. 2001). This is an integrated method based 
on ethnographic and qualitative research techniques that helps analyse the socio-cultural, 
political and economic contexts defining climate change adaptation activities. The 
adoption of SOCAA was not without resistance from members of the UN contributing 
team, since it was perceived to be too cumbersome, complex, and most likely not suitable 
for producing the quick, linear and visible results most appealing to donors.
Thanks to my research experience, I developed skills that increasingly enable me to 
question the status quo and introduce elements of change into the managerial practices 
designed to ensure aid effectiveness. With respect to my professional activity, this means 
providing critical inputs during the development of knowledge products (reports) and 
initiatives (training) that are especially designed to build climate change-related capacities 
in specific regions of the world. The opportunity to translate research insights into my 
day-to-day professional life is the main transformative impact this research can contribute 
to, and it represents a way of making my work relevant to those who assisted me.
My research also pointed to how knowledge constructions, in the attempt to adapt to the 
exercise of power, produce enacting effects. For example, in the case of Malawi, national 
decision makers deployed specific aspects of climate narratives (developmentalist view) 
to achieve relevant policy objectives (mobilising and accessing climate finance). In this 
case, dominant epistemologies were instrumentally used to alter externally imposed 
identities and build alternative responses. Thus, decision makers could bring national 
and local views and narratives to move ‘upwards’, speak and stand out in the national and 
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international planning arenas where a certain idea of climate change is still dominant. 
One possible way of influencing this process would be to share and discuss the results 
with the group of decision makers I consulted, analysing together different approaches 
to climate change and development, understanding the assumptions upon which the 
UNFCCC operates and how they can most effectively affect international processes 
through the COPs. Arguably, it will be crucial in the near future that national decision 
makers deploy the climate rationale concept – or any criteria that ‘scientifically’ ground 
policies and projects – at its full extent (WMO-GCF, forthcoming). It is not only the 
physical elements of climate change that need to be identified, but also the chain linking 
the biophysical and societal causes of climate vulnerability to the impacts of policy action.
Below, I provide further recommendations aimed at supporting policymakers or climate 
change technical specialists (from the scientific or international development domains) 
faced with the task of designing and implementing public policy interventions or 
activities related to or affecting adaptation processes. By not considering climate change 
as a hybrid socio-political process, this target audience risks propagating hegemonic 
epistemologies (e.g. Western-oriented, expert-based), supporting or undermining 
specific identities and agencies.
8.2.3 A new knowledge space: from pluralising epistemologies 
to hybrid ontologies
My work highlighted how certain adaptation interventions may reinforce the authority 
of multi-sited élites (e.g. local chiefs at the village level, or IPCC experts internationally), 
exacerbating marginalisation and exclusion (women and elders in LCPC or developing 
countries in international negotiations fora) as well as delegitimisation of context-
relevant knowledges. 
Increasing participation of marginal groups (from countries to individuals) in formal and 
externally-designed mechanisms – which has not yet reached its full potential, as shown 
by the case of Kasache – is a possible solution to this challenge, but not the only one. 
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Participation in formal institutions, in fact, bypasses entrenched inequalities rather than 
challenging them, as it builds on asserted and essentialised conceptualisations. Both at 
the international level through North-South or South-South cooperation mechanisms 
and at the local level via community-based platforms, these participatory systems tend to 
neglect alternative knowledge systems and responses. Epistemological and ontological 
freedom will be achieved not by having marginalised women and elders in Kasache 
become ‘agents’ (as recommended by gender mainstreaming or community-centred 
approaches), but by deconstructing and unpacking the causality of their marginalisation 
through reflections on the politics of knowledge and being.
According to my analysis, climate change knowledge should be regarded as having 
‘hybrid’ characteristics originating from the intersection with various spatial and 
temporal layers of meanings and experiences – and as a locus where conditions of 
cultural hegemony can be detected and destabilised by diverse actors. 
From the perspective of national policymakers, designing adequate and transformative 
responses to climate change is not about filling knowledge gaps or integrating knowledges, 
but rather about questioning the hierarchy that establishes which knowledge (or which 
quality in a specific epistemology) is predominant (Hulme 2017). Since no single 
and exclusive actor or consultative process can really establish a unique and ‘right’ 
adaptation trajectory on a fair basis, the solution would be to reflect on procedural 
and methodological issues and ask questions such as: what to do when multi-sited 
epistemologies and ontologies clash? Most importantly, establishing which knowledge 
matters should be linked to reflections about what kind of power (and group) is going 
to be reinforced and privileged by that knowledge (Ingold 2010; Hulme 2017). The 
methodological (rather than theoretical) focus on ‘asking the other question’ is crucial 
to overcoming these tensions (Kajiser and Kronsell 2014; Popke 2016; Hulme 2017). 
In the case of Malawi, the other question could be, for example, what has been missed 
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by having alternative ontologies removed or forcibly fit (through climate-resilient 
development projects) into the global climate change discourse. Some aspects of the 
relational ontology emerging from the interviews in Kasache, such as the caring qualities 
associated with nature (which is not considered to be in an inferior position to humanity), 
may suggest alternative conceptions of the human-nature relation. Such perspectives 
would challenge ideas of human autonomy and superiority to nature (which justify the 
exploitation of the natural environment as a non-sentient resource) and urge individuals 
to be more sensitive to the functioning of ecological balances, acknowledging human 
dependency on nature (or God, as in the case of Kasache).
While several individual (Burnham et al. 2016; Goldman et al. 2016; Popke 2016) and 
collective research efforts (e.g. the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, MEA 2006) 
have addressed the diverse epistemologies and ontologies in climate decision-making, 
practical policy experiences are rarer. The MEA (2006) noted that the recognition 
of epistemological and ontological pluralisms often requires the creation of new 
mechanisms, such as fora and platforms for negotiation or conflict resolution, trust 
building, and joint action, which can be open to additional stakeholders. 
The identification of conflicting, incongruent or contradictory climate-related 
narratives and experiences may also provide an opportunity for decolonising climate 
change knowledge. Acknowledgement of kusintha kwa nyengo, for example, may help 
to advance alternative and more effective pathways for climate-resilient development 
projects. This could help to rethink the Western dualistic view of the world, opening 
to alternative logics of environmental care and responsibility that are centred less on 
human self-interest and more on the sustaining relationships between humans and 
the Earth (Plumwood 1991).
Alternative experiences – especially those related to adaptation options – could be further 
investigated in relation to mbumba, nyau or ganyu, which so far have not been given 
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much consideration from community-based approaches to climate change. All these 
practices build on the intangible resources, social connections and grounded worldviews 
that have historically mediated individual and collective responses to climate variability 
and change. 
In addition, an ontological turn (Escobar 2010; Blaser 2014) in climate change 
epistemological pluralism may help identify co-emerging and urgent political problems 
(women’s marginalisation, natural resources depletion) to be addressed in the context of 
climate change. Given the interrelation of Western ontological dualisms, challenging the 
centrality of one of them could create opportunities for destabilising the whole rationalist 
apparatus, generating multiple empowering effects. Thus, recognising women’s situated 
and conflicting practices in Kasache may help to assess causality between different and 
(apparently) disconnected forms of oppression. As shown by self-help groups, women’s 
climate vulnerability in Malawi is being addressed through collective social formations 
building on matrilineal cooperation and mutuality. These target not just one but several 
dimensions of female empowerment (political, economic, psychological, etc.), so as to 
generate multiple socio-environmental and political outcomes (adaptation to climate 
variability, access to funding, improved female decision-making, enhanced self-
confidence). Observing such connections may foster the understanding and resolution 
of interconnected crises, which, in the case of Malawi, are grounded in unequal power 
relations and disembodied conceptions of the human-nature relation.
The ultimate contribution of this work lies in its aim to shift the focus from mainstreaming 
practices to the untapped potential of Malawi’s contextual climate change ontologies. 
Policy as well as academic debates should rethink the analytical concepts through which 
the qualities left out from the ‘all-encompassing’ climate change epistemology – the 
‘particular’, the ‘feminine’, the ‘relational’, the ‘private’ – are identified and explored 
(Plumwood 1991). This would help to reframe worldviews and practices erased by 
colonial and developmentalist experiences, as well as crafting policy actions that can 
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better express and materialise the vision of a ‘decolonised’ climate change knowledge. 
As suggested by Blaser (2014), a space could be carved out to listen to and engage in 
alternative kinds of world-making, producing the conditions for adequately responding 
to the Earth’s changing climate through a culture of coexistence and inclusion.
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Annex I - Guiding questions for interviews in Lilongwe
1) Who are the main producers of climate change knowledge in Malawi (e.g. universities, 
government or corporate labs)?
2) Does the local scientific community act as a recipient of knowledge or also as an agent 
of knowledge production?
3) Are linkages between knowledge and policy established through institutional structures?
4) Is climate science responsive to social and political institutions in Malawi?
5) Is there a demand for scientific expertise from political institutions?
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Annex II – Guiding questions for interviews in Kasache 
1) How do you frame the issue of climate change? How do you see the problem?
2) How do you measure it (qualitative vs. quantitative; diachronic vs. synchronic 
observations)?
3) How do you describe climate change adaptation? Have you always tried to adapt to the 
changing climate or is it something ‘new’ and brought from outside (projects, NGOs)?
4) Where do you turn for information on climate change (elders, specialists, NGOs)?
5) How do you relate this information to your everyday life experience and to other forms 
of knowledge/experience (scientific, local)?
6) Do you favour an action/benefit-driven knowledge approach? Do you try to combine 
climate change adaptation and poverty reduction/natural resource management?
7) Who are the repositories of this knowledge? Have information and knowledge always 
been taken into account (DRR assessment i.e.)? 
8) Have you ever been consulted on issues regarding climate change in your community?
9) Which resources do you find most useful for relating information on climate change 
adaptation (metaphors, models, narratives, experts/external sources, radio-listening, 
theatre, dance, maps, scenarios)?
10) What are the expectations in terms of knowledge exchanges between external 
organisations and the community?
11) Is there a preferred form of knowledge for community-based adaptation projects/
initiatives?
12) How are vulnerability assessments produced in your community? (e.g. through sharing 
information, deliberative discussions, reasoning together, mutual learning)
13) Do they allow for knowledge systems pluralism?
14) Is there any cross-scale integration of information (local, regional, global)?
15) Do you think different knowledge systems (local and indigenous knowledge vs. 
scientific/external knowledge) are used together or integrated?
16) What are the challenges and constraints of this integration?
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Annex III – Questionnaire for policymakers
The role of the science-knowledge interplay in influencing the formulation of climate 







o Telephone number: …………………………………………………………………
2. Professional role and affiliation:






 Other (please specify) ........................................................
o What is your professional affiliation? (Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Government
 Research institution/University




 Other (please specify) ..........................................................
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3. Qualifications and knowledge background





 Other (please specify)...........................................................









If Yes, which kind of aspects do you especially deal with? (Please tick/highlight/
underline one or more options)
 Climate change physical science (models, scenarios, data, etc.)
 Climate change adaptation and mitigation analysis/assessments
 Climate change policies/projects/programmes design
 Climate change projects/programmes implementation
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o What is your climate change knowledge mainly focused on? (Please tick/highlight/
underline one or more options)
 Climate science/Meteorology/Climatology
 Adaptation analysis/assessments
 Climate change policy development
 Climate finance and mitigation analysis/assessments
 Disaster risk reduction methodologies/analysis/assessments
 Other (please specify)..............................................................
o How do you rank your knowledge on climate change in relation to the aspects 






4. Climate change knowledge production
o Does Malawi possess local knowledge on climate change? 
 Yes
 No




o How does this local knowledge contribute to the national and international debate on 





o Does the local knowledge of Malawi contribute to your academic/professional 
knowledge? (Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No
 Other (please specify)..................................................














 Other (please specify)..................................................







o How do you rank the link between climate change science and policy in the 
formulation of effective climate change adaptation and mitigation interventions? 
(Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Very relevant
 Relevant
 Neither relevant nor irrelevant
 irrelevant
 Very irrelevant
o Do you think the linkages between climate change science and policy are visible in 
Malawi (through collaboration between academia and policy-makers for example)? 
(Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No 
 Other (please specify)..................................................









o Do you think your academic knowledge and/or professional experience influence your 
perception of climate change? (Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No
 Other (please specify)..................................................
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o Do you think climate change as a new emerging scientific/environmental/development 
issue is in competition with other ideas/facts in gaining scientific and political 
visibility? (Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No
 Other (please specify)..................................................
o If YES, which of the following issues do you consider as being in competition with 
climate change? (Please tick/highlight/underline one or more options)
 Natural resource management
 National budget considerations
 Human development issues (poverty reduction, gender empowerment, 
etc.)
 Disaster risk management
 Other (please specify)..................................................
o Is there any issue that climate change can otherwise reinforce?
 Natural resource management
 National budget considerations
 Human development issues (poverty reduction, gender empowerment, 
etc.)
 Disaster risk management
 Other (please specify)..................................................
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o Is there any aspect of the climate change issue which you do not agree upon? (Please 
tick/highlight/underline one or more options)
 Scientific explanations/conceptual framing/validity of scientific claims
 Political strategies at global/national levels
 Level of alarmism/relevance given at global level
 Other (please specify)..................................................




o Have you ever questioned the legitimacy of the global climate change science? 
(Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No




o Do you think the climate change knowledge produced or assessed by the global North 
(e.g. through IPCC reports) is influencing the climate change knowledge generation 
and policy formulation in Malawi? (Please tick/highlight/underline one option)
 Yes
 No














Annex IV - Photo gallery (2010-2017)
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 - Introductory meetings with the COOPI 
Project Manager in Salima, Group Village Heads, 
Traditional Authorities and Local Civil Protection 
Committee (LCPC) representatives in Msosa and 
Kasache








8 - Consultations with Group Village Heads
9 - Focus Group Discussion with female farmers
10, 11 - Kasache 
12 - Focus Group Discussion with farmers
13 - Lingadzi River Valley














15 - Individual interview with a female farmer
16 - House building in Kasache
17, 18 - Kasache
20 - Individual interview with a female elder
19, 21 - Individual interview with a male farmer
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22 - Focus Group Discussion with male farmers
23 - Individual interview with a female elder
24 - Group of female farmers
25 - Kasache
26 - Focus Group Discussion with female farmers















28 - Individual interviews with a Local Civil Protection 
Committee (LCPC) representative
29 - Bush fires around Kasache
30, 31, 32 - Smallholder farms around Lingadzi River 
banks
33, 34 - Lingadzi River Valley
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35 - Individual interview with Traditional Authority in 
Msosa
36 - Kasache
37 - Focus Group Discussion with elders
38 - Community consultation during a post-flood assess-
ment in Karonga (Malawi 2011)
39 - Stakeholder meeting organised by the Department 
of Disaster Risk Management Affairs (Karonga, Malawi 
2011)










42 - Group-work with Malawi’s policymakers (Dakar 
2010)
43 - National training workshop on National Adaptation 
Plans (NAPs) in Lesotho (Maseru 2015)
44 - National training workshop on National Adaptation 
Plans (NAPs) in Mauritania (Nouakchott 2015)
45 - Country work on National Adaptation Plans in a 
Regional Training Workshop (Abidjan 2017)
46 - Representing UNITAR at the UNFCCC (Bonn 2017)
47 - Working with Malawian decision makers (Addis 
Ababa 2014)
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